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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
On the Aggregation of Subjective Inputs from Multiple Sources
by
Mithun Chakraborty
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science
Washington University in St. Louis, May 2017
Research Advisor: Professor Sanmay Das
When we have a population of individuals or artificially intelligent agents possessing diverse
subjective inputs (e.g. predictions, opinions, etc.) about a common topic, how should we
collect and combine them into a single judgment or estimate? This has long been a fundamen-
tal question across disciplines that concern themselves with forecasting and decision-making,
and has attracted the attention of computer scientists particularly on account of the prolifer-
ation of online platforms for electronic commerce and the harnessing of collective intelligence.
In this dissertation, I study this problem through the lens of computational social science
in three main parts: (1) Incentives in information aggregation: In this segment, I analyze
mechanisms for the elicitation and combination of private information from strategic partici-
pants, particularly crowdsourced forecasting tools called prediction markets. I show that (a)
when a prediction market implemented with a widely used family of algorithms called mar-
ket scoring rules (MSRs) interacts with myopic risk-averse traders, the price process behaves
like an opinion pool, a classical family of belief combination rules, and (b) in an MSR-based
game-theoretic model of prediction markets where participants can influence the predicted
xii
outcome but some of them have a non-zero probability of being non-strategic, the equilib-
rium is one of two types, depending on this probability – either collusive and uninformative
or partially revealing; (2) Aggregation with non-strategic agents: In this part, I am agnostic
to incentive issues, and focus on algorithms that uncover the ground truth from a sequence of
noisy versions. In particular, I present the design and analysis of an approximately Bayesian
algorithm for learning a real-valued target given access only to censored Gaussian signals,
that performs asymptotically almost as well as if we had uncensored signals; (3) Market
making in practice: This component, although tied to the two previous themes, deals more
directly with practical aspects of aggregation mechanisms. Here, I develop an adaptation of
an MSR to a financial market setting called a continuous double auction, and document its
experimental evaluation in a simulated market ecosystem.
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The main text of the Rigveda (Griffith, 1896), an ancient Indian anthology of hymns that is
one of the earliest extant literary creations of humankind, ends with the following prayer:
sama¯n¯ı va a¯ku¯tih. sama¯na¯ hr.daya¯ni vah. |
sama¯namastu vo mano yatha¯ vah. susaha¯sati ||
“One and the same be your resolve, and be your minds of one accord.
United be the thoughts of all that all may happily agree.”
− r.gvedasam. hita¯ 10.191.4,
English translation by Ralph T.H. Griffith.
However, in most spheres of human life, thoughts differ and people do not agree on many
questions of general interest. Voters with different political leanings prefer different electoral
candidates; judges might disagree on the ranking of participants in a competition, and jury
members on whether or not the accused is guilty; economists with diverse views on the
impact of current government policies often come up with significantly different estimates
of the future gross domestic product of a country; even experts in science and technology
might disagree on questions such as “Will a manned flight to Mars occur within the next
decade?” But sometimes, for the purpose of planning, decision-making, policy formulation,
1
and suchlike, it is necessary to obtain a single answer to such a question – an answer that
can be interpreted as the collective response of the group or population under consideration.
This gives rise to the following problem:
When we have a population of individuals1 possessing potentially different sub-
jective inputs about a common topic, such as predictions on uncertain events,
noisy observations of hidden truths, etc., how should we collect and combine
them into a single judgment or estimate?
This problem can take on multiple incarnations, and various classes of methods (vote ag-
gregation, pooling, collective judgment, etc.) have been developed to address them; these
methods have traditionally been studied in academic disciplines such as economics and fi-
nance, sociology, political science, business, management, or operations research, and have
attracted the attention of computer scientists particularly on account of the proliferation
of online platforms for electronic commerce, crowdsourcing, and the harnessing of collective
intelligence (Surowiecki, 2005).
Researchers in machine learning / artificial intelligence have been exploring similar issues
under topics such as committee machines (Tresp, 2001), ensemble learning (Opitz and Maclin,
1999), and learning from expert advice (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 1997); but, in areas that lie
at the intersection of the computational and social sciences, e.g. algorithmic economics,
computational finance, computational social choice etc., this problem takes on additional
nuances: One often has to consider the goals and motivations of the providers of subjective
inputs in addition to their knowledge structures as well as the constraints and objectives of
the entity looking to aggregate these inputs.
Some of the interesting facets of the aggregation problem seen through the lens of computa-
tional social science are listed below:
• For a group with human (or, in general, strategic) members, can we take honesty in
reporting for granted? If no, how should we offer approrpiate incentives and / or
handle the potential for manipulation?
1An individual can refer to one of several human beings, institutions, artificially intelligent agents, etc.
2
• In what form (e.g. probability distributions over the outcome space, point estimates,
monetary bets, etc.) are individual inputs extracted? How much control do we have
over this form? Are the inputs known to be constrained or corrupted (censoring,
additive noise, etc.) by extraneous factors?
• What is the ultimate objective of our aggregation mechanism? This ties into our
criteria for evaluating individual inputs as well as the output of the aggregator (ground
truth revealed after aggregation that serves as an objective standard for assessment,
peer responses etc.).
• Should individual-level elicitation and aggregation be performed as two decoupled suc-
cessive stages, or is it better to interweave them somehow?
Evidently, these aspects interact with each other in complex ways, and looking for a solution
that addresses all of them simultaneously is often not just impracticable but also unnecessary
since not all these issues may be relevant to a single context. In this dissertation, I have
adopted the approach of identifying and analyzing problem domains that enable us to focus
on a subset of these issues at a time while abstracting away from others; however, my
overarching goal is to develop a richer and deeper understanding of methods for subjective
input aggregation, and identify and address challenges encountered in practical applications
of these techniques. Below is a summary of the specific contributions I intend to make with
this dissertation.
1.2 Contributions
Before summarizing the contributions of this dissertation, it is worthwhile to define termi-
nology that will appear repeatedly in the remainder of the document.
We will assume that there exists an entity (a person or an organization) that is interested
in some currently uncertain event, modeled as a random variable whose realized outcome
may or may not be revealed to it in the future. We will call this entity the principal, and
sometimes the learner or the decision maker. The principal knows that there exist agents,
also called experts (or traders in a market context), each possessing a quantifiable subjective
3
input bearing on that event; it does not know the values of these inputs but believes that
if it could extract and aggregate them in some principled way, the result would be the best
possible guess about the outcome.
The three broad themes that I address in the subsequent chapters are as follows:
(1) Incentives in information aggregation. In many situations, the agents might have no
instrinsic motivation to just hand over their subjective inputs to the principal; e.g. an
agent might be a meteorologist expecting compensation for reporting to the principal
the numerical estimate of the global average temperature ten years into the future that
is the product of her education, effort, and expertise. In such cases, it is imperative to
offer agents monetary or money-like incentives2, but there is a catch: If these incentives
are not carefully designed, an agent acting selfishly and rationally might lie to the
principal if she deems lying to be in her best interest.
One real-world approach towards providing such participation and truth-telling in-
centives to agents in the context of aggregating forecasts is to use prediction markets
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Pennock and Sami, 2007; Arrow et al., 2007) – an um-
brella term for a variety of crowdsourced forecasting tools. These online mechanisms
incentivize agents by allowing them to place bets for or against outcomes of the un-
certain event in question, or to buy and sell shares in a specially designed financial
instrument whose final monetary worth is tied to the realization of the event (e.g. the
instrument could be worth $1 per share if a Democrat wins the next US presidential
race, and is worthless otherwise). A publicly displayed property of the prediction mar-
ket – such as the betting odds or the price of the instrument – that is updated as
and when agents interact with the market (or, equivalently, report to the principal)
is interpreted as the principal’s collective forecast. Well-known examples of real-world
prediction markets include the Iowa Electronic Markets3, PredictIt4, Foresight Ex-
change5, Betfair6, and the Hollywood Stock Exchange7.
2A money-like incentive can refer to anything other than compensation in real currency that an agent
values and is willing to accept in exchange for her input, e.g. raffle tickets, reputation score within a
community, etc.
3https://tippie.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/
4https://www.predictit.org/
5http://www.ideosphere.com/
6https://www.betfair.com/
7http://www.hsx.com/
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Given the plethora of empirical evidence that prediction markets are at least as ef-
fective as more traditional means of forecasting such as surveys, polls, expert opinion
elicitation etc. (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Graefe and Armstrong, 2011; Cowgill and
Zitzewitz, 2015), considerable effort has been devoted to figuring out, in a rigorous for-
mal sense, how these mechanisms function as collectors, aggregators, and disseminators
of information / belief, and under what circumstances they could go wrong. These are
the major research questions I address in the first (and largest) part of this dissertation.
To this end, I focus on a popular family of algorithms used to implement automated
prediction markets, called market scoring rules, abbreviated as MSRs: (a) I show that,
under reasonable assumptions about the strategic nature of participating agents, the
market’s output (the price) behaves as an aggregate function belonging to a well-known
family called opinion pools that can be viewed as a generalization of weighted aver-
aging in some respects; (b) I analyze the extent to which the predictive power of the
market is retained when some participating agents do not just have information but
also influence on the forecast event so that the introduction of the prediction market
can generate outcome manipulation incentives, and suggest a remedial modification to
the mechanism.
(2) Aggregation with non-strategic agents. The existence of selfish-rational agents who
might try to manipulate an incentivized mechanism is not the only feature of the ag-
gregation problem that makes it hard; the hardness could arise from more fundamental
issues such as how agents’ inputs are formulated and what kind of queries are feasible.
Suppose that the “hidden truth” that the principal wishes to uncover is a real-valued
quantity, and each agent is known to possess a noisy valuation thereof; if the principal
is only allowed to ask each agent whether or not her valuation lies above or below a
threshold, how should it aggregate the binarized signals thus procured so as to arrive at
a good estimate of the real-valued target efficiently? Does the principal get to choose
its threshold(s) and, if so, how should it do so? These are ideas I explore in the next
part of this dissertation, abstracting away from incentive issues, and focusing on learn-
ing from differentially informed agents under the assumption that each agent reports
a censored noisy version of some ground truth that we are interested in.
5
(3) Markets in practice. This component of my dissertation, although tied to both of the
above strands, deals more directly with practical issues concerning aggregation mech-
anisms deployed “in the wild” where many aspects of agent behavior not accounted
for above come into play. While discussing theme (1), I considered a principal that de-
signs monetary incentives / compensation schemes and an agent who can only choose
what input (not necessarily consistent with her actual private information) to report –
within a market context, this translates to the market administrator dictating the pric-
ing rule, and a trader only specifying an order size (the quantity she would like to buy
or sell). If a trader does not like the current prices offered but does not mind waiting to
see if market conditions become favorable, there should be some way to accommodate
her, otherwise she might not participate, making her information unavailable to the
principal. One way of doing that in real-world financial markets is to allow a trader
to specify not just an order size but also a limit on the prices acceptable to her (the
highest price she is willing to pay if she is a buyer / the lowest she is willing to accept
if she is a seller), and then push such an order into one of two priority queues (for buy
and sell orders). How should we modify the market price-setting rule so as to make
the aggregation mechanism operate with such agents, and how do those modifications
affect the information aggregation characteristics of the system? Moreover, now that
we are in a market setting, it also makes sense to evaluate the system not just in terms
of its informative / predictive power but also market quality properties studied in the
economics and finance literatures (e.g. trading volume, social welfare, etc.). A signifi-
cant methodological difference that this theme has with the first two is that evaluation
of this complex environment is primarily based on simulation studies rather than the
use of analytical tools.
1.3 Organization of the dissertation
Theme (1) spans Chapters 2 and 3 whereas Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to themes (2) and
(3) respectively. A survey of the existing literature relevant to each chapter as well as its
relation to the content is provided in the respective chapter. Below is a gist of each chapter:
I cite published material on which the content is based, and indicate additions, if any.
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Chapter 2. I begin the chapter by describing the design of the prediction market algorithm
called the market scoring rule (Hanson, 2003b) that I touched upon while presenting
theme (1) above. I then show that, assuming the agents participating in such a market
to be risk-averse (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), the instantaneous price which can be viewed
as the “output” of this mechanism is formally equivalent to an opinion pool (Genest
and Zidek, 1986) applied to the private inputs of the agents. After establishing this
result under the most general definition of risk-aversion, I deduce further restrictions
on our risk-averse agent model that make the price behave as one of the more familiar
members of the opinion pool family (specifically a weighted arithmetic mean and a
renormalized weighted geometric mean), and show that we can even interpret the
market mechanism as a Bayesian learner for these models.
This is joint work with Dr. Sanmay Das, and is based mainly on our paper (Chakraborty
and Das, 2015) that was accepted for a spotlight presentation at the 29th Annual Con-
ference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2015). In this dissertation,
I provide detailed proofs of all theorems as well as additional experiments (Chapter 2
Section 2.4.3).
Chapter 3. In this chapter, I delineate a new game-theoretic model of MSR-based pre-
diction markets that Dr. Das and I built to address the following scenario: Market
participants have power to directly affect the forecast event so that the incentives
brought into the picture by the introduction of a prediction market could potentially
induce some of them to distort the outcome that the market was set up to predict but
not alter in any way (e.g. a referee in a game of basketball could have stakes in a pre-
diction market that intends to forecast the winner). I prove that, if some participants
have a non-zero probability of being non-strategic, the game-theoretic equilibrium of
this process is one of two types, depending on this probability − either collusive and
uninformative or partially revealing. Finally, I show how the compensation scheme
can be modified by incorporating ideas from the literature on peer prediction (Miller
et al., 2005) – a way of providing truth-telling incentives to agents based on what
their reports tell us about the reports of their peers (other agents participating in the
aggregation mechanism) when the hidden truth / uncertain event is never revealed to
the principal – to counteract undesirable incentives.
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This contribution is also co-authored with Dr. Das; parts of it have been published
(Chakraborty and Das, 2016) at the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI 2016), and presented at the 4th Workshop on Social Computing
and User Generated Content (SCUGC 2014) held in conjunction with the 15th ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 2014), at the 2nd Collective Intelli-
gence Conference (CI 2014), and also as an invited talk at the 20th Conference of the
International Federation of Operational Research Societies, 2014 (IFORS 2014). I give
proofs of all theorems as well as interesting corollaries and generalizations of the model
(Chapter 3 Section 3.7) that have not been published before.
Chapter 4. Here, I discuss the problem of zeroing in on a real-valued target by observ-
ing only a sequence of censored (binarized) Gaussian samples where the principal (or
learner) gets to choose the threshold that determines how each sample is binarized;
this is followed by the design and analysis of an approximately Bayesian algorithm
that achieves this result in an asymptotically near-optimal time with respect to certain
problem parameters (i.e. almost as good as if we had access to the uncensored signals).
I share authorship for this work, which was published at the 27th Conference on Uncer-
tainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2011), with Dr. Das and Dr. Malik Magdon-Ismail;
I give the proof for the main theorem in this dissertation.
Chapter 5. I describe in this chapter an adaptation of the most commonly used variety
(logarithmic) of MSRs, which takes market orders only (i.e. trading agents can only
pick a quantity to buy or sell), to a setting with limit orders (i.e. trading agents can
state a quantity as well as a limiting price), and an experimental set-up that we used
to uncover interesting properties of the resulting market ecosystem and compare to
benchmarks.
The contents of this chapter were published as a paper at the 29th AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2015) jointly authored with Dr. Das and Justin Peabody;
I have added some expository notes to underscore the significance of this chapter to
my dissertation.
Chapter 6. In the final chapter, I summarize the contributions made in this dissertation;
possible directions for future research relevant to each theme are already pointed out
in the respective chapter(s).
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Chapter 2
Semantics of aggregation with market
scoring rules
2.1 Introduction
Suppose that the event on which the principal needs a forecast is modeled as a random
variable and each agent’s private input as a personal probability (or distribution) on that
variable. One simple, principled approach towards achieving aggregation here is the opinion
pool (OP) which directly solicits inputs from these agents and then maps this vector of
inputs to a single probability (or distribution) based on certain axioms (Genest and Zidek
(1986)). However, this technique abstracts away from the issue of providing proper incentives
to a selfish-rational agent to reveal her private information honestly. Financial markets
approach the problem differently, offering financial incentives for traders to supply their
information about valuations and aggregating this information into informative prices. A
prediction market is a relatively novel tool that builds upon this idea, offering trade in a
financial security whose final monetary worth is tied to the future revelation of some currently
unknown ground truth.
The branch of finance that studies the rules for exchanging financial assets and their impact
on observable properties of the market is called market microstructure (Krishnamurti, 2009),
and this term also sometimes refers to a specific set of such rules, which is the sense in
which we will use it in the rest of the dissertation. Hanson (2003b) introduced a class of
microstructures for automated prediction markets called market scoring rules (MSRs) of
which the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) is arguably the most widely used and
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well-studied variety. An MSR effectively acts as a cost function-based market maker – a
market maker being a type of intermediary on a trading platform always willing to take the
other side of a trade with any willing buyer or seller – re-adjusting its quoted price after
every transaction.
One of the most attractive properties of an MSR is its incentive compatibility for a myopic
risk-neutral trader. But this also means that, every time an MSR trades with such an agent,
the updated market price is reset to the subjective probability of that agent; the market
mechanism itself does not play an active role in unifying pieces of information gleaned from
the entire trading history into its current price. Ostrovsky (2012) and Iyer et al. (2014)
have shown that, with differentially informed Bayesian risk-neutral and risk-averse agents
respectively, trading repeatedly, “information gets aggregated” in an MSR-based market in
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, if agent beliefs themselves do not converge, can the
price process emerging out of their interaction with an MSR still be viewed as an aggeragator
of information in some sense? Intuitively, even if an agent does not revise her belief based
on her inference about her peers’ information from market history, her conservative attitude
towards risk should compel her to trade in such a way as to move the market price not all the
way to her private belief but to some function of her belief and the most recent price; thus,
the evolving price should always retain some memory of all agents’ information sequentially
injected into the market. Therefore, the assumption of belief-updating agents may not be
indispensable for providing theoretical guarantees on how the market incorporates agent
beliefs. A few attempts in this vein can be found in the literature, typically embedded in a
broader context (Sethi and Vaughan, 2016; Abernethy et al., 2014), but there have been few
general results; see Section 2.2 for a review.
In this chapter, we develop a new unified understanding of the information aggregation char-
acteristics of a market with risk-averse agents mediated by an MSR, with no regard to how
the agents’ beliefs are formed. In fact, we demonstrate an equivalence between such MSR-
mediated markets and opinion pools. We do so by first proving that for any MSR interacting
with myopic risk-averse traders, the revised instantaneous price after every trade equals the
latest trader’s risk-neutral probability conditional on the preceding market state. We then
show that this price update rule satisfies an axiomatic characterization of opinion pooling
functions from the literature, establishing the equivalence. We identify further conditions on
agent strategy under which the market price behaves (exactly or approximately) as specific
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types of opinion pool. Our results are reminiscent of similar findings about competitive
equilibrium prices in markets with rational, risk-averse agents (Pennock (1999); Beygelzimer
et al. (2012); Millin et al. (2012) etc.), but those models require that agents learn from prices
and also abstract away from any consideration of microstructure and the dynamics of actual
price formation (how the agents would reach the equilibrium is left open). By contrast, our
results do not presuppose any kind of generative model for agent signals, and also do not
involve an equilibrium analysis – hence they can be used as tools to analyze the convergence
characteristics of the market price in non-equilibrium situations with potentially fixed-belief
or irrational agents.
2.2 Related work
Seminal work in establishing a formal relationship between asset prices and the private
information of trading agents was done by Pennock (1999) who showed that linear and
logarithmic opinion pools (see Definition 1 below) arise as special cases of the equilibrium
of his intuitive model of securities markets when all agents have generalized logarithmic
and negative exponential utilities respectively. More recently, an important line of research
(Beygelzimer et al., 2012; Millin et al., 2012; Hu and Storkey, 2014; Storkey et al., 2015)
has focused on a competitive equilibrium analysis of prediction markets under various trader
models, and found an equivalence between the market’s equilibrium price and the outcome
of an opinion pool with the same agents. Unlike these analyses that abstract away from
the microstructure, Ostrovsky (2012) and Iyer et al. (2014) show for that certain market
structures satisfying mild conditions, including MSRs, the market’s belief measure converges
in probability to the ground truth, when we have repeatedly trading and learning agents with
risk-neutral and risk-averse utilities respectively. Our contribution, while drawing inspiration
from these sources, differs in that we delve into the characteristics of the evolution of the
price rather than the properties of prices in equilibrium or upon convergence, and single out
the role played by the price-setting rule itself in inducing aggregation with no regard to how
agent beliefs are formulated.
While there has also been significant work on market properties for other microstructures
such as continuous double auctions or mediation by sophisticated market-making algorithms
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(e.g. Dave Cliff (1997); Farmer et al. (2005b); Brahma et al. (2012) and references therein)
when the agents are “zero-intelligence” or derivatives thereof (and therefore definitely not
Bayesian), this line of literature has not looked at market scoring rules in detail, and ana-
lytical results have been rare.
In recent years, the literature focusing on the MSR family has grown substantially. Chen
and Vaughan (2010) and Frongillo et al. (2012) have uncovered isomorphisms between this
type of market structure and well-known machine learning algorithms. We, on the other
hand, are concerned with the similarities between price evolution in MSR-mediated markets
and opinion pooling methods (see e.g. Garg et al. (2004)). Our work comes close to that of
Sethi and Vaughan (2016) who show analytically that the price sequence of a cost function-
based market maker with budget-limited risk-averse traders is “convergent under general
conditions”, and by simulation that the limiting price of LMSR with multi-shot but myopic
logarithmic utility agents is approximately a linear opinion pool of agent beliefs. Abernethy
et al. (2014) show that a risk-averse exponential utility agent with an exponential family
belief distribution updates the state vector of a generalization of LMSR that they propose to
a convex combination of the current market state vector and the natural parameter vector
of the agent’s own belief distribution (see their Theorem 5.2, Corollary 5.3) – this reduces to
a logarithmic opinion pool (LogOP) for classical LMSR. The LMSR-LogOP connection was
also noted by Pennock and Xia (2011) (in their Theorem 1) but with respect to an artificial
probability distribution based on an agent’s observed trade that the authors defined instead
of considering traders’ belief structure or strategies. We show how results of this type arise as
special cases of a more general MSR-OP equivalence that we establish in Section 2.4 below.
2.3 Model and definitions
The principal is interested in a binary event X ∈ {0, 1}, called the forecast event, whose
outcome will be revealed publicly at a known future date; X can represent a proposition
such as “A Democrat will win the next U.S. presidential election” or “The favorite will beat
the underdog by more than a pre-determined point spread in a game of football” or “The
next Avengers movie will hit a certain box office target in its opening week.” The opinion
of each of n agents on this event is quantified by her subjective point probability pii ∈ (0, 1)
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for X turning out to be 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For the time being, we will be agnostic to how
these probabilities are generated. In such a setting, if the principal had direct access to these
pii-values, the problem would be one of simply unifying them into a consensus or aggregate
– this has been tackled in many fields using opinion pools.
2.3.1 Opinion Pool (OP)
Opinion pools have been studied for a long time, and various characterizations exist thereof
(Genest and Zidek, 1986); here, we present an axiomatic characterization due to Garg et al.
(2004) for an aggregate operator of the form p̂ = f(p1, p2, · · · , pn) ∈ [0, 1] that takes as input
the vector of probabilistic reports pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, · · · , n submitted by n agents, also
called experts in this context.
Definition 1. A function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is defined as a valid opinion pool for n proba-
bilistic reports if it satisfies the following three criteria.
1. Unanimity: If all experts agree, the aggregate also agrees with them.
2. Boundedness: The aggregate is bounded by the extremes of the inputs.
3. Monotonicity: If one expert changes her opinion in a particular direction while
all other experts’ opinions remain unaltered, then the aggregate changes in the same
direction.
Two popular opinion pooling methods are the Linear Opinion Pool (LinOP) and the Log-
arithmic Opinion Pool (LogOP) which are essentially a weighted average (or convex com-
bination) and a renormalized weighted geometric mean of the experts’ probability reports
respectively. For a binary event,
LinOP(p1, p2, · · · , pn)=
∑n
i=1 ω
lin
i pi,
LogOP(p1, p2, · · · , pn)=
∏n
i=1 p
ωlogi
i
/[∏n
i=1 p
ωlogi
i +
∏n
i=1(1− pi)ω
log
i
]
,
where ωlini , ω
log
i ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
∑n
i=1 ω
lin
i = 1,
∑n
i=1 ω
log
i = 1.
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The following result for recursively defined pooling functions will prove useful for establishing
our desired equivalence.
Lemma 1. For a two-outcome forecasting task, if f2(r1, r2) and fn−1(q1, q2, . . . , qn−1) are
valid opinion pools for two probabilistic reports r1, r2 and n−1 probabilistic reports q1, q2, . . . , qn−1
respectively, then f(p1, p2, . . . , pn) = f2(fn−1(p1, p2, . . . , pn−1), pn) is also a valid opinion pool
for n reports.
Proof. Recall from Definition 1 that a valid opinion pool p̂ = φ(p1, p2, . . . , pm), where
p1, p2, . . . , pm ∈ [0, 1] are reported expert probabilities of occurrence of binary event X,
must satisfy
1. Unanimity: If pi = p ∀i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then p̂ = p.
2. Boundedness: min{p1, p2, . . . , pm} ≤ p̂ ≤ max{p1, p2, . . . , pm}.
3. Monotonicity: p̂ increases monotonically as pi increases, pj being held constant
∀j 6= i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, i.e. ∂φ
∂pi
> 0 everywhere ∀i.
By the condition of the lemma, all the above three properties are possessed by each each of
f2 and fn−1, and we need to prove that f has each of these properties, too.
To prove the unanimity of f : Let pi = p ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then,
f(p, p, . . . , p) = f2(fn−1(p, p, . . . , p), p)
= f2(p, p), by unanimity of fn−1,
= p, by unanimity of f2.
To prove the boundedness of f : Using the upper bounds on f2 and fn−1,
f(p1, p2, . . . , pn) ≤ max{fn−1(p1, p2, . . . , pn−1), pn}
≤ max{max{p1, p2, . . . , pn−1}, pn}
= max{p1, p2, . . . , pn−1, pn}.
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Similarly, using the lower bounds on f2 and fn−1, we can show that f(p1, p2, . . . , pn) ≥
min{p1, p2, . . . , pn−1, pn}.
To prove the monotonicity of f : The partial derivative of f with respect to each pi,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 is given by
∂f
∂pi
=
∂
∂pi
f2(fn−1(p1, p2, . . . , pn−1), pn) =
∂f2(fn−1, pn)
∂fn−1
· ∂fn−1(p1, p2, . . . , pn−1)
∂pn
> 0
by the monotonicity of f2 and fn−1 with respect to their respective inputs. Similarly,
∂f
∂pn
=
∂f2(fn−1, pn)
∂pn
> 0
by the monotonicity of f2.
2.3.2 Market Scoring Rule (MSR)
However, these experts may not be inclined to reveal their private beliefs to the principal
without the promise of any reward in return. This brings us to the issue of information
elicitation, the first step towards information aggregation from selfish-rational agents. Elici-
tation at a single-expert level is traditionally accomplished using proper scoring rules (Brier,
1950; Good, 1952; Gneiting and Raftery, 2007).
In general, a scoring rule is a function of two variables s(p, x) ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}, where p is
an agent’s probabilistic prediction (density or mass function) about an uncertain event, x is
the realized or revealed outcome of that event after the prediction has been made, and the
resulting value of s is the agent’s ex post compensation for prediction. For a binary event X,
a scoring rule can just be represented by the pair (s1(p), s0(p)) which is the vector of agent
compensations for {X = 1} and {X = 0} respectively, p ∈ [0, 1] being the agent’s reported
probability of {X = 1} which may or may not be equal to her true subjective probability,
say, pi = Pr(X = 1).
Assuming the expert to be risk-neutral, i.e. she will choose an action that maximizes her
subjective expectation of her raw ex post compensation, we know that she will report any
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probability value in the set P ∗s,pi , arg maxp∈[0,1] [pis1(p) + (1− pi)s0(p)]. A scoring rule s is
defined to be proper if it is incentive compatible for a risk-neutral expert; incentive com-
patibility is the property that it is in the expert cannot do better than reporting truthfully,
which in this setting translates to the condition: pi ∈ P ∗s,pi ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]. The properness is
strict if pi is the sole maximizer of her expected ex post score.
In addition, a two-outcome scoring rule is regular if sj(·) is real-valued except possibly that
s0(1) or s1(0) is −∞; any regular strictly proper scoring rule can written in the following
form (Gneiting and Raftery (2007)):
sj(p) = G(p) +G
′(p)(j − p), j ∈ {0, 1}, p ∈ [0, 1], (2.1)
G : [0, 1]→ R is a strictly convex function with G′(·) as a sub-gradient which is real-valued
expect possibly that −G′(0) or G′(1) is ∞; if G(·) is differentiable in (0, 1), G′(·) is simply
its derivative.
A classic example of a regular strictly proper scoring rule is the logarithmic scoring rule:
s1(p) = b ln p; s0(p) = b ln(1− p), where b > 0 is a free parameter. (2.2)
In principle, if there are n risk-neutral experts, the principal could promise each of them a
reward according to any strictly proper scoring rule, hence elicit their honest reports sepa-
rately, and then combine these reports perhaps using an opinion pooling method; however,
the principal’s total payout (“loss” or cost of information acquisition) would then be O(n).
To circumvent this issue, Hanson (2003b) introduced an extension of a scoring rule wherein
the principal initiates the process of information elicitation by making a baseline report p0,
and then elicits publicly declared reports pi sequentially from n agents; the ex post compen-
sation cx(pi, pi−1) received by agent i from the principal, where x is the realized outcome of
event X, is the difference between the scores assigned to the reports made by herself and
her predecessor:
cx(pi, pi−1) , sx(pi)− sx(pi−1), x ∈ {0, 1}. (2.3)
If each agent acts non-collusively, risk-neutrally, and myopically (as if her current interaction
with the principal is her last), then the incentive compatibility property of a strictly proper
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score still holds for the sequential version. Moreover, it is easy to show that the principal’s
worst-case payout (loss) is bounded regardless of agent behavior. In particular, for the two-
outcome logarithmic score, the loss bound for p0 = 1/2 is b ln 2; b can be referred to as the
principal’s loss parameter.
Definition 2. We call a market scoring rule well-behaved if the underlying scoring rule is
regular and strictly proper, and the associated convex function G(·) (as in (2.1)) is continuous
and thrice-differentiable, with 0 < G′′(p) <∞ and |G′′′(p)| <∞ for 0 < p < 1.
A sequentially shared strictly proper scoring rule of the above form can also be interpreted
as a cost function-based prediction market mechanism offering trade in an Arrow-Debreu
(i.e. (0, 1)-valued) security written on the event X, hence the name “market scoring rule”.
The cost function is a strictly convex function of the total outstanding quantity of the
security that determines all execution costs; its first derivative (the cost per share of buying
or the proceeds per share from selling an infinitesimal quantity of the security) is called
the market’s “instantaneous price”, and can be interpreted as the market maker’s current
risk-neutral probability (Chen and Pennock (2007)) for {X = 1}, the starting price being
equal to the principal’s baseline report p0. Trading occurs in discrete episodes 1, 2, . . . , n, in
each of which an agent orders a quantity of the security to buy or sell given the market’s
cost function and the (publicly displayed) instantaneous price. Since there is a one-to-one
correspondence between agent i’s order size and pi, the market’s revised instantaneous price
after trading with agent i, an agent’s “action” or trading decision in this setting is identical
to making a probability report by selecting a pi ∈ [0, 1]. If agent i is risk-neutral, then pi is,
by design, her subjective probability pii. This view of MSRs is useful for operational purposes
but not relevant to the theoretical results in this chapter; please refer to Hanson (2003b);
Chen and Pennock (2007) for further details. However, we will return to it in Chapter 5
when we describe experiments with an algorithmic trading agent based on extensions to the
logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR).
2.4 MSR behavior with risk-averse myopic agents
We first present general results on the connection between sequential trading in an MSR-
mediated market with agents having risk-averse utility (see below) and opinion pooling, and
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then give a more detailed picture for representative utility functions without and with budget
constraints in Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3.
Suppose that, in addition to a belief pii = Pr(X = 1), each agent i has a continuous utility
function of wealth ui(c), where c ∈ [cmini ,∞] denotes her (ex post) wealth, i.e. her net
compensation from the market mechanism after the realization of X defined in (2.3), and
cmini ∈ [−∞, 0] is her minimum acceptable wealth (a negative value suggests tolerance of
debt); ui(·) satisfies the usual criteria of non-satiation i.e. u′i(c) > 0 except possibly that
u′i(∞) = 0, and risk aversion, i.e. u′′i (c) < 0 except possibly that u′′i (∞) = 0, through out
its domain (Mas-Colell et al., 1995); in other words ui(·) is strictly increasing and strictly
concave. Additionally, we require its first two derivatives to be finite and continuous on
[cmini ,∞] except that we tolerate u′i(cmini ) = ∞, u′′i (cmini ) = −∞. Note that, by choosing
a finite lower bound cmini on the agent’s wealth, we can account for any starting wealth or
budget constraint that effectively restricts the agent’s action space.
Lemma 2. If |cmini | <∞, then there exist lower and upper bounds, pmini ∈ [0, pi−1] and pmaxi ∈
[pi−1, 1] respectively, on the feasible values of the price pi to which agent i can drive the market
regardless of her belief pii, where p
min
i = s
−1
1 (c
min
i + s1(pi−1)) and p
max
i = s
−1
0 (c
min
i + s0(pi−1)).
Proof. Agent i’s ex post wealth for trading in such a way as to revise the market price from
pi−1 to any p˜ ∈ [0, 1] is cx(p˜, pi−1) for outcome x but, from the constraints imposed by the
utility function, this wealth cannot be smaller than cmini for any x. Thus,
c1(p˜, pi−1) ≥ cmini
⇒ s1(p˜)− s1(pi−1) ≥ cmini
⇒ s1(p˜) ≥ cmini + s1(pi−1)
⇒ p˜ ≥ s−11 (cmini + s1(pi−1)) = pmini ,
since s1(·) is strictly increasing (hence invertible). Also, since cmini ≤ 0,
s1(p
min
i ) = c
min
i + s1(pi−1) =⇒ s1(pmini ) ≤ s1(pi−1) =⇒ pmini ≤ pi−1.
Similarly, from the inequality c0(p˜, pi−1) ≥ cmini and the decreasing monotonicity of s0(·), we
can show that p˜ ≤ s−10 (cmini + s0(pi−1)) = pmaxi ≥ pi−1.
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Since the latest price pi−1 can be viewed as the market’s current “state” from myopic agent
i’s perspective, the agent’s final utility depends not only on her own action pi and the
extraneously determined outcome x but also on the current market state pi−1 she encounters.
The optimal action of myopic risk-averse agent i is then given by
pi = arg max
p∈[0,1]
[piiui(c1(p, pi−1)) + (1− pii)ui(c0(pi, pi−1))] .
This leads us to the main result of this section, Theorem 1. Here, we sketch and discuss the
major implications of the theorem; a detailed proof can be found in Appendix A Section A.1.
Theorem 1. If a well-behaved market scoring rule for an Arrow-Debreu security with a start-
ing instantaneous price p0 ∈ (0, 1) trades with a sequence of n myopic agents with subjective
probabilities pi1, . . . , pin ∈ (0, 1) and risk-averse utility functions of wealth u1(·), . . . , un(·) as
above, then the updated market price pi after every trading episode i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is equiv-
alent to a valid opinion pool for the market’s initial baseline report p0 and the subjective
probabilities pi1, pi2, . . . , pii of all agents who have traded up to (and including) that episode.
Proof sketch. For every trading epsiode i, by setting the first derivative of agent i’s
expected utility to zero, and analyzing the resulting equation, we can arrive at the following
lemmas.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, if pi−1 ∈ (0, 1), then the revised price pi
after agent i trades is the unique solution in (0, 1) to the fixed-point equation:
pi =
piiu
′
i(c1(pi, pi−1))
piiu′i(c1(pi, pi−1)) + (1− pii)u′i(c0(pi, pi−1))
. (2.4)
Since p0 ∈ (0, 1), and pii ∈ (0, 1) ∀i, pi is also confined to (0, 1) ∀i, by induction.
Lemma 4. The implicit function pi(pi−1, pii) described by (A.4) has the following properties:
1. pi = pii (or pi−1) if and only if pii = pi−1.
2. 0 < min{pi−1, pii} < pi < max{pi−1, pii} < 1 whenever pii 6= pi−1, 0 < pii, pi−1 < 1.
3. For any given pi−1 (resp. pii), pi is a strictly increasing function of pii (resp. pi−1).
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Evidently, properties 1, 2, and 3 above correspond to axioms of unanimity, boundedness, and
monotonicity respectively (see Definition 1). Hence, pi(pi−1, pii) is a valid opinion pooling
function for pi−1, pii. Finally, since (A.4) defines the opinion pool pi recursively in terms of
pi−1 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we can invoke Lemma 1 to obtain the desired result. 
There are several points worth noting about this result.
• Since the updated market price pi is also equivalent to agent i’s action (Section 2.3.2),
the R.H.S. of (A.4) is agent i’s risk-neutral probability (Pennock (1999)) of {X = 1},
given her utility function, her action, and the current market state. Thus, Lemma 3
is a natural extension of the elicitation properties of an MSR. MSRs, by design, elicit
subjective probabilities from risk-neutral agents in an incentive compatible manner; we
show that, in general, they elicit risk-neutral probabilities when they interact with risk-
averse agents. Lemma 3 is also consistent with the observation of Pennock (1999) that,
for all belief elicitation schemes based on monetary incentives, an external observer
can only assess a participant’s risk-neutral probability uniquely; she cannot discern
the participant’s belief and utility separately.
• Observe that this pooling operation is accomplished by an MSR even without direct
revelation.
• Notice the presence of the market maker’s own initial baseline p0 as a component in the
final aggregate; however, for the examples we study below, the impact of p0 diminishes
with the participation of more and more informed agents, and we conjecture that this
is a generic property.
In general, the exact form of this pooling function is determined by the complex interaction
between the MSR and agent utility, and a closed form of pi from (A.4) might not be attainable
in many cases. However, given a paticular MSR, we can venture to identify agent utility
functions which give rise to well-known opinion pools. Hence, for the rest of this paper,
we focus on the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), one of the most popular tools for
implementing real-world prediction markets.
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For the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR),
c1(pi, pi−1) = b ln
(
pi
pi−1
)
, c0(pi, pi−1) = b ln
(
1− pi
1− pi−1
)
so that equation (A.4) can be rewritten as
pi
1− pi =
pii
1− pii ·
u′i
(
b ln
(
pi
pi−1
))
u′i
(
b ln
(
1−pi
1−pi−1
)) . (2.5)
2.4.1 LMSR and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility:
LogOP
Theorem 2. The only risk-averse utility function for which myopic agent i, having a sub-
jective belief pii ∈ (0, 1), and trading with an LMSR market with parameter b and current
instantaneous price pi−1, results in the market’s updated price pi being identical to a loga-
rithmic opinion pool between the current price and the agent’s subjective belief, i.e.
pi = pi
αi
i p
1−αi
i−1
/ [
piαii p
1−αi
i−1 + (1− pii)αi(1− pi−1)1−αi
]
, αi ∈ (0, 1), (2.6)
is given by
ui(c) = τi (1− exp (−c/τi)) , c ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}, constant τi ∈ (0,∞), (2.7)
the aggregation weight is αi =
τi/b
1+τi/b
.
The proof is in Appendix A Section A.1.1. Note that (A.9) is a standard formulation of the
CARA (or negative exponential) utility function with risk tolerance τi; smaller the value of
τi, higher is agent i’s aversion to risk. The unbounded domain of ui(·) indicates a lack of
budget constraints; risk aversion comes about from the fact that the range of the function
is bounded above (by its risk tolerance τi) but not bounded below.
Moreover, the LogOP equation (A.8) can alternatively be expressed as a linear update in
terms of log-odds (i.e. logit functions of probabilities), another popular means of formulating
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one’s belief about a binary event:
l(pi) = αil(pii) + (1− αi)l(pi−1), l(p) = ln
(
p
1−p
) ∈ [−∞,∞] for p ∈ [0, 1]. (2.8)
Aggregation weight and risk tolerance: Since αi is an increasing function of an agent’s
risk tolerance relative to the market’s loss parameter (the latter being, in a way, a measure of
how much risk the market maker is willing to take), identity (2.8) implies that the higher an
agent’s risk tolerance, the larger is the contribution of her belief towards the changed market
price, which agrees with intuition. Also note the interesting manner in which the market’s
loss parameter effectively scales down an agent’s risk tolerance, enhancing the inertia factor
(1− αi) of the price process.
Bayesian interpretation: The Bayesian interpretation of LogOP in general is well-known
(Bordley, 1982); we restate it here in a form that is more appropriate for our prediction
market setting. We can recast (A.8) as
pi =
pi−1
(
pii
pi−1
)αi
pi−1
(
pii
pi−1
)αi
+ (1− pi−1)
(
1−pii
1−pi−1
)αi .
This shows that, over the ith trading episode ∀i, the LMSR-CARA agent market environment
is equivalent to a Bayesian learner performing inference on the point estimate of the probabil-
ity of the forecast event X, starting with the common-knowledge prior Pr(X = 1) = pi−1, and
having direct access to pii (which corresponds to the “observation” for the inference problem),
the likelihood function associated with this observation being L (X = x|pii) ∝
∣∣∣ 1−x−pii1−x−pi−1 ∣∣∣αi ,
x ∈ {0, 1}.
Sequence of one-shot traders: If all n agents in the system have CARA utilities with
potentially different risk tolerances, and trade with LMSR myopically only once each in
the order 1, . . . , n, then the “final” market log-odds after these n trades, on unfolding the
recursion in (2.8), is given by l(pn) = α˜
n
0 l(p0) +
∑n
i=1 α˜
n
i l(pii). This is a LogOP where
α˜n0 =
∏n
i=1(1 − αi) determines the inertia of the market’s initial price, which diminishes as
more and more traders interact with the market, and α˜nj , j ≥ 1 quantifies the degree to which
an individual trader impacts the final (aggregate) market belief; α˜nj = αj
∏n
i=j+1 (1− αi),
j = 1, . . . , n− 1, and α˜nn = αn.
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Interestingly, the weight of an agent’s belief depends not only on her own risk tolerance
but also on those of all agents succeeding her in the trading sequence (lower weight for a
more risk tolerant successor, ceteris paribus), and is independent of her predecessors’ utility
parameters. This is sensible since, by the design of an MSR, trader i’s belief-dependent
action influences the action of each of (rational) traders i + 1, i + 2, . . . so that the action
of each of these successors, in turn, has a role to play in determining the market impact of
trader i’s belief.
In particular, if τj = τ > 0 ∀j ≥ 1, then the aggregation weights satisfy the inequalities
α˜nj+1/α˜
n
j = 1 + τ/b > 1 ∀j = 1, · · · , n− 1, i.e. LMSR assigns progressively higher weights to
traders arriving later in the market’s lifetime when they all exhibit identical constant risk
aversion. This seems to be a reasonable aggregation principle in most scenarios wherein the
amount of information in the world improves over time. Moreover, in this situation, α˜n1/α˜
n
0 =
τ/b which indicates that the weight of the market’s baseline belief in the aggregate may be
higher than those of some of the trading agents if the market maker has a comparatively high
loss parameter. This strong effect of the trading sequence on the weights of agents’ beliefs
is a significant difference between the one-shot trader setting and the market equilibrium
setting where each agent’s weight is independent of the utility function parameters of her
peers.
Convergence: If agents’ beliefs are themselves independent samples from the same distri-
bution P over [0, 1], i.e. pii ∼i.i.d. P ∀i, then by the sum laws of expectation and variance,
E [l(pn)] = α˜n0 l(p0) + (1− α˜n0 )Epi∼P [l(pi)] ; Var [l(pn)] = Varpi∼P [l(pi)]
∑n
i=1(α˜
n
i )
2.
Hence, using an appropriate concentration inequality (Boucheron et al. (2004)) and the
properties of the α˜ni ’s, we can show that, as n increases, the market log-odds ratio l(pn)
converges to Epi∼P [l(pi)] with a high probability; this convergence guarantee does not require
the agents to be Bayesian.
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2.4.2 LMSR and an atypical utility with decreasing absolute risk
aversion: LinOP
Theorem 3. The only risk-averse utility function for which myopic agent i, having a sub-
jective belief pii ∈ (0, 1), and trading with an LMSR market with parameter b and current
instantaneous price pi−1, results in the market’s updated price pi, results in the market’s
updated price pi being identical to a linear opinion pool between the current price and the
agent’s subjective belief, i.e.
pi = βipii + (1− βi)pi−1, for some constant βi ∈ (0, 1), (2.9)
is given by
ui(c) = ln(exp((c+Bi)/b)− 1), c ≥ −Bi, (2.10)
where Bi > 0 represents agent i’s budget, the aggregation weight being βi = 1− exp(−Bi/b).
The proof is in Appendix A Section A.1.2. To the best of our knowledge, the above atypical
utility function in (A.13) has not been described before: Its domain is bounded below, and
it below, and it possesses a positive, strictly decreasing Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion
measure (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) Ai(c) = −u′′i (c)/u′i(c) = 1b(exp((c+Bi)/b)−1) for any b, Bi > 0.
Note that, unlike in Theorem 2, the equivalence here requires the agent utility function to
depend on the market maker’s loss parameter b (the scaling factor in the exponential). Since
the microstructure is assumed to be common knowledge, as in traditional MSR settings, the
consideration of an agent utility that takes into account the market’s pricing function is not
unreasonable.
Since the domain of utility function (A.13) is bounded below, we can derive pii-independent
bounds on possible values of pi from Lemma 2: p
min
i = (1− βi)pi−1, pmaxi = βi + (1− βi)pi−1.
Hence, equation (A.12) becomes pi = piip
max
i + (1− pii)pmini , i.e. the revised price is a linear
interpolation between the agent’s price bounds, her subjective probability itself acting as the
interpolation factor.
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Aggregation weight and budget constraint: Evidently, the aggregation weight of
agent i’s belief, βi = (1 − exp(−Bi/b)), is an increasing function of her budget normalized
with respect to the market’s loss parameter; it is, in a way, a measure of her relative risk
tolerance. Thus, broad characteristics analogous to the ones in Section 2.4.1 apply to these
aggregation weights as well, with the log-odds ratio replaced by the actual market price.
Bayesian interpretation: Under the mild technical assumption that agent i’s belief
pii ∈ (0, 1) is rational, and her budget Bi > 0 is such that βi ∈ (0, 1) is also rational, it
is possible to obtain positive integers ri, Ni and a positive rational number mi−1 such that
pii = ri/Ni and βi = Ni/(mi−1 + Ni). Then, we can rewrite the LinOP equation (A.12)
as pi =
ri+pi−1mi−1
mi−1+Ni
, which is equivalent to the posterior expectation of a beta-binomial
Bayesian inference procedure described as follows: The forecast event X is modeled as the
(future) final flip of a biased coin with an unknown probability of heads. In episode i,
the principal (or aggregator) has a prior distribution Beta(µi−1, νi−1) over this probability,
with µi−1 = pi−1mi−1, νi−1 = (1 − pi−1)mi−1. Thus, pi−1 is the prior mean and mi−1 the
corresponding “pseudo-sample size” parameter. Agent i is non-Bayesian, and her subjective
probability pii, accessible to the aggregator, is her maximum likelihood estimate associated
with the (binomial) likelihood of observing ri heads out of a private sample of Ni independent
flips of the above coin (Ni is common knowledge). Note that mi−1, Ni are measures of
certainty of the aggregator and the trading agent respectively, and the latter’s normalized
budget Bi/b = ln(1+Ni/mi−1) becomes a measure of her certainty relative to the aggregator’s
current state in this interpretation.
Sequence of one-shot traders and convergence: If all agents have utility (A.13)
with potentially different budgets, and trade with LMSR myopically once each, then the
final aggregate market price is given by pn = β˜
n
0 p0 +
∑n
i=1 β˜
n
i pii, which is a LinOP where
β˜n0 =
∏n
i=1(1−αi), β˜nj = βj
∏n
i=j+1 (1− βi) ∀j = 1, . . . , n− 1, β˜nn = βn. Again, all intuitions
about α˜nj from Section 2.4.1 carry over to β˜
n
j . Moreover, if pii ∼i.i.d. P ∀i, then we can proceed
exactly as in Section 2.4.1 to show that, as n increases, pn converges to Epi∼P [pi] with a high
probability.
Implications for logarithmic utility: Theorem 3 is somewhat surprising since it is
logarithmic utility that has traditionally been found to effect a LinOP in a market equilibrium
(Pennock, 1999; Beygelzimer et al., 2012; Storkey et al., 2015). Of course, our results do
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not pertain to an equilibrium / convergence setting, but in light of similarities (elaborated
on in Section 2.4.3) between utility function (A.13) and logarithmic utility, it is perhaps not
unreasonable to ask whether the logarithmic utility-LinOP connection is still maintained
approximately for LMSR price evolution under some conditions.
2.4.3 LMSR and logarithmic utility
In this section, we shall explore the idea mentioned above in Section 2.4.2 that agents with
logarithmic utility induce an approximate linear opinion pool in a LMSR market under
certain conditions.
Comparison of utility function (A.13) with logarithmic utility: The two utility
functions under consideration are
uatyp(c;B, b) = ln(exp((c+B)/b)− 1), c ≥ B,
ulog(c;w) = ln(c+ w), c ≥ w
where constants B,w ∈ (0,∞) are the respective budgets. First note that both are strictly in-
creasing and strictly concave functions with domains bounded below and decreasing absolute
risk aversion, since the respective Arrow-Pratt measures are Aatyp(c;B, b) =
1
b(exp((c+B)/b)−1)
and Alog(c;w) =
1
c+w
. Moreover, uatyp(c) behaves approximately as a logarithmic utility for
small values of (c + B)/b and as a linear utility (corresponding to risk-neutrality) for large
values thereof.
(c+B)/b 1 =⇒ uatyp(c;B, b) ≈ ln(1 + (c+B)/b− 1) = ln(c+B)− ln b ≡ ln(c+B);
(c+B)/b 1 =⇒ uatyp(c;B, b) ≈ ln exp((c+B)/b) = (c+B)/b ≡ c,
using first order approximations, and applying the fact that a utility function is (strategically)
equivalent to any positive affine transformation of itself.
We provide a visual contrast of the above utility functions in Figure 2.1: Note that for
b = B = 1, the two functions are very close to each other for small (negative and close to
−B) values of wealth c. From the graphs, it appears to be a reasonable conjecture that the
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of a logarithmic utility function ulog(c;B) = ln(c + B), c ≥ −B,
where B = 1 is the (positive) budget, with various instances of the atypical decreasing
absolute risk aversion utility function (A.13) uatyp(c;B, b) = ln(exp((c+B)/b)− 1) with the
same budget B = 1 but different scaling factors b = 0.1, 1, 10.
two utility functions are most similar, in the sense that the switch in the nature of (A.13)
from approximately logarithmic to approximately linear occurs at a higher value of wealth,
for values of b that are comparable to B.
Proposition 1. For a myopic agent with a subjective probability pii ∈ (0, 1) and a logarithmic
utility function with budget wi ∈ (0,∞), i.e.
ui(c) = ln(wi + c), c ≥ −wi,
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the updated instantaneous price of a LMSR market with loss parameter b after interaction
with the agent can be written as
pi = p̂i + ∆, (2.11)
where p̂i is a LinOP of pii and pi−1 given by
p̂i = (1− exp(−w˜i))pii + exp(−w˜i)pi−1, w˜i = wi/b,
and the error term is
∆ = pii(1− pi)
∑∞
j=2
1
j
(
pmaxi −pi
1−pi
)j
− (1− pii)pi
∑∞
j=2
1
j
(
pi−pmini
pi
)j
,
with pmini = pi−1 exp(−w˜i) and pmaxi = 1 − (1 − pi−1) exp(−w˜i) being the lower and upper
bounds on the price pi imposed by the budget constraint.
The proof is in Appendix 2 Section A.2.
Approximation of actual pi by p̂i: If, instead of the Maclaurin series in the above
proof of Proposition 1, we had used the first-order approximation − ln(1− x) ≈ x, which is
reasonable for |x|  1,8 we would have obtained pi ≈ p̂i. Informally, the smaller the agent’s
normalized budget w˜i, the smaller the range
[
pmini , p
max
i
]
of feasible values of pi, hence the
smaller the fractions (pi− pmini )/pi and (pmaxi − pi)/(1− pi) are, hopefully leading to a better
approximation. But this might not even be necessary for achieving a small magnitude of
∆i which is the difference of two terms of comparable orders. On eyeballing the expression
for ∆i, it appears to be roughly two orders of magnitude smaller than p̂i. Since the exact
dependence of the approximation error on the value of w˜i is hard to figure out analytically,
we adopt a simulation-based approach towards exploring this relationship, described below.
But, before that, we perform a quick sanity check on the approximation under consideration.
From (A.19), it is evident that
lim
pii↘0
pi = p
min
i = lim
pii↘0
p̂i; lim
pii↗1
pi = p
max
i = lim
pii↗1
p̂i,
8Note that the relative error of the linear approximation of the logarithmic function, i.e.
∣∣∣x−f(x)f(x) ∣∣∣, where
f(x) = − ln(1− x), is at most 10% for x ≤ 0.193.
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indicating that the actual and approximate updated market prices coincide for extreme agent
beliefs.
Experiments: We ran 5× 9 sets of 1000 simulations each for getting a rough idea about
the quality of the approximation pi ≈ p̂i. For each simulation, we generated a sequence of
n = 100 agents defined by their time-invariant belief-budget pairs {(pii, wi)}ni=1. Since the
parameter of interest is the normalized budget w˜i, the exact value of the LMSR loss parameter
b is immaterial, and we set it to 1. We sampled the w˜i’s uniformly at random from the
interval [0, w˜max], w˜max ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. The beliefs were random samples from the
distribution Beta(ptrue, 1−ptrue), ptrue ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}. Thus our knowledge model was
that there was a “true” underlying distibution, Pr(X = 1) = ptrue, according to which nature
would decide the forecast event X in the future, and each agent had some idiosyncratic noisy
version pii of this ptrue, the variability of the agents’ beliefs being represented by the above
Beta distribution with mean α
α+β
= ptrue and pseudo-sample size (confidence) parameter
(α + β) held constant at 1 (α and β denote standard parameters of a Beta distribution).
Over the n trading episodes, we computed two price trajectories starting at p0 = 0.5 each,
one induced by each agent maximizing her myopic expected logarithmic utility9, and the
other by the approximate price update equation that always rejects the error term in (2.11).
At the end of each simulation, we evaluated the root-mean-squared deviation between these
two price trajectories, and averaged these values over all 1000 simulations in the set to obtain
the “mean RMSD between true and approximate price processes” which serves as our error
measure for the approximation.
We report our results in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
Figure 2.2 gives a quantification of the approximation error for various combinations of
model parameter values. On eyeballing the sample trajectories in Figure 2.3, the path of
approximate prices (dashed black) seems quite close to the path of true prices (solid green),
more so for the lower value of w˜max, as expected; also note the high price volatility in panel
(b) corresponding to the higher agent budgets, which is understandable since the agent is
9For agent i, we discretized the possible range of pi, i.e. [p
min
i , p
max
i ] in steps of 10
−4, computed the vector
of expected logarithmic utility values for these discrete pi values, and chose the pi-value corresponding to
the maximum entry in this vector as the updated price.
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Figure 2.2: The error measure increases with increasing difference between ptrue and p0 = 0.5
for any fixed w˜max, and also with an increase in w˜max for any given ptrue-value; nevertheless,
the error appears to be small even for higher values of w˜max (less than 0.03 for 0.1 ≤ ptrue ≤
0.9, w˜max ≤ 0.75). Error bars are not shown since standard errors are consistently two orders
of magnitude smaller than corresponding sample means.
now closer to being risk-neutral. The main takeaway message from our experiments is that
the approximation seems reasonable for a wide range of values of ptrue and w˜max.
We also studied the dependence of the error measure on the parameter (α + β) which is
inversely related to the variance of the traders’ beliefs. We fixed ptrue = 0.7 and varied
(α + β) over {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10}. The results are reported in Figure 2.4. For
both w˜max = 0.2 and 0.5, we see that this error measure peaks at 1 and then drops off slowly
as (α + β) increases further.
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Figure 2.3: Price trajectories for two sample simulations with w˜max = 0.2 and w˜max = 2 are
displayed in panels (a) and (b) respectively, ptrue = 0.7 for both. “Lower bound” (dashed
blue curve) and “Upper bound” (dashed red curve) for each trading epsiode i correspond to
price bounds pmini and p
max
i respectively.
2.5 Discussion and future work
We have established the correspondence of a well-known securities market microstructure
to a class of traditional belief aggregation methods and, by extension, Bayesian inference
procedures in two important cases. An obvious next step is the identification of general
conditions under which a MSR and agent utility combination is equivalent to a given pooling
operation.
Another research direction is extending our results to a sequence of agents who trade re-
peatedly until “convergence”, taking into account issues such as the order in which agents
trade when they return, the effects of the updated wealth after the first trade for agents with
budgets, etc.
However, there is an implicit assumption common to all the results cited and presented
in this chapter – the outcome of the forecast event, which serves as the ground truth for
verifying all agents’ reports and hence deciding their payoffs, is extraneously determined,
and is beyond all agents’ control. Prediction markets are often used in situations where this
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Figure 2.4: Variation of the approximation error measure in our simulations with respect to
the pseudo-sample size (confidence) parameter of the distribution of agent beliefs.
assumption is violated to a greater or lesser degree – and it is one of these situations that
we will analyze in depth in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Outcome manipulation in incentivized
collective forecasting mechanisms
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we saw how prediction markets use the idea of offering trade in financial instru-
ments for aggregating and disseminating private information dispersed among a potentially
diverse crowd. However, attention is seldom paid in the literature on prediction markets to
the possibility that market participants might have some degree of control on the outcome of
the forecast event, and hence the presence of a prediction market may make agents affecting
the outcome act differently than they otherwise would. In fact, sometimes it is this very
power to affect outcomes that gives agents the informational edge that such markets get
their value from.
Consider three canonical real-world examples where prediction markets (or betting markets)
have demonstrated their forecasting ability to great effect: elections / politics Berg et al.
(2008), sporting events Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), and software product releases Cowgill
and Zitzewitz (2015). In each of these cases, it is easy to see how the presence of a prediction
market on the event may distort incentives. A congressional staffer or member of congress
may know more about the probable outcome of a key vote than the general public, but she
is also in a position to influence said outcome. A referee or player has substantial ability to
influence the results of a game. A software engineer has the potential to delay (or speed up)
the release of a product.
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When trading agents can influence the event on which the market is written to such an
extent that the outcome cannot be considered exogenous, it is natural to ask two questions:
(1) Are market prices still informative of the forecast event, i.e. how much do they still
tell us about the realized outcome?
(2) Are the actions of the outcome-deciders still truthful, i.e. do they take the same actions
that they would in the absence of the prediction market?
While it is acknowledged that prediction markets have value as aids in making business and
policy decisions, they have gone through cycles of hype and bust for reasons that include reg-
ulatory concerns about manipulation, the emblematic anecdote in this vein being the failure
of DARPA’s proposed policy analysis markets (Hanson, 2007b). While their actual proposed
range and purpose was more complex, they became caricatured in the media as “terrorism
futures” (Clifton, 2003), and the project was canceled almost as soon as information about
it became publicly widespread. Stiglitz (July 31, 2003) pointed out some issues with the
idea in an Op-Ed piece:
Did [Poindexter] believe there is widespread information about terrorist activity
not currently being either captured or appropriately analyzed by the “experts”
in the FBI and the CIA? Did he believe that the 1,000 people “selected” for the
new futures program would have this information? If so, shouldn’t these people
be investigated rather than rewarded?
But there are more fundamental problems with the idea. If trading is anonymous,
then it could be subject to manipulation, particularly if the market has few
participants, providing a false sense of security or an equally dangerous false
sense of alarm. If trading is not anonymous, then anyone with information about
terrorism would be, understandably, reluctant to trade on it. In that case, the
market would not serve its purpose.
There are obviously prediction markets that will not work, but stock and futures markets
have been used for a long time as forecasting tools, and prediction markets are similar in
essence. The key is to understand when these markets may be prone to manipulation and
how much to trust them. To this end, we propose and analyze a new model for studying
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manipulative behavior that captures two aspects of real-world prediction markets: (1) agents
directly affect the forecast event, and (2) some of the outcome-deciding agents may not
participate in the prediction market (e.g. employees who have an impact on the outcome
of a product launch typically would not all take part in the company’s in-house prediction
market for its release date). In markets where an individual has a small effect on the outcome
(like large elections), agents’ incentives for manipulation are likely to be weak. With this in
mind, we mainly focus on a two-stage game-theoretic model of a market with two “players”
or agents who affect the outcome and can also trade on it (Sections 3.3 and 3.4), and then
discuss how our insights extend to models with more players in Section 3.7.
But, before getting into the technical details, we provide an informal overview of our model
in Section 3.1.1, followed by a summary of the major contributions of this chapter in Sec-
tion 3.1.2, and review of relevant literature in Section 3.2.
3.1.1 A model for manipulation
In our two-player model, the agents are called Alice and Bob; before the game commences,
each of them receives a private signal about some underlying entity. In the first stage of
the game, both players have the opportunity to participate (sequentially), once each, in a
prediction market mediated by a (variant of a) market scoring rule (MSR) introduced in
Chapter 2. Alice moves first; Bob may or may not participate in trading depending on his
type, and, if he does, he goes second. In the second stage, the two players simultaneously (and
independently) take actions which we term “votes”10 for convenience, although in general
they model each participant’s role in determining the outcome. For example, for a product
release date prediction market, a (binary) private signal could stand for whether an agent
knows / believes she is capable of contributing her share in making sure that the launch is on
time; her (binary) “vote” in this case would indicate whether she actually puts in her share
of the requisite effort. The payoffs from the first-stage prediction market are determined by
a simple function of the stage-two votes. If Bob has not traded, his vote is consistent with
his private signal, otherwise he is strategic; Alice is always strategic.
10The nomenclature is inspired by a vote-share prediction market, e.g. Chakraborty et al. (2013).
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Our model directly captures the experiments of Chakraborty et al. (2013) where prediction
markets with student participants were used to forecast the fraction of “up” (vs “down”)
ratings given by students to course instructors. Moreover, Augur, a “decentralized, open-
source platform for prediction markets” slated for live release in 2017 (Peterson and Krug,
2015), is a real-world mechanism with manipulation incentives similar to those in our model:
A consensus, computed from votes cast by participants called “reporters”, serves as a proxy
for the payoff-deciding ground truth of a market on which these reporters can also wager.
3.1.2 Contributions
The above model yields several interesting insights. Our main result is that the equilibria
of the game can be cleanly categorized into two types, depending on Bob’s probability of
participation in the trading stage. Below a threshold on Bob’s participation probability,
say p˜ (a function of the MSR used and the signal structure), we call the equilibrium a low
participation probability equilibrium (LPPE), and above p˜, we call it a high participation
probability equilibrium (HPPE). In an LPPE, Alice essentially predicts Bob’s vote, and
then bases her trading on the optimal combination of her own and Bob’s votes, and the
prediction market price is reflective of the expected outcome. In an HPPE, on the contrary,
Alice effectively expects Bob to enter and collude with her, and she chooses a market position
that allows Bob and her to split the maximum extractable profit from the market mechanism,
i.e. the MSR’s worst-case loss, in a (not necessarily even) ratio dependent on the MSR. The
following implications of the equilibria are noteworthy:
(a) Informativeness of prices about outcome: The price after Alice trades is equal to her
posterior expectation of the market outcome given her signal and her trading action
(hence, an efficient disseminator of information about the outcome at that point) in
an LPPE, but contains only partial information about the final outcome in an HPPE.
If Bob trades, the final market price is an accurate forecast of the actual outcome.
(b) Consistency of actions with signals: We provide a full characterization of signal struc-
tures under which Alice’s actions are consistent with (or, at least, indicative of) her
private signal. If Bob does participate in the trading stage, his actions are fully deter-
mined by Alice’s trading choice, independent of his signal.
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(c) Effectiveness of prediction markets in the face of participants who influence outcomes
substantially: One implication of point (b) above is that, as long as some fraction of the
outcome-deciders refrain from market participation and are truthful in their outcome-
affecting actions (proxied in our model by Bob with his non-zero non-participation
probability), the introduction of a prediction market to elicit forecasts prior to the
occurrence of the outcome-deciding process is less likely to produce damaging incentives
in the sense that even the potential manipulator Alice is forced to act, under certain
conditions, as if she were truthful.
(d) Choice of market scoring rule: The equilibrium strategies of Alice and Bob, and the
resulting market properties, have a strong dependence on the the functional form of the
MSR used, as shown by Tables , Sections . Thus, our analysis also provides guidelines
on the the scoring rule a designer can use to implement the prediction market if she
wants to achieve certain marker properties.
(e) Strategizing by a one-shot trader on point of entry: The above properties are important
from the perspective of a market observer and / or the market designer, but our results
have implications for the agents too, particularly if they are free to choose when to
interact with the market maker rather than in a pre-defined sequence. In an extreme
case of our two-player model – when both Alice and Bob are deterministically strategic,
and this is common knowledge – our results show that the first mover Alice may sustain
a higher or lower profit (in equilibrium) than the second mover depending on the MSR
used, hence it depends on the MSR whether it is better to be enter the market earlier
or later.
Incentivizing truthful trading and voting: In Section 3.8, we return to the mar-
ket design question, and propose a remedy for manipulation in an extension of the above
two-stage game with n ≥ 2 participants, by introducing two modifications: first, we put
a budget constraint on every trader which limits the amount by which she can alter the
observed market price; second, we combine the prediction market with a payment scheme
based on the peer prediction method (Miller et al., 2005; Jurca and Faltings, 2009) for the
voting mechanism, by tuning parameters, in order to obtain desirable incentive compatibility
properties. We also analyze the level of subsidy needed in the combined prediction / voting
mechanism.
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3.2 Related work
This chapter relates most directly to three major strands of literature: (1) Incentives and
manipulation in prediction markets, (2) Insider trading in financial markets, (3) Information
elicitation when the “ground truth” is not revealed.
(1) The literature on incentives in prediction markets is growing ever since Hanson (2003b)
introduced the concept of market scoring rules. Chen et al. (2009) and Gao et al. (2013) have
studied the effect of non-myopic strategies on an LMSR market modeled as an extensive-form
Bayesian game, under various private information structures of the participants who trade
repeatedly. We consider agents that are still interact at most once each with the market
mechanism but manipulation incentives arise from another source: their power to affect the
forecast event.
Incentives for manipulation in prediction markets may arise in a number of ways. There
are several contributions – both empirical / experimental (Hanson et al., 2006; Rhode and
Strumpf, 2006) and theoretical (Hanson and Oprea, 2009; Boutilier, 2012; Dimitrov and
Sami, 2010; Chen et al., 2011a; Huang and Shoham, 2014) – on price manipulation in pre-
diction markets: tampering with the market price by belief misrepresentation, perhaps even
at a monetary cost, so as to indirectly influence some decision that will be made by the
principal (market organizer) or non-participating market observers based on that price, e.g.
a politically motivated manipulator might make a large investment in an election predic-
tion market to make one of the candidates appear stronger (Rothschild and Sethi, 2016).
A related body of work pertains to decision markets – a collection of contingent markets
set up to predict the outcomes of different decisions such that only markets contingent on
decisions that are taken pay off, the rest being voided – a concept proposed by Hanson
(1999) and built on by several groups (Othman and Sandholm, 2010; Chen et al., 2011b). In
this chapter, we consider MSR-based prediction market settings, and not the above decision
markets. Moreover, the type of manipulation we are interested in is not price manipulation
but outcome manipulation where an agent can take an action that partially influences the
outcome to be predicted, and base her trading decision on her action choice and her relevant
belief about other agents.
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An early formal analysis of prediction market outcome manipulation is that of Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2007) on a two-outcome market model that follows the rules of the Iowa Electronic
Markets (Berg and Rietz, 2006). Their results apply to a rational expectations equilibrium
setting with agents having constant absolute risk aversion utility functions, and they do
not take the market microstructure into account. We explicitly model the microstructure,
focusing on market scoring rules – a well-studied prediction market mechanism that is widely
used in practice (Jian and Sami, 2012) – under a different agent model. More recently, Shi
et al. (2009) have introduced “principal-aligned scoring rules” (a refinement of proper scoring
rules) to provide disincentives for extraneous manipulations by traders that can modify the
probability distribution over outcomes so as to reduce the expected utility of the principal.
However, this technique works only when the principal’s utility vector over outcomes is
publicly known, at least in a probabilistic sense. Moreover, it provides clear incentives
for manipulations that are beneficial to the principal in expectation (which might not be
desirable in some cases).
(2) The second major body of literature comes from theoretical finance and market mi-
crostructure. What happens if there is an “insider” – a market participant who knows the
liquidation value (i.e. final gross monetary worth after revelation of the outcome) of a se-
curity, and can trade on this information? Kyle (1985) proposed a seminal model of insider
trading, and characterized the rate at which a monopolist insider’s information gets dissem-
inated into market prices in the presence of noise trading and a risk-neutral market-maker.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) presented another view of how asymmetric information affects
price formation, and their model has been adapted for market making in prediction markets
(Das, 2008a; Brahma et al., 2012). There has also been work on extending Kyle’s model to
competing traders with inside information (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Foster and
Viswanathan, 1996). Ostrovsky (2012) examined information aggregation with differentially
informed traders in a general information framework under both Kyle’s pricing model and
market scoring rules. Again, in all of these models, the liquidation value of the market se-
curity is assumed to be exogenously determined, so there is no interaction between trading
behavior and the behavior that produces the market outcome, unlike in our model.
(3) In the last part of this chapter, we use peer prediction to align the incentives of partic-
ipants in the two-stage game we propose here. This idea is motivated by the literature on
providing truth-telling incentives in traditional means of opinion or information gathering
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such as surveys, polls, and reputation systems that can be subsumed under “information
elicitation sans verification” (Waggoner and Chen, 2013). Prelec et al. have developed and
experimented with the Bayesian Truth Serum or BTS (Prelec, 2004; Prelec and Seung, 2007;
Weaver and Prelec, 2012). In this method, each respondent is required to answer a multiple-
choice question and predict the distribution of responses from the entire population; she is
then assigned a score which rewards an answer whose observed frequency is higher than the
average predicted frequency and penalizes a bad prediction of population response. Under
mild assumptions, this technique induces a Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy of reporting
one’s private information provided that there is a large number of participants. Several
extensions of BTS have been proposed (e.g. Radanovic and Faltings (2014) and references
therein).
Miller et al. (2005) proposed the peer prediction method (PP) that adapts the concept of
proper scoring rules to the problem of rating. This method scores a rater with respect to the
posterior belief that her report induces on another rater’s report, assuming a common prior
and likelihood structure known to the mechanism. This idea has spawned an interesting
line of research (e.g. Witkowski and Parkes (2012) and references therein). Witkowski and
Parkes (2012) introduce two variants of PP that elicit two temporally separated reports
from each agent, at least one of which is a belief report about another agent’s signal. These
latter techniques can work for arbitrary subjective priors but are restricted to binary signal
domains.
The situations we are interested in analyzing in this chapter are not the ones for which BTS
or PP were derived. They are intended to solve the problem of getting people to vote, or give
their opinion. The kinds of settings we are interested in are ones where people would already
vote / give their opinion / do their work “honestly”, but the introduction of a prediction
market may change their incentive to do so. Therefore, while the ideas from this literature
will turn out to be useful, we cannot simply apply BTS or PP in the first place and ignore the
existence of the prediction market (keeping in mind that the concept of a prediction market
serves as useful shorthand in our model, but this could equally be a liquid real money futures
market or the like).
It is worth mentioning here that our idea of achieving incentive compatibility by a two-stage
game in Section 3.8, each stage having monetary transfers between the principal and the
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participants, is similar in spirit to work on auction design (Cre´mer and McLean, 1988) that
predates peer prediction. Cre´mer and McLean design a two-stage mechanism for a seller
of a single item who is unaware of the potential buyers’ valuations. In the first stage, each
bidder makes a payment, conditional on her peers’ announced valuations, to the seller for a
“lottery” to win the item. In the second stage, bidders declare their types and the winner
pays her announced valuation. The second stage by itself would not be truthful but the
authors show that, under certain information structures, the combined payoff from the two
stages induces dominant strategy or Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility, enabling the seller
to “extract the full surplus.”
3.3 Model and definitions
Let τ ∈ T denote the unobservable true value of the random variable on which both the
prediction market and the outcome-deciding (voting) system are predicated. At t = 0, the
two agents, Alice and Bob (A and B in subscripts), receive private signals sA, sB ∈ Ω = {0, 1}
respectively. The signal structure, comprising the prior distribution Pr(τ) on the true value
and the conditional joint distribution Pr(sA, sB|τ) of the private signals given the true value,
is common knowledge.
Let q0(·) denote Alice’s posterior probability that Bob received the signal sB = 0, given her
own signal and common knowledge, i.e.
q0(s) , Pr (sB = 0|sA = s) =
∑
τ∈T Pr(sA = s, sB = 0|τ) Pr(τ)∑
τ∈T Pr(sA = s|τ) Pr(τ)
∀s ∈ {0, 1}. (3.1)
In this chapter, we ignore the uninteresting special cases q0 ∈ {0, 1} which correspond
to Alice having no uncertainty about her peer Bob’s private signal. We need no further
assumptions on the signal structure for our main result (Theorem 4) since it depends only
on the magnitude of q0 regardless of how it is evaluated. We shall discuss a specific signal
structure in Section 3.6. However, it is worthwhile to define here the property of stochastic
relevance (Miller et al., 2005) which is a necessary assumption for one of our important
corollaries (Corollary 1).
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Definition 3. For binary random variables si, sj ∈ {0, 1}, sj is said to be stochastically
relevant for si if and only if the posterior distribution of si given sj is different for different
realizations of sj, i.e. if and only if Pr(si = 0|sj = 0) 6= Pr(si = 0|sj = 1).
An important implication of the above definition for our model is that if sA is stochastically
relevant for sB, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the value s of Alice’s signal and
q0(s) = Pr (sB = 0|sA = s); i.e. if we could somehow learn the value of q0, then we would be
able to extract Alice’s signal unambiguously from it.
We now describe the rules of the two-stage game comprising the market and voting mecha-
nisms. We will call this the trading-voting game, and assume that its rules are known to all
participants and observers.
Stage 1 (market stage): The market price at any time-step t is public, the starting price
at t = 0 being p0 which is the market designer’s baseline estimate of the liquidation value,
i.e. the final gross payoff per unit of the prediction market security which, in our setting, is
identical to the market outcome (see Stage 2 below).
Because the market outcome for this problem has a different structure from that in Chap-
ter 2, the prediction market is implemented using a slight variation of the market scoring
rule (MSR) algorithm introduced in Chapter 2: As usual, we denote the underlying strictly
proper scoring rule as s(r, ω), where ω is the true (revealed) market outcome, and r is an
agent’s forecast / report on it but we now use a formulation of the rule that is used for
elicitation of personal expectations of a continuous random variable ω ∈ [0, 1] and not per-
sonal probabilities. The principle is a natural extension to that in our Chapter 2 formulation:
strict propriety implies that if an agent is promised an ex post compensation of s(r, ω), then
the only way she can maximize her subjective expectation of her ex post compensation is by
reporting her expectation of the random variable ω as her forecast r. Similar formulations
were used by Ostrovsky (2012) for theoretical analyses and by Chakraborty et al. (2013) for
experiments. Moreover, for a clean analysis, we shall focus on strictly proper rules satisfy-
ing some regularity and smoothness conditions (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007; Abernethy and
42
Frongillo, 2012):
s(r, ω) =
f(ω), r = ωf(r) + f ′(r)(ω − r), otherwise , ω, r ∈ [0, 1] (3.2)
where f(·) is a continuous, finite, strictly convex function on [0, 1]; its first derivative f ′(·) is
continuous, monotonically increasing, and finite on [0, 1] except possibly that f ′(0) = −∞ or
f ′(1) =∞; its second derivative f ′′(·) is positive11 on [0, 1] and finite in (0, 1). Additionally,
we need the function to have the following symmetry:
f(1+y
2
)− f(1−y
2
) = yf ′(1
2
) ∀y ∈ [0, 1]. (3.3)
Henceforth, we shall refer to (market) scoring rules possessing all the above properties as
symmetric well-behaved (market) scoring rules.12 This covers a large family of MSRs that
includes three of the most widely used and studied – (LMSR), quadratic (QMSR), and
spherical (SMSR) – respectively defined as:
LMSR: s(r, ω) = ω ln r + (1− ω) ln(1− r),
QMSR: s(r, ω) = ω2 − (ω − r)2,
SMSR: s(r, ω) = (rω + (1− r)(1− ω)) /
√
r2 + (1− r)2.
At t = 1, Alice interacts with the market maker, and takes such as position as to change
the price to pA. At t = 2, Bob has an opportunity to trade but may not show up with a
commonly known probability pi ∈ [0, 1] called Bob’s non-participation probability ; if he does
trade, he changes the price to pB. Regardless of whether Bob trades, the market terminates
after t = 2.
11The strict positivity of f ′′(·) is sufficient but not necessary for the strict convexity of f(·) to hold on [0, 1]
(all we need is non-negativity). Nevertheless, for technical convenience, we shall restrict our presentation to
convex functions with strictly positive second derivatives, and refer to such functions only when we use the
expression “strict convexity”, in a slight abuse of terminology.
12Note that the definition of “well-behaved” used here is slightly different from that in Chapter 2 but this
overloading of terms should not create a confusion since this term is not relevant to subsequent chapters,
and follows the new definition throughout this chapter.
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Stage 2 (voting stage): In this stage, Alice and Bob simultaneously declare their “votes”
vA, vB ∈ Ω. Taking part in Stage 2 is mandatory for both agents.
We define truthful voting as declaring one’s private signal as one’s vote, i.e. vk = sk,
k ∈ {A,B}.
We assume that, if Bob did not trade in Stage 1, he votes truthfully, and we call such a
Bob honest. Any agent participating in the prediction market is Bayesian, strategic, and
risk-neutral. Hence, if Bob trades, we refer to him as strategic Bob.
The liquidation value of the security, i.e. the market outcome, is given by the average13 vote
v = (vA + vB) /2 ∈ {0, 12 , 1}. The ex post net payoffs of Alice and Bob, which we will also
sometimes refer to as their profits, follow from the definition of a market scoring rule as a
sequentially shared proper scoring rule Hanson (2007a), and are respectively given by
RA(pA, p0, vA, vB) = s(pA, vA+vB2 )− s(p0, vA+vB2 ),
RB(pB, pA, vA, vB) = s(pB, vA+vB2 )− s(pA, vA+vB2 ).
(3.4)
This completes the technical description of our model, but there are a few points worth
noting here:
• Agents derive utility solely from their profits in the prediction market, and have no
vested interest in any realized outcome although they have power to influence it, exactly
as in the works of Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007) and Shi et al. (2009); this can be
viewed as a model of agents who are inherently non-strategic in the absence of any
financial incentives, as is often experimentally observed (e.g. Gao et al. (2014)).
• Bob does not strategically decide whether to take part in the prediction market; it
is determined extraneously – the proclivity to trade can be viewed as one of the two
independent components of Bob’s type, the other being his private signal sB: The
complete distribution of Bob’s type is given by the signal structure detailed above and
the two-point distribution {Pr(honest Bob) = pi,Pr(strategic Bob) = 1−pi}. Here,
13In general, we can have v = αvA + (1− α)vB , α ∈ (0, 1), where α models Alice’s degree of control over
the final outcome. In this chapter, we focus on the special case α = 12 as a starting point where both agents
are equally powerful.
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honest Bob models agents who remain unaffected by the introduction of the prediction
market owing to social norms or some exogenous payoff.14 Among other things, we
aim to study what effect, if any, the uncertainty around the market participation of
some outcome-deciders has on the actions of a strategic agent when there is incentive
for manipulation.
In the rest of the chapter, we will often use the terms Stage 1 action and trading action
to denote pA, pB, and Stage 2 action to denote vA, vB. Unlike in a traditional predic-
tion market, the true value τ of the underlying random variable is never revealed in this
trading-voting game. However, if every agent were to vote truthfully (and this were com-
mon knowledge), then by the properties of MSRs, an agent’s expected net payoff would be
maximized by “reporting”, in Stage 1, her posterior expectation of the liquidation value v.
With this in mind, we will sometimes refer to pA and pB as the “reports” or “price-reports”
of Alice and Bob respectively.
3.4 Equilibrium analysis of the two-player game
The solution concept we will use for the two-stage trading-voting game described in Sec-
tion 3.3 is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) which is a refinement of Nash equilibria
for Bayesian games (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). A PBE is a specification of an assessment,
comprising a strategy and a belief structure, for each player such that each player’s action
according to her strategy and belief at any stage of the game is a “best reponse” (sequential
rationality), and each player’s belief about all currently unknown aspects of the game at any
stage is obtained from all players’ actions until that stage using Bayesian inference whenever
possible (consistency). For this game, a strategy profile of the players Alice and Bob is a
specification of the vector ((pA, vA), (pB, vB)), and we shall denote a PBE strategy profile by
((pPBEA , v
PBE
A ), (p
PBE
B , v
PBE
B )).
14For an MSR-mediated prediction market, Alice’s payoff function (3.4) depends only on Bob’s Stage 2
action vB and not on his Stage 1 action pB . Hence, our results for Alice in Section 3.4 also apply to a
slightly modified model where honest Bob can still trade strategically in Stage 1 but is constrained to vote
truthfully in Stage 2.
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In the game under consideration, Alice makes her first move by updating the market price
from p0 to pA which becomes publicly known; then, Bob makes his first move by either
participating in the market and revising pA to the publicly observable pB or not participating,
the latter being equivalent to setting pB = pA; after this sequential first stage, both Alice
and Bob make their second moves (picking vA and vB respectively) simultaneously. Thus,
our analysis of the game consists of the following three steps:
1. Lemma 5 delineates the inference about Alice’s second move vA that can be drawn by
the rest of the world including Bob from her Stage 1 action pA, for any p0 ∈ (0, 1).
2. Lemma 6 presents, for any p0 ∈ (0, 1), strategic Bob’s best response (pB, vB) to his
observation of pA and belief about vA; it also tells us what inference about vB the rest
of the world including Alice can draw from pB in this case. We already know that, for
honest Bob, pB = pA and vB = sB.
3. Finally, Theorem 4 completes the equilibrium specification for the particular case of
p0 =
1
2
by providing Alice’s best choices for pA and vA given her signal, her knowledge
of the above two lemmas, and her observation of pB.
Lemma 5. For the trading-voting game described in Section 3.3, if the prediction market
has a starting price p0 ∈ (0, 1), and (pA, vA) denotes Alice’s combined action in the two-stage
game, i.e. her report-vote pair, then
• for any pA < p0, Alice’s action (pA, 0) strictly dominates (pA, 1);
• for any pA > p0, her action (pA, 1) strictly dominates (pA, 0); and
• she is indifferent between the actions (p0, 0) and (p0, 1).
This result holds regardless of Bob’s report-vote pair (pB, vB).
Informally, if Alice pulls the market price down (resp. up) from its initial value, she is
“forecasting” that the final outcome will be lower (resp. higher) than the market’s initial
estimate and, since her payoff is higher for a prediction closer to the realized outcome (the
average vote), it is in her best interest to do everything in her power to ensure a low (resp.
high) average vote.
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Proof. Using equations (3.4) and (3.2), we can show by simple algebra that, for any pA, the
difference between Alice’s profits for voting vA = 1 and vA = 0 is
RA(pA, p0, 1, vB)−RA(pA, p0, 0, vB) = 12 (f ′(pA)− f ′(p0)) , ∀vB ∈ {0, 1}.
From the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·) for a symmetric well-behaved MSR, we have
pA R p0 ⇐⇒ f ′(pA) R f ′(p0) ⇐⇒ RA(pA, p0, 1, vB) R RA(pA, p0, 0, vB)
for pA ∈ [0, 1]. Thus Alice’s optimal vote, regardless of Bob’s actions, is vA = 0 if pA < p0
and vA = 1 if pA > p0; she is indifferent only if pA = p0.
The above theorem implies that immediately after Alice has traded, one can infer that vA = 0
deterministically if pA < p0, vA = 1 deterministically if pA > p0. However, if pA = p0, which
is equivalent to Alice not trading with the market maker, the rules of the game do not allow
Bob to predict vA deterministically: He knows that Alice does not stand to make any profit
from the market regardless of the outcome, and hence, must be indifferent between voting
0 and 1. Hence, it is reasonable to assume a belief structure in which Bob’s posterior belief
assigns equals probabilities to vA = 0 and vA = 1 whenever pA = p0.
15
Assumption 1. If PB denotes Bob’s posterior belief (about Alice’s vote), given his signal
sB and Alice’s price report pA, then for any signal s ∈ 0, 1,
PB(vA = 0|sB = s, pA = p0) = PB(vA = 1|sB = s, pA = p0) = 12 .
Obviously, PB(vA = 0|sB = s, pA < p0) = PB(vA = 1|sB = s, pA > p0) = 1, by Lemma 5.
Before we proceed further with our analysis, we will define two positive proper fractional
quantities that are purely functions of the structure of the MSR used for designing the predic-
tion market and play key roles in determining the equilibrium of the game. We can invoke
the mean value theorem to show that, for a symmetric well-behaved MSR, the equation
15We shall later see in Sections 3.4.1 through 3.4.3 that, for the case p0 =
1
2 which are main focus in this
paper, Alice never leaves the market price unchanged in equilibrium for any positive value of Bob’s non-
participation probability pi. But, we still include a discussion of the case pA = p0 for the sake of completing
the PBE description.
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f ′(r) = (f(1
2
)− f(0))/(1
2
− 0) has a root in (0, 1
2
), which is unique owing to the monotonicity
of f ′(·); let this root be denoted by pL, i.e.
pL , (f ′)−1
(
2
(
f(1
2
)− f(0)) ) ∈ (0, 1
2
). (3.5)
Similarly, let pH denote the unique root of the equation f ′(r) = (f(1) − f(1
2
))/(1 − 1
2
) in
(1
2
, 1), i.e.
pH , (f ′)−1
(
2
(
f(1)− f(1
2
)
) ) ∈ (1
2
, 1). (3.6)
We call pL and pH the “lower threshold” and “upper threshold” of the MSR respectively
since they mark points of discontinuity in the players’ equilibrium behavior, as we will see
shortly. From the definitions, it is obvious that
0 < pL < 1
2
< pH < 1. (3.7)
Moreover, using definitions (3.5) and (3.6) and the symmetry condition (3.3), we can obtain
the following results (the detailed proof is in Appendix B Section B.1).
Proposition 2. For a symmetric well-behaved market scoring rule, the lower and upper
thresholds pL, pH defined in (3.5) and (3.6) satisfy the equalities
f ′(pL) + f ′(pH) = 2f ′(1
2
); (3.8)
pL + pH = 1; (3.9)
f(pH)− f(pL) = (2pH − 1)f ′(1
2
) = (1− 2pL)f ′(1
2
). (3.10)
Table 3.1 provides the functional forms of f(·) and f ′(·), and the values of the thresholds
pL, pH for each of the three specific MSRs mentioned in Section 3.3.
Notice that, as soon as strategic Bob arrives to trade, he acquires all the information
relevant to his decision making procedure that the rules of the game allow him to have (he
can observe both p0 and pA, and draw inference about vA in accordance with Lemma 5);
Bob also knows that he and Alice are the only outcome-deciders and, even if an agent traded
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LMSR QMSR SMSR
f(r)
{
r ln r + (1− r) ln(1− r) 0 < r < 1,
0 r ∈ {0, 1} r
2
√
r2 + (1− r)2
f ′(r) ln
(
r
1−r
)
2r 2r−1√
r2+(1−r)2
pL 0.2 0.25 12
(
1−
√√
2−1
2
)
≈ 0.2725
pH 0.8 0.75 12
(
1 +
√√
2−1
2
)
≈ 0.7275
Table 3.1: Structural properties of the three representative market scoring rules considered
in this paper.
after him, that agent would have no effect on his payoff. Thus, strategic Bob makes his
trading and voting decisions (pB, vB) simultaneously.
Lemma 6. For the trading-voting game described in Section 3.3, where the market scoring
rule has lower and upper thresholds pL, pH , and has a starting price p0 ∈ (0, 1),
• if pA < p0, then strategic Bob’s best-response vote is vB = 1 (resp. vB = 0) if
pA < p
L (resp. pA > p
L) but he is indifferent between the two possible voting choices if
pA = p
L, and his accompanying price-report is pB =
1+vB
2
;
• if pA > p0, then strategic Bob’s best-response vote is vB = 1 (resp. vB = 0) if
pA < p
H (resp. pA > p
H) but he is indifferent between the two possible voting choices
if pA = p
H , and his accompanying price-report is pB =
1+vB
2
;
• if pA = p0, then strategic Bob’s best-response vote is vB = 0 (resp. vB = 1) if
p0 >
1
2
(resp. p0 <
1
2
) but he is indifferent if p0 =
1
2
, and his accompanying price-report
is pB =
1
2
+vB
2
.
This result is independent of Bob’s private signal sB.
Before proving the above lemma, we present a detailed tabular representation of the results
of Lemmas 5 and 6 in Table 3.2. Evidently, the quantities pL, pH , and p0 split the possible
range of market prices [0, 1] into three or four sub-intervals depending on their relative
magnitudes such that strategic Bob’s best response is to “disagree with” Alice’s voting
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choice (revealed through pA) in Stage 2 if Alice’s price-report pA lies in either of the “outer”
sub-intervals [0,min(p0, p
L)) or (max(p0, p
H), 1], and to “agree with” Alice if pA lies in the
remaining one or two “inner” sub-interval(s) between min(p0, p
L) and max(p0, p
H); in any of
these situations (except pA = p0), strategic Bob knows exactly what the market outcome
v is going to be, so he can make a perfect forecast pB = v. The special cases pA ∈ {pL, pH , p0}
represent points of transition in best-response characteristics.
Proof. If pA 6= p0, Bob knows vA unambiguously. So, by the properties of a symmetric well-
behaved MSR, Bob’s payoff function RB (pB, pA, vA, vB) from (3.4) is maximized uniquely
at pB =
vA+vB
2
for any vB, i.e. his combined two-stage action (
vA
2
, 0) dominates (p, 0) for any
p 6= vA
2
, and (vA+1
2
, 1) dominates (p, 1) for any p 6= vA+1
2
. Hence, for a known vA, it suffices to
compare RB(vA2 , pA, vA, 0) and RB(vA+12 , pA, vA, 1) to determine strategic Bob’s optimal
decision.
Case I: pA < p0 ⇒ vA = 0 from Lemma 5. In this scenario, strategic Bob selects action
(pB = 0, vB = 0) if RB(0, pA, 0, 0) is larger and (pB = 12 , vB = 1) if RB(12 , pA, 0, 1) is larger.
The difference simplifies to
RB(12 , pA, 0, 1)−RB(0, pA, 0, 0) =
[
2
(
f(1
2
)− f(0))− f ′(pA)] /2
=
[
f ′(pL)− f ′(pA)
]
/2, by (3.5).
Then, since f ′(·) is strictly increasing,
pA R pL ⇐⇒ f ′(pA) R f ′(pL) ⇐⇒ RB(12 , pA, 0, 1) Q RB(0, pA, 0, 0).
Thus, if strategic Bob observes that pA is smaller than p0, his best response is to report
pB =
1
2
and vote vB = 1 if pA is also smaller than p
L (which is always true if p0 < p
L) but
to report pB = 0 and vote vB = 0 if pA exceeds p
L (which is possible for a pA smaller than
p0 only if p
L < p0), and to be indifferent between these two actions if pA = p
L.
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p0 pA Best vA
Best (pB, vB)
for strategic Bob
0 < p0 ≤ pL 0 ≤ pA < p0 0
(
1
2
, 1
)
pA = p0 0 or 1
(
3
4
, 1
)
p0 < pA < p
H 1 (1, 1)
pA = p
H 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
or (1, 1)
pH < pA ≤ 1 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
pL < p0 <
1
2
0 ≤ pA < pL 0
(
1
2
, 1
)
pA = p
L 0 (0, 0) or
(
1
2
, 1
)
pL < pA < p0 0 (0, 0)
pA = p0 0 or 1
(
3
4
, 1
)
p0 < pA < p
H 1 (1, 1)
pA = p
H 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
or (1, 1)
pH < pA ≤ 1 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
p0 =
1
2
0 ≤ pA < pL 0
(
1
2
, 1
)
pA = p
L 0 (0, 0) or
(
1
2
, 1
)
pL < pA < p0 0 (0, 0)
pA = p0 0 or 1
(
1
4
, 0
)
or
(
3
4
, 1
)
p0 < pA < p
H 1 (1, 1)
pA = p
H 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
or (1, 1)
pH < pA ≤ 1 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
1
2
< p0 < p
H 0 ≤ pA < pL 0
(
1
2
, 1
)
pA = p
L 0 (0, 0) or
(
1
2
, 1
)
pL < pA < p0 0 (0, 0)
pA = p0 0 or 1
(
1
4
, 0
)
p0 < pA < p
H 1 (1, 1)
pA = p
H 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
or (1, 1)
pH < pA ≤ 1 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
pH ≤ p0 < 1 0 ≤ pA < pL 0
(
1
2
, 1
)
pA = p
L 0 (0, 0) or
(
1
2
, 1
)
pL < pA < p0 0 (0, 0)
pA = p0 0 or 1
(
1
4
, 0
)
p0 < pA ≤ 1 1
(
1
2
, 0
)
Table 3.2: Alice’s best vote and Bob’s best report-vote pair if he trades, given starting price
p0 and Alice’s report pA. Recall that p
L ∈ (0, 1
2
) and pH ∈ (1
2
, 1) for any symmetric well-
behaved MSR, hence the table covers all possible combinations of the values of pL, pH , and
p0. Theorem 4 applies to the p0 =
1
2
shown in the middle of the table.
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Case II: pA > p0 ⇒ vA = 1 from Lemma 5. Arguing as before, we now need to consider the
difference
RB(1, pA, 1, 1)−RB(12 , pA, 1, 0) =
[
2
(
f(1)− f(1
2
)
)− f ′(pA)] /2
=
[
f ′(pH)− f ′(pA)
]
/2, by (3.6).
Again, from the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·),
pA R pH ⇐⇒ f ′(pA) R f ′(pH) ⇐⇒ RB(1, pA, 1, 1) Q RB(12 , pA, 1, 0).
Thus, if strategic Bob observes that pA is larger than p0, his best response is to report
pB =
1
2
and vote vB = 0if pA is also larger than p
H (which is always true if p0 > p
H) but to
report pB = 1 and vote vB = 1 if pA is smaller than p
H (which is possible for a pA larger
than p0 only if p
H > p0), and to be indifferent between these two actions if pA = p
H .
Case III: pA = p0. Let us define
R̂p0B (pB, vB) , EPB [RB(pB, pA, vA, vB)|pA = p0],
where PB is Bob’s posterior as defined in Assumption 1. Clearly, EPB [vA|pA = p0] = 12 .
On simplification using the linearity of expectation, for any vB, we have
R̂p0B (pB, vB) = f(pB) + f ′(pB)
(
1
2
+vB
2
− pB
)
− f(p0)− f ′(p0)
(
1
2
+vB
2
− p0
)
≤ f
( 1
2
+vB
2
)
− f(p0)− f ′(p0)
(
1
2
+vB
2
− p0
)
∀pB ∈ [0, 1],
equality holding only at pB =
1
2
+vB
2
due to strict convexity of f(·)
= RB
( 1
2
+vB
2
, p0,
1
2
, vB
)
, vB ∈ {0, 1}.
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Hence, Bob’s problem of choosing an action reduces to considering the difference
RB
( 1
2
+1
2
, p0,
1
2
, 1
)
−RB
( 1
2
+0
2
, p0,
1
2
, 0
)
= f(3
4
)− f(1
4
)− f ′(p0)/2
=
[
f(3
4
)− f(1
4
)
1
2
− f ′(p0)
]
/2
=
[
f ′(1
2
)− f ′(p0)
]
/2 by symmetry condition (3.3) with y = 1
2
.
Thus, by the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·), strategic Bob should choose (pB = 14 , vB =
0), or (pB =
3
4
, vB = 1), or should remain indifferent between these two choices according to
whether p0 (= pA) is larger than, smaller than, or equal to
1
2
respectively.
Now that we have fully characterized how the game unfolds (in a PBE) after Alice has taken
her Stage 1 action, the next and final step towards completing the equilibrium specification
is to figure out her best-response price-report pA. For the rest of the analysis, we will
assume that the strategic selfish-rational agent Alice bases her trading decision on her belief
about Bob’s action, quantified by q0 defined in (3.1) and Bob’s non-participation probability
pi ∈ [0, 1], as well as on her knowledge of Lemmas 5 and 6 above. It is germane at this
point to articulate a somewhat surprising implication of Lemma 5: Although Alice can see
Bob’s first move pB between making her own first and second moves, this additional piece
of information has no bearing on her voting choice once she has already taken her Stage 1
action.
To understand the impact of pi on Alice’s decision and hence the game outcome, let us first
consider the two extreme cases pi = 1 and pi = 0.
3.4.1 Equilibrium when Bob’s non-participation is certain (pi = 1)
In this scenario, Alice knows that there is another outcome-decider Bob who will vote ac-
cording to his private signal (i.e. vB = sB), and there is no way for her to influence vB
through her maket action. Hence, if PA represents Alice’s subjective belief about all uncer-
tain aspects of the game (including Bob’s unobserved private signal and the future Stage
2 outcome) given her private signal, then the “equilibrium” is fully described by specifying
Alice’s report-vote pair (pA, vA) that optimizes the expectation with respect to P
A of her
53
net payoff in this one-player game. For pi = 1,
EPA [vB] = EPA [sB] = 0 · q0 + 1 · (1− q0) = 1− q0, (3.11)
where q0 = q0(s), defined in equation (3.1), is Alice’s subjective probability of Bob’s signal
being 0 given her own private signal. Let us define
R̂A(pA, vA) , EPA [RA(pA, p0, vA, vB)|sA, p0] .
Then, from equations (3.2), (3.4), and (3.11), using the linearity of expectation, we have,
R̂A(pA, vA) = f(pA) + f ′(pA)
(
vA+1−q0
2
− pA
)− f(p0)− f ′(p0) (vA+1−q02 − p0)
≤ RA(vA+1−q02 , p0, vA, 1− q0) ∀pA ∈ [0, 1],
equality holding only for pA =
vA+1−q0
2
. Thus, for determining Alice’s best response, it
suffices to compare RA(1−q02 , p0, 0, 1− q0) and RA(1− q02 , p0, 1, 1− q0); the difference between
them simplifies to
∆RA(q0, p0) , RA(1− q02 , p0, 1, 1− q0)−RA(1−q02 , p0, 0, 1− q0)
= f(1− q0
2
)− f(1−q0
2
)− 1
2
f ′(p0)
=
[
(1− q0)f ′(12) + f( q02 )
]− f(1−q0
2
)− 1
2
f ′(p0)
= f(1− q0
2
)− [f(1+q0
2
)− q0f ′(12)
]− 1
2
f ′(p0),
the last two equalities following from the symmetry condition (3.3), plugging in y = 1 − q0
and y = q0 respectively.
Obviously, Alice should take the action (pA =
1−q0
2
, vA = 0) if ∆RA(q0, p0) < 0, the action
(pA = 1 − q02 , vA = 1) if ∆RA(q0, p0) > 0, and should be indifferent between these two
actions otherwise. Thus, for a general value of p0, Alice’s decision making depends in a
complex manner, through ∆RA(q0, p0), on the interaction between the properties of the
convex function f(·) and the magnitudes of q0 and p0, and so her equilibrium action cannot
be expressed as a simple function of her posterior belief q0. However, for the special but
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practically important case p0 =
1
2
, we can obtain clean and insightful results as follows.
∆RA(q0,
1
2
) = (1
2
− q0)f ′(12) + f( q02 )− f(1−q02 ) = f(1− q02 )− f(1+q02 ) + (q0 − 12)f ′(12).
From the strict convexity of f(·), we have f( q0
2
) > f(1−q0
2
) + (q0 − 12)f ′(1−q02 ) so that
∆RA(q0,
1
2
) > (1
2
− q0)
(
f ′(1
2
)− f ′(1−q0
2
)
)
> 0, ∀q0 ∈ (0, 12)
since f ′(1
2
) > f ′(1−q0
2
) ∀q0 ∈ (0, 1) owing to the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·). Likewise,
we have f(1+q0
2
) > f(1− q0
2
) + (q0 − 12)f ′(1− q02 ) so that
∆RA(q0,
1
2
) < −(q0 − 12)
(
f ′(1− q0
2
)− f ′(1
2
)
)
< 0, ∀q0 ∈ (12 , 1)
since f ′(1− q0
2
) > f ′(1
2
) ∀q0 ∈ (0, 1) owing to the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·). Obviously,
∆RA(
1
2
, 1
2
) = 0.
We conclude that, for p0 =
1
2
and pi = 1, Alice’s equilibrium action is (pA =
1−q0
2
, vA = 0) if
q0 >
1
2
, and (pA = 1− q02 , vA = 1) if q0 < 12 . She is indifferent between the report-vote pairs
(pA =
1
4
, vA = 0) and (pA =
3
4
, vA = 1) if q0 =
1
2
.
In summary, if the market starts out with a uniform prior over all possible Stage 2 outcomes,
and it is commonly known that Bob is honest, then in a PBE, Alice picks the mode of her
(binary) posterior distribution over the possible values of Bob’s signal as her own vote vPBEA
after moving the market price to pPBEA =
vPBEA +1−q0
2
. Although it is unsurprising that the
strategic player Alice’s actions are not necessarily consistent with her private signal sA, the
above equilibrium analysis has certain interesting implications for the informativeness of her
price-report pPBEA that do not easily follow from intuition.
First of all, for p0 =
1
2
and any q0 ∈ (0, 1), note that pPBEA 6= p0; hence, using Lemma 5, we
can figure vPBEA out right as a simple function of p
PBE
A after Alice’s Stage 1 action:
vPBEA =
0 pPBEA < 12 ,1 pPBEA > 12 .
55
Next, since vB in this scenario has no dependence on p
PBE
A , it be shown be from the linearity
of (conditional) expectation that pPBEA satisfies the following fixed-point equation.
EPA
[
v|pA = pPBEA
]
=
vPBEA + EPA [vB]
2
=
vPBEA + (1− q0)
2
= pPBEA ,
i.e. Alice’s price-report is the Bayesian estimate of the market outcome given all the infor-
mation available to everyone in the world but Bob just after Alice takes her Stage 1 action.
Finally, note that
pPBEA = (1− q02 ) ∈ (34 , 1) ∀q0 ∈ (0, 12) =⇒ q0 = 2(1− pPBEA ) ∀pPBEA ∈ (34 , 1);
pPBEA =
1−q0
2
∈ (0, 1
4
) ∀q0 ∈ (12 , 0) =⇒ q0 = 1− 2pPBEA ∀pPBEA ∈ (0, 14);
pPBEA is either
1
4
or 3
4
only if q0 =
1
2
, and it can never lie in (1
4
, 3
4
). Hence, an external observer
can deduce Alice’s posterior belief q0 uniquely from pA in an equilibrium. If we further
assume the stochastic relevance of sA for sB (Definition 3) within a common-knowledge
signal structure, then the observer can recover Alice’s private signal sA from the above value
of q0, regardless of her actual vote (announced signal) vA! In view of these characteristics,
we can call an equilibrium of this type a “partially revealing equilibrium”.
3.4.2 Equilibrium when Bob’s participation is certain (pi = 0)
In this scenario, Alice knows that Bob’s signal has no bearing on his action and, in fact, she
can fully control his actions, as indicated in Lemma 6. From Table 3.2, it follows that for
pA lying in each of the outer sub-intervals [0,min(p0, p
L)) and (max(p0, p
H), 1], where Bob
(being deterministically strategic) definitely disagrees with Alice, the average vote is 1
2
so
that Alice’s ex post payoff is given by the function
R˜p0(pA) = RA(pA, p0, 0, 1) = RA(pA, p0, 1, 0)
= f(pA) + f
′(pA)
(
1
2
− pA
)− f(p0)− f ′(p0) (12 − p0) ∀p0 ∈ (0, 1).
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The first derivative of the above function with respect to pA over [0, 1] is given by
R˜′p0(pA) = f ′′(pA)
(
1
2
− pA
)
R 0 ⇐⇒ pA Q 12 since f ′′(pA) > 0.
Thus, R˜p0(·) is a strictly convex function for pA ∈ [0, 1] with a unique global maximum at
pA =
1
2
. Since min(p0, p
L) ≤ pL < 1
2
< pH ≤ max(p0, pH), the suprema of the segments
of Alice’s actual overall payoff function over [0,min(p0, p
L)) and (max(p0, p
H), 1] are at the
respective “inner” extremities min(p0, p
L) and max(p0, p
H). However, the behavior of the
payoff function over the inner interval(s) depends strongly on the relative magnitudes of
pL, pH , and p0. Since this makes the general analysis technically complicated and hard to
interpret qualitatitively, we focus on the case p0 =
1
2
, as in Section 3.4.1.
For p0 =
1
2
, Table 3.2 tells us that Alice’s ex post net payoff as a function of pA over the
sub-intervals [0, pL), (pL, 1
2
), (1
2
, pH), and (pH , 1] is given by the corresponding segments
of RA(pA, 12 , 0, 1), RA(pA, 12 , 0, 0), RA(pA, 12 , 1, 1), and RA(pA, 12 , 1, 0); hence, the pA that
maximizes the overall payoff function, given Lemmas 5 and 6, can be obtained by analyzing
these four function segments.
First note, from expressions (3.4) and (3.2), that
RA(12 , 12 , 0, 1) = RA(12 , 12 , 0, 0) = RA(12 , 12 , 1, 1) = RA(12 , 12 , 1, 0) = 0. (3.12)
Moreover, by considering the first derivative of each of these functions as above, we can
show that each is strictly convex over [0, 1] with unique global maxima at 1
2
, 0, 1, and 1
2
respectively. Since 0 < pL < 1
2
< pH < 1, the local suprema for the sub-intervals [0, pL),
(pL, 1
2
), (1
2
, pH), and (pH , 1] are at pL, pL, pH , and pH respectively; let the values of the
corresponding suprema be denoted by R∗0,1, R∗0,0, R∗1,1, and R∗1,0. Note that
R∗0,1 < R∗0,0 = R∗1,1 > R∗1,0,
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which we can establish as follows.
R∗0,1 = RA(pL, 12 , 0, 1)
< RA(12 , 12 , 0, 1) since RA(pA, 12 , 0, 1) is uniquely maximized at pA = 12 ,
= 0 from (3.12),
= RA(12 , 12 , 0, 0) from (3.12),
< RA(0, 12 , 0, 0) since RA(pA, 12 , 0, 0) is uniquely maximized at pA = 0,
= R∗0,0;
by similar reasoning, R∗1,1 > R∗1,0; and
R∗1,1 −R∗0,0 = RA(pH , 12 , 1, 1)−RA(pL, 12 , 0, 0)
=
[
f(pH)− f(pL)]+ pL [f ′(pH) + f ′(pL)]− f ′(1
2
),
using pL = 1− pH from (3.9),
= (1− 2pL)f ′(1
2
) + pL · 2f ′(1
2
)− f ′(1
2
), from (3.10) and (3.8)
= 0.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the variation of RA with pA over [0, 1] for LMSR, QMSR, and SMSR.
From the above discussion, it is clear that this special case of the game has two PBEs with
strategy profiles ((pL, 0), (0, 0)) and ((pH , 1), (1, 1)). If Alice makes the first move pA = p
L,
then (pB = 0, vB = 0) is a best response by Bob according to Lemma 6, and Alice’s preferable
Stage 2 action is vA = 0 from Lemma 5; from Alice’s perspective, if she knows that Bob
will respond with vB = 1 for 0 ≤ pA < pL and vB = 0 for pL ≤ pA ≤ 12 , then it is in her
best interest to set pA = p
L, and hence vote vA = 0 in accordance with Lemma 5, thereby
resulting in a market outcome of v = 0. Although (pB =
1
2
, vB = 1) is Bob’s alternative best
response to Alice’s pA = p
L by Lemma 6, it cannot be part of a (subgame perfect) Nash
equilibrium where Alice’s action is (pL, 0) because Alice would prefer pA = p
L + ε for any
ε ∈ (0, 1
2
− pL) to pA = pL if she knew that Bob would respond with vB = 1 for 0 ≤ pA ≤ pL
and vB = 0 for p
L < pA ≤ 12 , owing to the jump discontinuity at pL. By similar arguments,
we can establish that ((pH , 1), (1, 1)) is another equilibrium.
Thus, Alice and Bob jointly create a fake world where they pretend to agree regardless
of their signals, and thereby reap the maximum possible profit from the mechanism (the
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principal organizing the market incurs maximum loss whenever Bob participates since the
last trader Bob makes an accurate forecast, in accordance with Lemma 6 Hanson (2007a)).
We call equilibria of this type “collusive”. Further, observe that for pi = 0, Alice’s price-
report gives us no information about her private signal or her belief about that of Bob; it
merely indicates her vote as per Lemma 5 (vA = 0 if pA = p
L and vA = 1 if pA = p
H).
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Figure 3.1: Alice’s payoff as a function of her Stage 1 action for three representative MSRs
with Bob’s non-participation probability pi = 0 and starting market price p0 =
1
2
; the
general characteristics are similar for other symmetric well-behaved MSRs: We have jump
discontinuities at the lower and upper thresholds, and a value of zero at pA =
1
2
. For
LMSR, the figure is truncated, and both the outer segments actually continue towards −∞
symmetrically, away from 1
2
.
3.4.3 Equilibrium when Bob’s participation is uncertain (0 < pi <
1)
We shall now delve into the “grey area” where Alice as well as the rest of the world has
some finite uncertainty about Bob’s participation. In view of the lessons learned from the
relatively simpler scenarios pi ∈ {0, 1}, we shall present the analysis of this more general
scenario pi ∈ (0, 1) for a starting market price of p0 = 12 only16, in order to obtain clean
results; in fact, we included the symmetry assumption (3.3) in our model (Section 3.3)
16The initial price p0 =
1
2 corresponds to starting the market at a uniform “prior” – a standard practice
in prediction markets.
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for the same reason. For a larger family of MSRs that satisfy all the criteria stated in
Section 3.3 except the symmetry condition and for values of p0 other than
1
2
, one can still
adopt an approach similar to the one in this paper to analyze the game but the procedure
will be algebraically more involved.
It is not unreasonable to conjecture that there exists some critical value of Bob’s non-
participation probability below which the PBE of the resulting game is of the partially
revealing variety as in Section 3.4.2, and above which it is closer to the collusive equilibrium
obtained in Section 3.4.1. The following theorem formalizes this intuition.
Theorem 4. For any value of Bob’s non-participation probability pi ∈ (0, 1) and Alice’s
posterior belief q0 ∈ (0, 1), the trading-voting game described in Section 3.3 has a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with the following attributes:
For every q0, there exists a fixed value of Bob’s non-participation probability, say pic(q0),
which we call the “crossover” probability (dependent on the MSR), on either side of which the
equilibria are qualitatively different. We call the sub-interval pi < pic the high participation
probability (HPP) equilibrium domain, and the sub-interval pi > pic the low participation
probability (LPP) equilibrium domain.
• In an HPP equilibrium:
– In Stage 1, Alice moves the market price to pA = p
L if q0 >
1
2
, and to pA = p
H if q0 <
1
2
where pL, pH are the upper and lower thresholds, independent of pi, q0, defined in (3.5) and
(3.6); strategic Bob’s price-update is pB = 0 if pA = p
L, and pB = 1 if pA = p
H .
– In Stage 2, Alice votes vA = 0 if she set pA = p
L, vA = 1 if pA = p
H ; strategic Bob
votes vB = 0 if he set pB = 0, and vB = 1 if he set pB = 1.
• In an LPP equilibrium:
– In Stage 1, Alice’s price-report pLPPA is equal to her posterior expectation of the market
liquidation value (average vote) given the parameters pi, q0 and her report p
LPP
A , i.e. p
LPP
A =
E
[
v|pi, q0, pA = pLPPA
]
. Moreover, pLPPA <
1
2
if q0 >
1
2
, pLPPA >
1
2
if q0 <
1
2
. strategic Bob’s
price-update is pB = 0 if p
L ≤ pA ≤ 12 , pB = 1 if 12 < pA ≤ pH , and pB = 12 otherwise.
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– In Stage 2, Alice votes vA = 0 if pA >
1
2
, vA = 1 if pA <
1
2
; strategic Bob votes vB = 0
if pA ∈
[
pL, 1
2
] ∪ (pH , 1], vB = 1 otherwise.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the general characteristics of Alice’s and Bob’s actions in the two
equilibrium domains for q0 >
1
2
.
p
B
= 0 p0 = 0.5pA= p
L
Alice's HPP report → v
A
 = 0
Bob's HPP report → v
B
 = 0, if he trades
p
0
 = 0.5pL
Alice's possible LPP report → v
A
 = 0
Bob's LPP report → v
B
 = 0, if he trades
0 p
B
= p
0
 = 0.5p
L
Alice's possible LPP report → v
A
 = 0
Bob's HPP report → v
B
 = 1, if he trades
p
A
p
ApB= 0
Figure 3.2: Alice’s price-reports for q0 >
1
2
and strategic Bob’s responses for HPP (left)
and LPP domains. The actual magnitude of pA in the LPP domain depends on values of
pi, q0. Results are symmetric for q0 <
1
2
.
More specifically, pLPPA is one of the following:
µ0,0 =
pi(1− q0)
2
, µ0,1 =
1− piq0
2
, µ1,0 =
1 + pi(1− q0)
2
, µ1,1 = 1− piq0
2
,
where 0 < µ0,0 < µ0,1 <
1
2
< µ1,0 < µ1,1 < 1, ∀pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1). (3.13)
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 detail the dependence of Alice’s equilibrium trading action pPBEA
on pi, q0 for any symmetric well-behaved market scoring rule with p
L ∈ (0, 1
4
), pL = 1
4
, and
pL ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
) respectively (“Domain” signifies whether the equilibrium is of the HPP or LPP
type as defined above). The quantities pi∗H(q0) and pi
∗
L(q0) in Tables 3.3 and 3.5, and pi
∗ in
Table 3.5 are defined as follows:
• pi∗H(q0) is the unique root in (0, 1) of the following equation in pi:
f(1+pi(1−q0)
2
)− f(pH)− (1− piq0
2
− pH) f ′(pH) + (1−pi
2
)
f ′(1
2
) = 0
for a given convex function f(·) associated with a symmetric well-behaved MSR (which
has a well-defined pH), and any given value of the parameter q0 ∈ (0, 1). For 0 < q0 <
min(1
2
, 2pL), we have 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi
∗
H(q0) < 1.
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• pi∗L(q0) is the unique root in (0, 1) of the equation
f(1−piq0
2
)− f(pL)−
(
pi(1−q0)
2
− pL
)
f ′(pL)− (1−pi
2
)
f ′(1
2
) = 0
for a given f(·) and q0 as before. For max(12 , 1 − 2pL) < q0 < 1, we have 1−2p
L
q0
<
pi∗L(q0) < 1.
• pi∗ is the unique root in (2− 4pL, 1) of the equation
f(1
2
− pi
4
)− f(pL)− (pi
4
− pL) f ′(pL)− (1−pi
2
)
f ′(1
2
) = 0
for a given f(·) with pL ∈ (1
4
, 1).
For the proof of existence and uniqueness of each of the above roots, refer to Appendix B
Lemma 10. Table 3.6 presents the crossover probability pic as a function of q0 for all three
mutually exclusive and exhaustive sub-classes of symmetric well-behaved MSRs, defined on
the basis of the value of pL.
Proof sketch. Here we just outline the proof of Theorem 4, the details are in Appendix B
Section B.2. As in Section 3.4.1 for the case pi = 1, we have to work with Alice’s expected ex
post profit that averages out her uncertainty with respect to two questions – what signal Bob
received, and whether he will trade in the prediction market. Owing to the linearity of the
profit function (3.4) in the market outcome, the expectation of the profit across outcomes
is equal to the profit function evaluated at the expected outcome. The rest of the proof is
similar to the analysis presented in Section 3.4.2 for the case pi = 0: We need to consider the
four sub-intervals [0, pL), (pL, 1
2
], (1
2
, pH), (pH , 1[, over which Alice’s expected ex post payoff
as a function of her price-report pA is given by the corresponding segments of the functions
RA(pA, 12 , 0, 1), RA(pA, 12 , 0, 0), RA(pA, 12 , 1, 1), and RA(pA, 12 , 1, 0) respectively, with special
emphasis on the jump discontinuities at the thresholds pL and pH . An important difference
from Section 3.4.2 is that, for pi ∈ (0, 1), the global maxima of these functions are no longer
located at 1
2
, 0, 1, and 1
2
respectively but at µu,v =
u+(1−pi)v+pi(1−q0)
2
for u, v ∈ {0, 1}. So,
the local suprema of some of the four segments that we are interested in may not lie at the
extremities of the corresponding intervals but rather at an “interior” point, depending in a
complex manner on the values of pL, pi and q0. For example, if pi <
2pL
1−q0 , then the local
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q0 pi p
PBE
A (for p
L < 1
4
) Domain
0 < q0 < 2p
L 0 < pi < pi∗H(q0) p
H HPP
pi = pi∗H(q0) p
H or µ1,0 LPP or HPP
pi∗H(q0) < pi < 1 µ1,0 LPP
q0 = 2p
L 0 < pi < 1 pH HPP
2pL < q0 <
1
2
0 < pi < 2p
L
q0
pH HPP
pi = 2p
L
q0
pH = µ1,1 LPP or HPP
2pL
q0
< pi < 1 µ1,1 LPP
q0 =
1
2
0 < pi < 4pL pL or pH HPP
pi = 4pL
pL = µ0,0 or
pH = µ1,1
LPP or HPP
4pL < pi < 1 µ0,0 or µ1,1 LPP
1
2
< q0 < 1− 2pL 0 < pi < 2pL1−q0 pL HPP
pi = 2p
L
1−q0 p
L = µ0,0 LPP or HPP
2pL
1−q0 < pi < 1 µ0,0 LPP
q0 = 1− 2pL 0 < pi < 1 pL HPP
1− 2pL < q0 < 1 0 < pi < pi∗L(q0) pL HPP
pi = pi∗L(q0) p
L or µ0,1 LPP or HPP
pi∗L(q0) < pi < 1 µ0,1 LPP
Table 3.3: Alice’s PBE price-report for a symmetric well-behaved MSR with pL ∈ (0, 1
4
),
p0 =
1
2
.
supremum over [0, pL) of the overall RA is at µ0,0 ∈ (0, pL). Taking these issues into account,
we can determine the local suprema of the four segments and compare them to establish
that we have perfect Bayesian equilibria where Alice’s Stage 1 action is in accordance with
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, her Stage 2 action is given by Lemma 5, and strategic Bob’s
actions are given by Lemma 6 with the restriction that vB = 0 if pA = p
L and vB = 1 if
pA = p
H (as in Section 3.4.2). 
Behavior at crossover probability If pi = pic, then Alice is indifferent between her
LPP and HPP price-reports although the values of these reports are, in general, distinct.
However, if the prediction market is implemented with a symmetric well-behaved MSR with
pL < 1
4
, and q0 lies in (2p
L, 1−2pL), then Alice’s LPP and HPP price-reports at the crossover
probability are identical so that the two domains coincide. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4
for LMSR under a specific signal structure, the details of which are provided in Section 3.6:
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q0 pi p
PBE
A (for p
L = 1
4
) Domain
0 < q0 <
1
2
0 < pi < pi∗H(q0) p
H HPP
pi = pi∗H(q0) p
H or µ1,0 LPP or HPP
pi∗H(q0) < pi < 1 µ1,0 LPP
q0 =
1
2
0 < pi < 1 pL or pH HPP
1
2
< q0 < 1 0 < pi < pi
∗
L(q0) p
L HPP
pi = pi∗L(q0) p
L or µ0,1 LPP or HPP
pi∗L(q0) < pi < 1 µ0,1 LPP
Table 3.4: Alice’s PBE price-report for a symmetric well-behaved MSR with pL = 1
4
, p0 =
1
2
.
q0 pi p
PBE
A (for p
L > 1
4
) Domain
0 < q0 <
1
2
0 < pi < pi∗H(q0) p
H HPP
pi = pi∗H(q0) p
H or µ1,0 LPP or HPP
pi∗H(q0) < pi < 1 µ1,0 LPP
q0 =
1
2
0 < pi < pi∗ pL or pH HPP
pi = pi∗
pL or pH or
µ0,1 or µ1,0
LPP or HPP
pi∗ < pi < 1 µ0,1 or µ1,0 LPP
1
2
< q0 < 1 0 < pi < pi
∗
L(q0) p
L HPP
pi = pi∗L(q0) p
L or µ0,1 LPP or HPP
pi∗L(q0) < pi < 1 µ0,1 LPP
Table 3.5: Alice’s PBE price-report for a symmetric well-behaved MSR with pL ∈ (1
4
, 1
2
),
p0 =
1
2
.
In the left panel, we have a signal structure where q0 ≈ 0.52 < 1 − 2pL = 0.6. Hence, by
Tables 3.3 and 3.6, Alice’s unique PBE price-report at the crossover probability pic(q0) =
2pL
1−q0 ≈ 0.83 is pL = µ0,0 =
pic(1−q0)
2
= 0.2. However, in the right panel, q0 ≈ 0.82 > 0.6, hence
Alice has two alternative PBE price-reports, pL = 0.2 (HPP) or µ0,1 =
1−picq0
2
≈ 0.11 (LPP),
at the crossover probability pic(q0) = pi
∗
L(q0) ≈ 0.96.
Figure 3.3 depicts the crossover probability pic as a function of q0 for each of the three selected
MSRs − logarithmic, quadratic, and spherical.
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q0
pic(q0)
0 < pL < 1
4
pL = 1
4
1
4
< pL < 1
2
0 < q0 < 2p
L pi∗H(q0) pi
∗
H(q0) pi
∗
H(q0)
q0 = 2p
L 1 pi∗H(q0) pi
∗
H(q0)
2pL < q0 <
1
2
2pL
q0
pi∗H(q0) pi
∗
H(q0)
q0 =
1
2
4pL 1 pi∗
1
2
< q0 < 1− 2pL 2pL1−q0 pi∗L(q0) pi∗L(q0)
q0 = 1− 2pL 1 pi∗L(q0) pi∗L(q0)
1− 2pL < q0 < 1 pi∗L(q0) pi∗L(q0) pi∗L(q0)
Table 3.6: The crossover probability pic as a function of q0 over the sub-intervals into which
the pL splits the entire possible range (0, 1) of q0 values, for symmetric well-behaved MSRs
with pL smaller than, equal to, and larger than 1
4
.
3.5 Implications of the equilibrium result
The following are some interesting corollaries to our main result, that shed light on various
aspects of the operation of prediction markets in the face of outcome manipulation possi-
bilities, including our main concerns about informativeness (Section 3.5.4) and truthfulness
(Section 3.5.2).
3.5.1 Dependence of crossover probability on Alice’s uncertainty
From Table 3.6 and the representative curves in Figure 3.3, observe a peculiarity of symmetric
well-behaved MSRs with pL < 1
4
such as LMSR. For 2pL < q0 < 1−2pL, which can be seen as
a region of “high” uncertainty in Alice’s posterior about Bob’s private signal after receiving
her own, the crossover probability actually decreases with Alice’s increasing uncertainty:
pic is inversely proportional to q0 and (1 − q0) over 2pL < q0 < 12 and 12 < q0 < 1 − 2pL
respectively. This means that the partially revealing LPP domain is realized for lower values
of Bob’s non-participation probability for these MSRs than for those with pL ≥ 1
4
over this
central region surrounding q0 =
1
2
. On the flip side, outside this high uncertainty region,
pic increases faster as Alice’s certainty moves away from q0 ∈ {0, 1} for MSRs with “low”
pL-values so that there exist values of q0, namely 2p
L and (1 − 2pL) for pL ≤ 1
4
, for which
any value of pi ∈ [0, 1] induces an HPP equilibrium.
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Figure 3.3: Dependence of crossover probability on Alice’s posterior belief about Bob for the
three MSRs; e.g. for QMSR, if q0 = 0.25. then pic ≈ 0.9537, so we have an LPP equilibrium
with pA = (1 + pi(1 − q0))/2 for pi > 0.9537, and an HPP equilibrium with pA = pH = 0.75
for pi < 0.9537.
3.5.2 Private signal revelation
Unfortunately, strategic Bob’s report-vote pair is fully determined by Alice’s report and
does not depend on sB. There is no guarantee that Alice’s vote will be truthful either: In
general, as Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 indicate, regardless of whether we are in the LPP or HPP
domain, for p0 =
1
2
,
q0(sA) <
1
2
=⇒ pPBEA > 12 =⇒ vPBEA = 1;
q0(sA) >
1
2
=⇒ pPBEA < 12 =⇒ vPBEA = 0,
(3.14)
i.e. Alice votes the mode of her posterior distribution over Bob’s signal, as in Section 3.4.1.
However, if we invoke the additional assumption of stochastic relevance (Definition 3), then
we can use pA to uncover sA, as in Section 3.4.1, in an LPP equilibrium. This stands in
contrast to the situation where Bob’s participation is certain, the limiting case of the HPP
domain, where pA ∈ {pL, pH} has no dependence on q0 (Section 3.4.2).
Corollary 1. If the signal structure is such that Alice’s signal sA is stochastically relevant
for Bob’s signal sB, then the value of sA can be recovered from Alice’s price-report in an LPP
equlibrium pLPPA = µu,v (pi, q0), u, v ∈ {0, 1}, regardless of whether vA = sA.
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Proof. Since pA being either p
L or pH indicates that we are in the HPP domain, pLPPA 6∈
{pL, pH}. We also know that pLPPA 6∈ {0, 12 , 1} from inequalities (3.13). Moreover, by observ-
ing which sub-interval,
(
0, pL
)
,
(
pL, 1
2
)
,
(
1
2
, pH
)
or
(
pH , 1
)
, contains Alice’s LPP price-report,
we can infer Alice’s vote vA and Bob’s vote vB if he participates in the market (Lemmas 5
and 6), and hence which µu,v, u, v ∈ {0, 1}, equals pA. Since pi is common knowledge, we can
solve for q0 from the expression for µu,v. For example, if 0 < pA < p
L, then we can be certain
that pA = µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
so that q0 =
1−2pA
pi
. Under the assumption of stochastic relevance,
q0(sA) is one-to-one, so we can deduce sA uniquely from its value.
In a general HPP equilibrium (0 < pi < pic), we can only tell whether q0 >
1
2
(if pA = p
L)
or q0 <
1
2
(if pA = p
H), but this is insufficient for recovering sA without further assumptions
about the signal structure. The following corollary presents sufficient conditions on the signal
structure for sA to be recoverable from Alice’s equilibrium action regardless of whether we
are in the LPP or HPP domain.
Corollary 2. If the signal structure is such that Alice’s posterior probability q0 of Bob
obtaining signal 0, given sA, lies strictly on different sides of
1
2
for different values of sA ∈
{0, 1}, i.e. either (q0(0) < 12 and q0(1) > 12) or (q0(0) > 12 and q0(1) < 12), then the value of
sA can be recovered from her PBE price-report (or, equivalently, vote).
Proof. From (3.14), we can tell by looking at pA (or equivalently vA) whether q0 <
1
2
or
q0 >
1
2
, and can hence deduce whether sA = 0 or sA = 1 from the signal structure.
Note that the signal structure in Corollary 2 automatically implies the stochastic relevance
property of Corollary 1. In light of the two corollaries above, we can conclude that whenever
there is a non-zero probability of Bob not trading but voting truthfully, there are signal
structures for which Alice’s trading action (in equilibrium) indirectly reveals her private
information!
In particular, if q0(0) >
1
2
and q0(1) <
1
2
, then it follows from (3.14) that, for p0 =
1
2
, vA = sA,
regardless of whether the value of pi puts us in the LPP or HPP domain. In other words, in
our model, a sufficient condition on the binary signal structure for Alice to vote truthfully
in equilibrium regardless of Bob’s non-participation probability is that she believes it more
likely than not for Bob to receive the same signal that she has.
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3.5.3 HPP profit sharing
The HPP equilibria are a world where collusion appears with Alice as the “leader” picking
the vote that both will coordinate on, and pushing the price to just the level where it
makes sense for strategic Bob to push the price all the way to 0 or 1 and vote the same
way as Alice. In this way, they extract the maximum profit from the market maker, and
split it between the two of them in a ratio that is dependent on the functional form of the
MSR. In particular, for the three major MSRs considered, Alice makes more profit than Bob
in a collusive equilibrium, with the discrepancy being the least for LMSR – we omit the
straightforward calculations, and present the results in the following table:
Share in total HPP profit
if Bob is strategic
LMSR QMSR SMSR
Alice’s share 67.81% 75% 78.32%
Bob’s share 32.19% 25% 21.68%
However, it is possible to construct a symmetric well-behaved MSR with lower threshold
pL < 1
4
for which Alice makes less profit than strategic Bob in an HPP equilibrium: For
f(r) = 0.99(r− 1
2
)6 + 0.01r2, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1,17 with pL ≈ 0.1550 < 1
4
, Alice’s HPP profit share is
approximately 46.91%!
Corollary 3. In a trading-voting game where the prediction market is implemented by any
symmetric well-behaved MSR with lower threshold pL ≥ 1
4
, Alice’s ex post net profit in an
HPP equilibrium is greater than that of strategic Bob.
Proof. Regardless of the value of q0, if we are in the HPP domain, the starting price is p0 =
1
2
,
and Bob trades in Stage 1, then Alice and Bob’s ex post net profits in an HPP equilibrium
are respectively given by
RHPPA = f(pH) + (1− pH)f ′(pH)− f(12)− 12f ′(12)
= f(pL)− pLf ′(pL)− f(1
2
) + 1
2
f ′(1
2
);
RHPPB = f(1)− f(pH)− (1− pH)f ′(pH)
= f(0)− f(pL) + pLf ′(pL).
17The term 0.01r2 ensures that f ′′( 12 ) 6= 0 so that the associated MSR satisfies all our technical desiderata.
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These expressions follow readily from Alice and Bob’s HPP report-vote pairs as shown in
Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.2, as well as definitions (3.4) and (3.2). To prove the equivalence of
the two expressions for RHPPA , we invoke relations (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) from Proposition 2,
and simplify. For RHPPA , we additionally use the result f(1) − f(0) = f ′(12) obtained from
the symmetry condition (3.3) by plugging in y = 1. Hence,
RHPPA −RHPPB = 2
[
f(pL)− pLf ′(pL)]− f(0)− f(1
2
) + 1
2
f ′(1
2
)
= 2
[
f(pL)− 2pL (f(1
2
)− f(0))]− f(0)− f(1
2
) + 1
2
f ′(1
2
),
from definition (3.5)
= 2f(pL) + (4pL − 1)f(0)− (1 + 4pL)f(1
2
) + 1
2
f ′(1
2
)
> 2
[
f(1
2
) +
(
pL − 1
2
)
f ′(1
2
)
]
+ (4pL − 1)f(0)− (1 + 4pL)f(1
2
) + 1
2
f ′(1
2
),
from the strict convexity of f(·)
= 4
(
pL − 1
4
) [
f(0)− f(1
2
) + 1
2
f ′(1
2
)
]
, on simplification
≥ 0, for pL ≥ 1
4
since f(0) > f(1
2
) + (0− 1
2
)f ′(1
2
) from the strict convexity of f(·). Hence RHPPA > RHPPB for
any symmetric well-behaved MSR with pL ≥ 1
4
.
If Bob is honest, Alice’s payoff is obviously a function of his private signal faithfully an-
nounced in the outcome-deciding voting stage. Corollary 3 tells us that, even if Bob is
strategic and hence ends up colluding with the manipulator Alice, her profit share in a
collusive equilibrium depends strongly on the MSR used – an insight that can potentially
inform the choice of an MSR for market design.
3.5.4 Informativeness of market prices about final outcome
Rewriting all our results so as to focus on what the market prices pA at t = 1 and pB at
t = 2 predict about the outcome (average vote), we obtain the following table (recall that
the final price pB = pA for honest Bob, and pB = v for strategic Bob):
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strategic Bob honest Bob
LPP HPP LPP HPP
pA Bayesian estimate Predetermined Bayesian estimate Predetermined
pB Actual outcome Actual outcome Bayesian estimate Predetermined
“Predetermined” signifies that pA ∈ {pL, pH};
“Bayesian estimate” denotes Alice’s expectation of the average vote.
3.6 A specific signal structure
Thus far, we have been non-specific about the signal structure, proving general results; we
now consider a concrete example scenario to illustrate our findings: The underlying random
variable takes values in the signal space itself, i.e. T = Ω = {0, 1}, the prior probability
of τ = 0 being ρ0 ∈ (0, 1). Given τ , the agents’ signals are independently and identically
distributed: for any “true” τ ∈ {0, 1}, each participant gets the “correct” signal (identical to
the true τ) with probability (1− ρe), otherwise gets the wrong signal; the error probability
ρe ∈ (0, 1)\{12}. Note that if and only if ρe = 12 , we have q0(0) = q0(1) = 12 regardless of ρ0,
hence signals are not informative Chen et al. (2009), i.e. the prior and posterior probabilities
are equal. Then,
q0(0) =
(1− ρe)2 ρ0 + ρ2e (1− ρ0)
(1− ρe) ρ0 + ρe (1− ρ0) , q0(1) =
(1− ρe) ρe
ρeρ0 + (1− ρe) (1− ρ0) .
This signal structure has multiple interesting information-revealing characteristics: First,
we have q0(0) 6= q0(1), i.e. Alice’s signal is stochastically relevant for that of Bob. Hence,
Corollary 1 applies. Second, it is easy to show that, if ρ0 =
1
2
(a uniform common prior),
then Alice’s vote is always truthful since, for any ρe ∈ (0, 1), sA = 0⇔ q0 > 12 ⇔ vA = 0, by
(3.4).
Figure 3.4 shows Alice’s equilibrium report in a LMSR market and her expected liquidation
value vs. pi, for signal sA = 0 and fixed ρ0, ρe (hence, a fixed q0). The HPP and LPP
regions are clearly visible to the left and right of the cross-over probability, where Alice’s
price-report (the dashed curve) is distinct from and coincides with her expected liquidation
value (the continuous curve) respectively. The corresponding plots for the other two MSRs
are qualitatively similar, hence omitted.
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Figure 3.4: Crossover from HPP to LPP equilibria regions for LMSR over 0 < pi < 1 for
the signal structure described in Section 3.6 with two different sets of parameter values: the
prior probability of τ being 0 is ρ0 =
1
2
for both panels, and the error probability ρe is 0.4
and 0.1 for the left and right panels respectively. For the left panel, pLPPA = µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
,
hence pA increases with pi for pi > pic whereas for the right panel, p
LPP
A = µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
, hence
pA decreases with pi in the LPP domain. In both panels, pA = p
L = 0.2 in the HPP domain.
For each curve, we have shown with a dashed blue line Alice’s expected average vote taking
Lemmas 5 and 6 into account, which coincides with pA in the LPP domain.
3.7 Extensions to more than two agents
Our model is stylized, but the framework and methodology can be applied to more complex
scenarios. Below, we sketch two specific lines of generalization.
Additional outcome-deciders who do not trade: Consider a scenario in which Alice
and Bob are the only traders but jointly decide less than 100% of the outcome, say, v =
vA+vB+
∑n
i=1 vi
n+2
, where {vi}ni=1 are the votes (and also the private signals) of n non-strategic
agents. We can still use the methodology of Section 3.4 to solve for the PBE, and show
that it is still of two broad types − we do need further specifications for a consistent belief
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structure, and the equilibria may have some additional characteristics depending on model
parameters.
For example, suppose that there are three outcome-deciders Alice, Bob, and Charlie each
of whom draws a signal from a structure identical to that in Section 3.6 but Charlie is
deterministically honest; the market outcome is v = vA+vB+vC
3
, where C is the subscript
corresponding to Charlie, and all other aspects of the model are the same as in Section 3.3.
It is easy to show that the natural extension of Lemma 5 still holds, i.e. (pA, 0) dominates
(resp. is dominated by) (pA, 1) for any pA <
1
2
(resp. pA >
1
2
) regardless of Alice’s signal
and all actions taken in the game after her price update. But, now strategic Bob’s best
response depends not only directly on Alice’s price-report pA but also on his posterior belief
about Charlie’s vote / signal which is, in turn, based on his own signal sB as well as his
inference about Alice’s signal sA. Let us denote by q
A
0 (sA) Alice’s posterior probabilities that
another agent received a signal 0, given her own signal sA, and by q
B
0 (sA, sB) the same for
Bob, given he knows not just sB but also Alice’s signal sA.
To complete the description of a consistent belief structure for this signal structure, we
assume that Bob infers sA = 0 (resp. sA = 1) whenever pA <
1
2
(resp. pA >
1
2
). Then,
the main deviation from the analysis in Section 3.4 is that Bob’s thresholds pL and pH now
become functions of sB ∈ {0, 1} so that each has two possible values, say pLsB=0, pLsB=1, and
pHsB=0, p
H
sB=1
respectively. Hence, we can show that in any PBE, pA <
1
2
for sA = 0 (i.e.
qA0 >
1
2
) and pA >
1
2
for sA = 1 (i.e. q
A
0 <
1
2
). Morever, Alice’s best response is, for a
low enough pi, to set pA at one of the above thresholds, and, for a high enough pi, at her
expectation of the outcome, given her t. Consider, for example, a scenario in which the
signal structure has ρ0 = 0.5 and ρ = 0.075 and Alice receives signal sA = 0. Calculations
show that qA0 (sA) = 0.8613, and hence p
L
sB=0
≈ 0.1694, pLsB=1 ≈ 0.3257, pHsB=0 ≈ 0.6743, and
pHsB=1 ≈ 0.8306.
For pi = 0.2, Figure 3.5(a) shows that Alice sets pA = p
L
sB=0
and vA = 0 in equilibrium.
Now, if sB = 0, then strategic Bob “agrees” with Alice and votes vB = 0 because pA lies
at his signal-dependent threshold pLsB=0, but if sB = 1, he votes vB = 1 because pA is now
lower than his threshold pLsB=0. i.e. in a “disagreement sub-interval”. Moreover, the above
result also suggests that for such a low-pi equilibrium, Bob’s vote is always identical to his
signal, hence his signal is always revealed. For pi = 0.98, Figure 3.5 (b) reveals that Alice’s
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expected payoff, given her knowledge of how the game unfolds after she trades, is maximized
at pA =
0+((1−pi)·1+pi·(1−qA0 (0))+(1−qA0 (0)))
3
≈ 0.982, i.e. Alice’s expected outcome, and this gives
her PBE price-report; but now, pA is less than both p
L
sB=0
and pLsB=1 so that, regardless of
his signal, strategic Bob disagrees with Alice, and his signal cannot be inferred from his
action (just as in the two-player game). In any case, strategic Bob moves the price to his
posterior expectation of v, which is no longer in {0, 1}.
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Figure 3.5: Alice’s expected payoff for different values of her trading action pA given her
knowledge of the extensions of Lemmas 5 and 6 for the case of three outcome-deciders. For
both plots, Alice has the same signal (sA = 0) and all model parameters are equal, except
Bob’s non-participation probability pi, as noted above.
Additional traders who do not affect the outcome: Agents with no control over the
outcome who trade before Alice only matter in the level to which they move the price seen by
Alice but, from Alice’s perspective, this is equivalent to a general ‘starting’ price p0 ∈ (0, 1);
if they all trade after Bob, Alice and Bob’s equilibrium actions remain unchanged because,
for an MSR, an agent’s payoff depends on the actions of her predecessors and not on those
of her successors, by design (as long as these successors are not outcome-deciders).
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The game becomes more complex when there are intermediate traders between Alice and
Bob. To test how the equilibrium strategies implied by Theorem 4 fare in such scenarios, we
ran some simple simulations with an LMSR market maker. The market starts at p0 = 0.5,
and Alice moves first, but she is followed by a sequence of 10 “boundedly rational” myopic
budget-limited traders, described in greater detail in the next paragraph; then Bob trades in
the market (i.e. is of the strategic type) with probability 1 − pi. As before, the outcome
is Alice and Bob’s average vote; the other traders do not vote.
Each intervening trader i obtains her private signal from the same source as Alice and Bob,
and then draws her estimate wi of the market outcome from a beta distribution: The mean
of this distribution is equal to her posterior expectation of any other agent’s signal given her
own realized signal, mi = E[sj|si] = Pr(sj = 1|si) for any j, and the variance is mi(1−mi)/2
or, in other words, the “pseudo-sample size” parameter of the beta distribution is 1. In
addition, each trader has the same budget B, i.e. each of these agents trades in such a way
that her loss (negative ex post payoff) never exceeds B. From the properties of the LMSR,
it can be easily shown that such an agent i can move the market price from her observed
value pi−1 to a maximum of pmaxi = (1 − γp¯i−1) and to a minimum of pmini = γpi−1, where
γ = e−B/b, p¯i−1 = 1 − pi−1. This budget constraint captures the intuition that agents who
do not influence an outcome and / or have poor knowledge thereof should be conservative in
their trading decisions. The intervening trader i buys a quantity that moves the market price
up to min(wi, p
max
i ) if wi > pi−1, sells a quantity that pushes the price down to max(wi, p
min
i )
if wi < pi−1, and does not trade otherwise.
As in Section 3.4, it is easy to show that Alice’s vote is revealed immediately after she
trades (this is consistent with the empirical observation that insiders are often “big players”,
and can be identified by other traders from their trading decisions). Thus, the problem
is still easy for strategic Bob who can see his immediate predecessor’s report and infer
Alice’s vote from her price update, and base his actions on this knowledge. But, how should
Alice play? This is a strategically more complex game, and finding equilibrium strategies
may be difficult. However, one possibility is for Alice to simply ignore the existence of the
intermediate traders and use her strategy from Theorem 4 – we will call an Alice taking
such an action strategic. While this is not necessarily an equilibrium (or a priori even a
good) strategy, in our simulations, we observe that it significantly improves upon a simple
alternative – declaring one’s private signal as the vote after updating the price to one’s
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posterior expected average vote – which we shall designate being truthful18. Thus, the
model may well have predictive value even in this more complex setting.
Profits Strategic Bob Truthful Bob
Strategic Alice 0.303,0.479 0.123, 0.265
Truthful Alice 0.280, 0.479 0.131, 0.265
Table 3.7: Alice and Bob’s expected profits for being strategic vs. truthful, with 10
intervening traders for the signal structure described in Section 3.7. Results are averaged
over 105 simulations. The first entry in each cell corresponds to Alice, the second to Bob. The
table does not list all strategies available to the players, and does not depict the equilibrium;
it shows that when both players employ Theorem 4 strategies, each achieves at least as much
expected profit as they would for any strategy-pair in which at least one is truthful. We
observed similar results for other parameter combinations.
Table 3.7 shows a sample of our findings for a signal structure similar to that in Section 3.6
with ρ0 = 0.5, ρ = 0.4, pi = 0.4; the budget is B = 0.5. Strategic Bob is as described
in Section 3.3; the difference between truthful Bob and honest Bob is that the former
not only votes truthfully but also participates in Stage 1, updating the price to the realized
outcome. Note that Bob’s profit in Table 3.7 appears to be independent of whether Alice is
strategic or truthful. This is due to two factors: Bob’s action (and hence his profit)
depends only on whether Alice’s report pA is above or below 0.5, indicating her vote, and
for this information structure, pA is always on the same side of 0.5 given Alice’s signal,
irrespective of her strategy; his profit depends on his immediate predecessor’s report too, but
with a sufficiently large number of intermediate traders, this price-report is also practically
stable.
3.8 Incentivizing truthful trading and voting
Until this point, we have assumed that there is zero compensation for the agents associated
with the outcome-deciding process. But, if agents derive some extra-market utility, known to
the principal, from the the outcome itself or if the principal itself can offer additional payment
18For computing the posterior expected average vote, truthful Alice just assumes that Bob will vote his
private signal.
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to each agent corresponding to her role in the outcome-deciding process, it is reasonable to
ask whether the resulting (modified) two-stage game has an equilibrium where all n ≥ 2
agents “vote” truthfully (and, of course, trade in a way that reflects their truthful vote).
We propose a design for a combined two-stage trading-voting mechanism (“voting” again
being a metaphor for an agent’s outcome-affecting action) for the general case of n agents
(n ≥ 2) that disincentivizes manipulative behavior. The basic model is a natural extension
of that described in Section 3.3 but this section is independent of the analysis in Section 3.4.
In the first stage of the game, the n agents trade in a prediction market in some pre-
determined order, and then simultaneously choose their actions vi ∈ Ω (not necessarily
binary) in the second stage, the market liquidation value v being some function of {vi}ni=1
(not necessarily the average). Each agent has zero non-participation probability in the
market and trades exactly once. Thus, although the myopic assumption still holds, the
scenario is adversarial in the sense that all outcome-deciders participate deterministically
in the prediction market. The number of participants n as well as the belief structure on
the underlying type τ and the agents’ private signals {si}ni=1 is common knowledge. Let us
denote the agents’ price reports {pi}ni=1, the starting market price being p0.
Here, we demonstrate our approach with a LMSR market with liquidity parameter b, the
treatment for other scoring rules being similar. Although the worst-case loss in a traditional
LMSR market is bounded, it is theoretically possible for an individual trader to earn an
unbounded profit from it. To circumvent this issue, we place a fixed budget B on every
agent (i.e. each agent trades in such a way that their loss can never exceed B).19 From the
properties of LMSR, it can be easily shown that agent i can move the market price from their
observed value pi−1 to a maximum of pmax = (1− γp¯i−1) and to a minimum of pmin = γpi−1,
where γ = e−B/b, p¯i−1 = 1− pi−1. Thus, agent i’s net payoff from the prediction market is
rPMi (pi, pi−1, v) = b
[
v ln
(
1/pi−1−1
1/pi−1
)
− ln
(
1−pi−1
1−pi
)]
. (3.15)
19With the budget constraint, the market may lose some of its expressiveness (Abernethy et al., 2011), i.e.
a trader may not be able to update the market price so as to coincide with their estimate of the liquidation
value, but it is still directionally expressive in the sense that it is still rational for an agent to shift the price
as close to her estimate as possible.
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Simple algebra shows that for each i, the maximum and minimum possible values of the
above under the budget constraint are
rPMi,max = b ln
(
max
{
1− γpi−1
1− pi−1 ,
1− γp¯i−1
1− p¯i−1
})
, rPMi,min = −B = b ln γ. (3.16)
Let lˆi(vi) denote agent i’s posterior expectation of the liquidation value based on her decision
to vote vi (declared signal) and her inference from the common prior, her private signal
si, and the prices p0, p1, . . . , pi−1 (assuming every other agent is Bayesian and truthful in
both voting and trading), and rˆPMi (p˜, pi−1, vi) be her posterior expected net payoff from the
market mechanism on updating the price from pi−1 to any reachable p˜. From the above
linear dependence of rPMi on v, rˆ
PM
i is readily seen to be a simple linear function of lˆi(vi).
Our key idea is to introduce a compensation scheme for the voting mechanism such that the
combined payoff from the market and the voting system when an agent is truthful in both
stages (and believes that everyone else is going to be similarly truthful) exceeds the largest
profit she can make by deviating from truth-telling. A promising technique for achieving
this end is the peer prediction scheme introduced by Miller et al. (2005) proposed in the
literature providing truth-telling incentives to experts in a traditional (non-market) means
of information gathering like a survey or poll when the ground truth is never accessible to
the principal. The following is a brief description thereof tailored to our setting.
We choose a reference participant f(i) a priori for agent i such that i’s vote is stochas-
tically relevant for that of f(i) (the posterior is different for different realizations of the
signal). At the end of voting, the transfer made to participant i by the center is a func-
tion of the posterior on participant f(i)’s vote vf(i) under the common prior, likelihood
and agent i’s vote vi, the function being a strictly proper scoring rule. Suppose we use
a strictly proper scoring rule R(·) (not necessarily logarithmic) so that agent i’s peer-
prediction score is given by rPPi (vf(i), vi) = αiR
(
g
(
vf(i)|vi
))
, where g(·|·) is said posterior.
Thus, agent i’s expected peer-prediction score is rˆPPi (si, vi) = αiφ(si, vi) where φ(si, vi) =∑
vf(i)∈Ω R
(
g
(
vf(i)|vi
))
g
(
vf(i)|si
)
and g(·|·) is said posterior, αi > 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Miller
et al show that truthful voting is a strict Nash equilibrium for this mechanism. The con-
stants αi have no effect on the truth-telling incentives of the voting stage alone, and we
show below how to tune these free parameters to ensure honest behavior. Note that while
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the LMSR prediction market has a single parameter b that determines all its properties, the
proposed combined mechanism has n additional parameters.
Now we can state our result: there is a way to set the parameters b and αi (which are under
the designer’s control) that guarantees that the overall expected earnings rˆi =
(
rˆPMi + rˆ
PP
i
)
for every i is uniquely maximized under the imposed constraints when their trading and
voting are both consistent with their private information (in equilibrium). Let ∆φm =
mins,s′∈Ω, s′ 6=s [φ(s, s)− φ(s, s′)], which is strictly positive by the incentive compatibility of
the peer-prediction method and is a function of the signal structure.
Theorem 5. Let there be n participants in the above mechanism, each with budget B. If we
promise every agent i, when she arrives to trade, a peer- prediction payment with some αi
satisfying
αi >
b
∆φm
ln
(
max
{
1−γpi−1
γ(1−pi−1) ,
1−γp¯i−1
γ(1−p¯i−1)
})
,
where all symbols have the meanings stated above, then there exists an ex interim Bayes-Nash
equilibrium where each agent i announces vi = si in the outcome-deciding stage after having
updated the market price as close as possible to her to truthful expected liquidation value, i.e.
pi =

pmin if lˆi(si) < pmin,
lˆi(si) if pmin ≤ lˆi(si) ≤ pmax,
pmax otherwise.
Proof. Part I: For any voting choice vi = v
′, agent i’s expected market liquidation value
assuming everyone else to be truthful is lˆi(v
′) , and since rˆPPi is independent of pi, from
Equation (3.15), it follows that
∂rˆi
∂pi
=
∂rˆPMi
∂pi
= lˆi(v
′)−pi
pi(1−pi) R 0 ⇐⇒ pi Q lˆi(si).
Part II: For proving that when subsidies are set to yield the conditions on αi above, it is in
an agent’s best interest to pick her honest vote, it suffices to show that for any possible signal
values s, s′ where s′ 6= s, and any feasible prices p˜,p˜′,p˜′′, rˆi(si = s, pi = p˜′, pi−1 = p˜, vi = s) >
rˆi(si = s, pi = p˜
′′, pi−1 = p˜, vi = s′) which reduces to αi[φ(s, s) − φ(s, s′)] > rˆPMi (p˜′′, p˜, s′) −
rˆPMi (p˜
′, p˜, s). The greatest lower bound on the L.H.S. is, by definition, αi(∆φm) where ∆φm
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is a known constant and always strictly positive. An upper bound on the R.H.S. is obviously
the range of all possible payoffs from the prediction market of agent i with budget B whose
predecessor’s price-report is pi−1, i.e. (rPMi,max − rPMi,min), given by Equations (3.16). Thus,
setting αi to a value exceeding the (finite positive) bound specified in the theorem statement
is a sufficient condition for the desired inequality to hold.
The two parts together complete the proof.
If R(·) ≡ ln(·), then the “raw” peer-prediction scores rPPi are always negative, so there
is no incentive for voluntary participation. This problem can be solved, as in Miller et al.
(2005), simply by subtracting from the raw score of agent i the constant αi mins,s′∈Ω(ln(s|s′))
which is a function of the prior and likelihood structures and independent of actual trader
behavior. This ensures positive peer-prediction payments but also necessitates subsidization
of the mechanism. For our budget-constrained LMSR market, b ln 2 is a (perhaps loose)
upper bound on its loss so the market subsidy is linear in b and independent of n. The
amount of subsidy for the voting phase is proportional to
∑n
i=1 αi. A reasonable choice for
αi is αi =
κb
∆φm
ln
(
max
{
1−γpi−1
γ(1−pi−1) ,
1−γp¯i−1
γ(1−p¯i−1)
})
where κ is a constant slightly greater than 1.
It is straightforward to show that
ln
(
2
γ
− 1
)
≤ (∆φm
κb
)
αi ≤ ln
(
2(1− γ)
(
1
γ
)i+1
+ 1
γ
)
∀i,
assuming that the starting market price is 0.5. Since γ = e−B/b, it is clear that, for fixed b,
αi is Ω(B) and O(iB) and, for fixed i, B, it is Θ(1). Hence the total peer prediction subsidy
is linear in B, independent of b, and Ω(n) and O(n2).
3.9 Discussion
In this chapter, we have taken a significant step in exploring the crucial incentive issues that
have the potential to derail the effectiveness of prediction markets for various forecasting
tasks. We have introduced a new formal model for studying the incentives for and the
impact of manipulation in prediction markets whose participants can affect the outcome
by taking actions external to the market but there is some uncertainty about the market
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participation of some outcome-deciders. We have characterized the equilibria of the induced
game, discussed their properties, and outlined important extensions. Interesting avenues for
future work include generalizing our results to markets with other price-setting mechanisms,
richer signal structures, outcome functions other than the mean vote (such as non-linear and
/ or noisy functions of the agents’ second-stage actions), and agents who also strategically
pick the time-points at which they trade.
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Chapter 4
Aggregating censored signals from
non-strategic noisy agents
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will abstract away from the task of providing truth-telling incentives,
and concentrate on methods that can be used for combining signals obtained from agents
as responses to queries designed by the principal, with the aim of getting as close to an
unknown “ground truth” as possible; our agent model will assume a lack of strategization
and consist only of the signal structure – the sampling distribution of agents’ signals given
the ground truth – to account for the subjectivity in their inputs to the aggregator.
There exist many problem domains where the learner’s goal is to locate a certain target,
given access only to a sequence of (potentially) oracles each of which provides a noisy binary
response to the question of whether the target belongs to a sub-space (chosen by the learner)
of its range of variation. Examples explored in the literature include dynamic pricing of goods
and services (Harrison et al., 2012), object localization in images (Sznitman et al., 2013),
and drug dosage discovery in Phase I clinical trials (Cheung and Elkind, 2010b).
Although the material in this chapter has general applicability, let us stay true to the spirit
of information aggregation within a (prediction) market context presented in Chapters 2
and 3, and try to motivate the discussion by recounting the automated market maker for
financial markets developed by Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009), henceforth referred to as
MM. Recall that a market maker is a trading agent that places both buy and sell orders
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within the same market (unlike buyers and sellers who respectively have demand and supply
only), and readjusts its prices after every trade with some financial objective in mind, e.g.
expected long-term profit maximization.
In the market model of Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009), the asset being traded attains a “true”
(unknown) value at market inception that remains unchanged henceforth, and each trading
agent acquires a noisy version of this value. At each time-step or episode, the MM publicly
quotes an ask price and a (lower) bid price defined as the price at which it is willing to sell
and buy one unit of the asset respectively in the episode. Exactly one agent interacts with the
MM per episode and buys one unit, sells one unit, or does nothing depending on whether her
valuation is higher than the ask price, lower than the bid price, or in between these quotes.
Agents following such simple trading rules that are not “immediately” irrational but lack
sophisticated optimization or learning components are often called zero-intelligence traders
(Gode and Sunder, 1993), and have been used to illustrate the emergence of interesting
aggregate-level properties (e.g. market efficiency) from individual properties (e.g. bounded
rationality).
Since the MM sees which of the three above actions the agent took, the ask and bid prices, in
addition to determining revenues, also serve as thresholds defining three (mutually exclusive
and exhaustive) sub-intervals such that the MM knows which of these sub-intervals the latest
trader’s valuation lies in. It can use this knowledge to adjust its quotes for the next episode
with the ultimate aim of converging on the true asset value so that it stands to profit (in the
long run) from the imperfectly informed traders. Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009) accomplish
this task within a reinforcement learning setting by having the MM maintain a Gaussian
belief state over the unknown value (which serves as the unchanging state of the world), use a
moment-matching approximation to its Bayesian posterior after every agent interaction, and
set bid-ask quotes as an action in its updated belief state; they show experimentally that this
methodology has impressive price discovery properties. If we consider the single-threshold
variant of this problem (where bid and ask price always coincide), the MM can be viewed as
a learner or principal performing an aggregation of stochastic binary (thresholded) signals
with its mean belief acting as the aggregate, albeit with a potential long-term profit-making
aim unlike in Chapters 2 and 3. We will concern ourselves only with what the principal
wishes to learn, and not why it wants to learn it.
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We present an algorithm that starts with a Gaussian prior belief on a real-valued target,
maintains a Gaussian belief at all times (after an initial transient phase; see below for details)
by applying a moment-matching approximation to the true (complicated and non-Gaussian)
posterior, and sets its threshold for querying each agent in a sequence at the mean of its
current belief distribution. We show that it unconditionally converges to the target with high
probability, and the asymptotic rate of convergence is near-optimal with respect to many
problem parameter, optimality being defined with respect to an exact Bayesian inferential
procedure that observes agents’ real-valued (unthresholded) signals.
4.2 Related work
The literature on learning with thresholded signals or binarized observations is scattered
across various lines of academic research. For example, in online dynamic pricing, a seller
wishes to determine the demand curve. She sets a price for a good and observes whether
or not the arriving buyer chooses to purchase at that price (Harrison et al., 2010). In
drug dosage discovery, the goal is typically to estimate the maximum dosage level that
causes toxicity with less than some target probability (this is typically the focus of Phase I
clinical trials) (Cheung and Elkind, 2010a). Threshold queries are also used in image or face
localization, where classifiers are used as subroutines to determine whether or not a face or
letter or character appears in the query region of some image (Sznitman and Jedynak, 2010).
Most contributions in this vein have focused on noise of a particular form: Nature generates
the correct answer, but it is then sent through a noisy transmission channel (Jedynak et al.,
2011). Thus, the probability of seeing the wrong signal is constant, independent of the point
of measurement (the particular threshold set by the learner). Several papers have focused on
proving the asymptotic optimality of policies that measure either at or around the median
(Horstein, 1963; Burnashev and Zigangirov, 1974; Castro and Nowak, 2008). More recent
work shows that measuring at the median is sequentially optimal for entropy reduction in the
case of symmetric noise (Waeber et al., 2011). In a different vein, Karp and Kleinberg (2007)
consider noisy binary search: in this problem, a finite sequence of biased coins, ordered in
increasing probability of a “heads” outcome, has to be searched for the last element with a
probability of heads lower than a specified target value.
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The bisection problem itself can also be thought of as a version of the classic problem of
stochastic root finding (Robbins and Monro, 1951), where the learner is trying to learn the
root of a real-valued, decreasing function f . The model is that the learner sequentially queries
at points θ1, θ2, . . . , θn, and receives observations of f(θ1), f(θ2), . . . , f(θn) after addition of
noise (e.g. zero-mean Gaussian noise). A natural extension to binary signals is to assume
that the learner observes whether or not the corrupted signal is above or below zero. This
directly corresponds to a noisy binary signal indicating whether the threshold is smaller than
or larger than the root. In this case, the noise model is heavily dependent on how close the
threshold is set to the target root. When the threshold is near the target, the probability of
seeing the wrong signal is significantly higher and no longer bounded away from 1
2
.
4.3 The learning problem
We set up a formal model for studying this sequential learning problem as follows: The
aim is to determine, within error tolerance ε, a fixed but unknown “target” value V ∈ R,
by querying a sequence of agents (or oracles) at episodes t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}; agent t has an
idiosyncratic estimate wt of the target due to independently and identically distributed
additive (zero-mean Gaussian) noise with a fixed, known variance σ2z , i.e.
wt = V + zt, where zt ∼i.i.d. N (0, σz) ∀t = 1, 2, . . . ,
where N (µ, σ) denotes a Gaussian distribution with location and scale parameters µ and σ
respectively. If the learner had access to these raw samples w1, w2, . . ., the learning problem
could be solved by a classic Bayesian approach: one could start with a Gaussian prior (the
conjugate prior for this scenario) over the possible values of the unknown target v ∈ R, i.e.
p0(v) = N (µ0, σ0) for some µ0 ∈ R and σ0 > 0, and hence perform a standard inference on
this sequence of observations − it is well-known that the leaner’s belief distribution pt(v)
after every observation xt will be Gaussian with mean µt and standard deviation σt given
by the following two-dimensional updates:
µt+1 = µt +
ρ2t
1 + ρ2t
(wt − µt), ρ2t+1 =
ρ2t
1 + ρ2t
, where ρt = σt/σz, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . .
(4.1)
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The learner returns µt at every t as her current estimate of V . Moreover, note that, the
higher the value of the ratio ρt which quantifies the learner’s uncertainty relative to that of
the noisily informed crowd, the larger the step-size |µt+1 − µt| for any given µt and wt, i.e.
as long as this Bayesian learner has a higher relative uncertainty, she takes a larger step “in
the right direction” in expectation, since Ept [µt+1 − µt] = ρ
2
t
1+ρ2t
(V − µt) where Ept [·] denotes
expectation with respect to the learner’s time-t belief.
The catch in our model is that the learner is constrained to ask agent t only if wt is above
or below some threshold θt of the learner’s choice, i.e. she only observes the binary signal
xt = I(wt ≥ θt) = sign(V + zt − θt) ∀t.
Such an observation, where we only know whether or not a data point is above a specified
threshold, is said to be censored. With a Gaussian prior, our posterior distribution with this
type of observation is not Gaussian. Our problem can thus be seen as a censored variant
of stochastic root finding (Robbins and Monro, 1951) where a learner, trying to learn the
root of a real-valued decreasing function f(·), sequentially queries at points θ1, θ2, . . . , θn to
receive observations of f(θ1), f(θ2), . . . , f(θn) after addition of noise zt; in our scenario, the
learner just sees I(f(θt)+zt ≥ 0) where f(θ) = V −θ. Moreover, our probability of obtaining
a “wrong” signal at t is
Pr(wt ≥ θt|V < θt)I(V < θt) + Pr(wt < θt|V ≥ θt)I(V ≥ θt) = 1− Φ(∆t/σz),
on simplification, where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and
∆t , |θt − V |. Evidently, the above probability increases towards 12 as ∆t approaches 0 or,
in other words, as the threshold gets closer to the target. This is a significant deviation from
earlier models for learning from noisy binary signals which assume that the correct response
to every binary query at t = 1, 2, . . . reaches the learner after passing through a transmission
channel whose noise characteristics are independent of the query or, equivalently, the time-
step (Jedynak et al., 2012).
In this setting, the learner is faced with the two-step task, at every t:
(i) Choosing a query threshold θt given its current belief about the target (which implies
that our problem can be subsumed under active learning (Castro and Nowak, 2008)).
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(ii) Updating its belief, and hence its estimate of the target, on receiving the response xt.
Note that the learner is free to pick each θt on the basis of her prior belief, the entire
history {θ1, x1, θ2, x2, . . . , θt−1, xt−1}, and a learning objective of her choice, e.g. minimizing
her uncertainty at the end of a pre-specified time horizon. In principle, a Bayesian learner
could set up a dynamic program to solve its two-part problem, where the state is an entire
probability (belief) distribution and in every state, the action of computing a threshold is
taken. But instead of dealing with an infinite-dimensional state space, we will aim to come up
with a heuristic strategy with simple threshold-setting rules and state updates comparable
to (4.1) but having provable performance guarantees. We provide in detail the underlying
rationale for our algorithm in Section 4.4.
4.4 The intuition for our solution approach
The Bayesian Setting. At time t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., assume a (prior) distribution for V , which
we denote pt(v). After observation xt, the Bayesian update to the distribution is given by
pt+1(v) = Φ (xt(v − θt)/σz) pt(v)/At, −∞ < v <∞,
where At =
∫∞
−∞ dv pt(v) Φ (xt(v − µt)/σz), and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function (CDF). Assuming pt is correct, which may not be the case, pt+1 incor-
porates all the new information from xt. At time t, the best estimate of V is given by the
mean of the distribution, which we define as
µt = Ept [V ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
dv vpt(v).
If the learner had to output an estimate for V at time t, the expected cost is the variance,
σ2t = Varpt [V ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
dv v2pt(v)− µ2t .
The Starting Prior. As with all Bayesian inference algorithms, we need to start with some
prior p0(v). In our context, the noise in the signals is based on a normally distributed random
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variable zt ∼ N (0, σz). One way to quantify the uncertainty in the learner’s prior is through
the learner’s initial variance, which we define as σ20 = ρ
2
0σ
2
z (and, in general, σ
2
t = ρ
2
tσ
2
z).
Given the learner’s initial variance, in accordance with the principal of maximum entropy,
we adopt the least informative prior. This happens to be the normal distribution, so we
assume that p0(v) = N (0, ρ0σz) (we can always assume µ0 = 0 by translating V ).
A few words about the dimensionless parameter ρ0, an important measure of the harshness of
the learning environment, are in order. The harshest environment has ρ0 → 0, where, if the
prior is correct, the learner is very sure of her belief about V , but the signals are essentially
random signs, and so it is hard to make any progress in learning from the observations.
This is the regime we are interested in because (i) it is the hard interesting problem; and,
(ii) any inference based algorithm will eventually get more and more certain as it receives
more observations, which means that ρt → 0. Thus, if it is to succeed, any algorithm has
to be able to make good progress in this harsh regime. In fact, any reasonable heuristic
(and we present one) can learn when the observations are relatively noiseless; the ultimate
performance of an algorithm is dependent on its behavior in this ρ → 0 regime. From now
on, we set the scale of the problem by choosing σ2z = 1 (which is without loss of generality;
the scale can always be added back through powers of σz using dimensional arguments).
Myopic Thresholds. Within this Bayesian setting, we perform task (i) of our problem
using the the simple myopic strategy of setting θt = µt, the expectation of the learner’s
current belief pt, at each t. This may or may not be sequentially optimal, but as we show
in Section 4.6, it is sufficient to obtain near-optimal asymptotic performance. In the multi-
threshold generalization of this problem, the selection of thresholds becomes non-trivial and
is dictated by further assumptions / constraints. However, our state update procedure that
we introduce in Section 4.5 can be extended to such situations and, since multiple thresholds
provide strictly more information, the performance cannot be worse than that of the single-
threshold algorithm which itself is near-optimal.
It is true that, to implement this myopic single-threshold strategy, one only needs to compute
µt at every time step, and perform the Bayesian update after observing xt. Unfortunately,
this computation requires the calculation of two integrals (one to compute At, and one to
compute the expectation) which are not analytically tractable, even for elementary starting
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priors p0(v). The natural alternative is to use numerical integration. However, numerical
integration leads to issues of numerical stability and efficiency. To compute pt, one needs
to store the entire history of θt, xt, At, which is O(t), and then the running time to set
θt, if we compute the integrals numerically with N quadrature points, is O(Nt). Together
with the numerical instability, this rapidly becomes computationally infeasible. In addition,
algorithmic issues can arise in selecting appropriate finite bounds for the integration domain.
As such, it makes sense to investigate whether approximate belief updates exist that enable
easier computation of thresholds and yet come with good performance guarantees. This
leads us to Section 4.4.1
4.4.1 Non-Parametric Histograms
Once the choice of thresholds has been made, the main challenge is to efficiently update the
prior (task (ii)). Consider the method, which we call NonParam henceforth, that uses a
non-parametric finite-support distribution to approximate the belief state after each episode.
Let v1 < · · · < vN be N possible values for V , the prior distribution p0(v) being given by the
probability-vector (p0(v1), . . . , p0(vN)), a truncated and renormalized discretization of our
actual Gaussian prior; the Bayesian update after observing every xt is then given by
pt+1(vi) =
1
At
Φ (xt(vi − θt)) pt(vi), i = 1, 2, . . . , N, At =
N∑
i=1
Φ (xt(vi − θt)) pt(vi).
The computation of the threshold / expectation in each episode as a finite sum θt = µt =∑N
i=1 vipt(vi) takes O(N) time; to converge to within ε of V , the resolution in the finite
prior should be O(ε), i.e. N = Ω(ε−1), making this a computationally intense procedure.
Another problem with this approach is that one must commit to a range for V , introducing
additional assumptions, and leading to serious problems when V is outside, or in the tail of,
the range. In spite of being impracticable, this method offers insights into the behavior of
the Bayesian update, aiding the design of our proposed algorithm, and also serves as a (near-
exact) benchmark for evaluating our accuracy. Starting from a Gaussian prior, using our
myopic thresholds, and running these non-parametric histogram-based updates, we illustrate
how the posterior evolves in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of pt(v) using non-parametric histograms and Bayesian updates; p0(v)
is N (0, 10), σ = 1, V ≈ 9.45. Typical evolution consists of 3 main phases. (i) Truncation
(ρt = σt/σ  1): All observations are in the same direction (here xt = +1) and almost
noiseless, so the Bayesian update results in a skewed distribution. Shown for comparison is
a truncated (on one side only) and renormalized Gaussian distribution (using our heuristic),
which approximates this phase better than Gaussian. (ii) Collapse: When the first observa-
tion in the opposite direction arrives (here xt = −1), the distribution collapses to something
more symmetric, although not quite normal. Shown for comparison is the entropy-matched
normal with the same mean. (iii) Convergence: ρt is typically small and µt is close to V ,
i.e. the algorithm has (probabilistically) bracketed V . From then on, nearly independent
observations which are close to random signs cause the distribution to rapidly converge to
normal, as would be expected with truly independent observations.
4.5 The algorithm
We can now delineate the operation of our algorithm for belief updates (or, equivalently,
learner’s state transitions), illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The state of the learner at time t is completely described in terms of four parameters,
(lt, rt,mt, st), that describe its current belief distribution, which can take on two forms:
either Gaussian, or truncated Gaussian. The support of the distribution is given by (lt, rt).
In all cases, either the left bound lt = −∞ or the right bound rt = ∞). The location
and shape of the distribution are determined by mt, s
2
t , the mean and the variance of the
underlying Gaussian. Thus the learner’s belief distribution is a rescaled normal distribution
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Figure 4.2: Learner’s state transitions.
on the support (lt, rt).
pt(v) =

N
(
v−mt
st
)
st
(
Φ
(
rt−mt
st
)
− Φ
(
lt−mt
st
)) v ∈ (lt, rt),
0 otherwise,
where N(·) is the standard normal probability density function (PDF). The initial prior is
normal with mean m0 = µ0 = 0 and variance s
2
0 = σ
2
0 (equal to ρ
2
0 for σz = 1), which is
described by the state (−∞,∞, 0, ρ0). These approximations to the true Bayesian evolution
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allow us to compute the mean belief µt, identical to the threshold θt, by a simple known
formula at every t.
Additionally, the algorithm has a switch-over parameter ρ∗ such that, roughly speaking, a
value of the relative uncertainty ρt, defined in (4.1), higher than ρ
∗ is taken to suggest that
we are in a situation where the truncation heuristic (Figure 4.1 Panel (i)) is most reasonable.
We use ρ∗ ≥ 1 since small ρt values ( 1) constitute the “challenging” regime.
A high level description of our method is given in Algorithm 1, and the general idea is as
follows. We start with Gaussian belief but since initial observations are likely to be all in
the same direction, we maintain a truncated normal distribution (as in Figure 4.1 Panel (i)).
Upon collapse (i.e. when the learner receives the first observation in the opposite direction,
as in Figure 4.1 Panel (ii)), we revert back to Gaussian, using entropy matching to set its
parameters. Though the Gaussian is not very accurate at collapse, this is only a transient
phase; as convergence occurs (as in Figure 4.1 Panel (iii)), the Gaussian becomes a better
and better approximation, so we remain in the Gaussian world, using moment matching to
update the parameters. The algebraic updates are provided below.
Algorithm 1 The Learning Algorithm
Initialize l0 = −∞, r0 =∞, m0 = µ0, s0 = σ0.
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
Set threshold at µt;
Receive noisy thresholded signal xt;
Update lt, rt,mt, st;
Compute µt+1, ρt+1 = σt+1/σz;
end for
Approximate Gaussian Inference (ρt ≤ ρ∗). As in Das and Magdon-Ismail (2008),
in transitioning from Gaussian to Gaussian, we can compute the mean and variance of the
true posterior, and we approximate this with the Gaussian that has the same mean and
variance. So we perform approximate moment matching inference in this case. Das and
Magdon-Ismail (2008) derive exactly such moment matching equations for two thresholds,
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which we can directly specialize to the single threshold case:
µt+1 = µt + xt
(
σz
√
2/pi
)
ρ2t√
1 + ρ2t
; (4.2)
ρ2t+1 = ρ
2
t
[
1 + ρ2t (1− 2/pi)
1 + ρ2t
]
. (4.3)
Truncation (ρt > ρ
∗). When ρt is large, we approximate the inference by truncating (as
in Figure 4.1) as long as the signal is consistent with the truncation. The state updates are:
(lt,∞,mt, st) (θt,xt=+1)−→ (θt − 2σz,∞,mt, st);
(−∞, rt,mt, st) (θt,xt=−1)−→ (−∞, θt + 2σz,mt, st).
Collapse. No matter what ρt is, if the signal is inconsistent with the truncated Gaussian,
then we collapse back to Gaussian (see Figure 4.1). Unfortunately, updating to a Gaussian
using moment matching would take the distribution with finite support and collapse to a
distribution with infinite support and the same variance, typically producing a Gaussian that
is too localized although there can be a lot of uncertainty in the learner’s posterior. So a
better way to capture this uncertainty is by matching the entropy. We call this approximate
inference by entropy matching. To make the entropy matching analytically tractable, we first
doubly truncate the distribution (as in regular truncation), compute the mean and entropy
of the resulting distribution, and then collapse to the Gaussian with this mean and entropy.
For finite lt and rt, the state updates are:
(lt,∞,mt, st) (θt,xt=−1)−→ (−∞,∞, µt+1, ρt+1);
(−∞, rt,mt, st) (θt,xt=+1)−→ (−∞,∞, µt+1, ρt+1).
We abuse notation above, in that the updates are not the same in both cases. In the top
case (xt = −1), set l = lt and r = µt + 2σz; in the bottom case (xt = +1), set l = µt − 2σz
and r = rt. Then, a tedious but straightforward computation of the mean and entropy of
the resulting rescaled doubly truncated Gaussian with support (l, r) and parameters (mt, st),
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followed by entropy matching gives:
µt+1 = mt+1 + st+1
[
N(l′)−N(r′)
Φ(r′)− Φ(l′)
]
,
σ2t+1 = s
2
t+1
[
(Φ(r′)− Φ(l′))2e
l′N(l′)−r′N(r′)
Φ(r′)−Φ(l′)
]
.
where l′ = (l −mt) /st, r′ = (r −mt) /st.
4.6 Analysis
Note that exact Bayesian inferential procedure, described in (4.1), that we can perform
for the scenario mentioned in Section 4.3 when the learner has access to raw valuations
(with a Gaussian starting prior and Gaussian observations) serves as a “gold standard” for
evaluating our algorithm in Section 4.5 since one is certainly getting more information from
the unthresholded signals and so should be able to do better. Hence, we first analyze the
raw-valuation algorithm, and then compare the asymptotic performance of our method that
works with thresholded signals to it.
The proofs of all results furnished in this chapter are highly technical and relegated to
Appendix C.
4.6.1 Bayesian inference with uncensored signals
Since wt = V + zt, we can rewrite state update equations (4.1) as
µt+1 =
µt + ρ
2
t (V + zt)
1 + ρ2t
and ρ2t+1 =
ρ2t
1 + ρ2t
.
Assuming that µ0 = 0, and that {zt}t≥0 are i.i.d. N (0, 1), i.e. σz = 1, we can unfold the
above recursion to show that µt has a Gaussian distribution with
E[µt] = V − V
1 + tρ20
and Var[µt] = ρ
2
0
tρ20
(1 + tρ20)
2
. (4.4)
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Theorem 6 below gives the convergence of µt both in expectation and with high probability.
Fix an error tolerance ε > 0. The dependence of the expected value on t immediately implies
a lower bound on the time after which the expectation of µt (which is our output estimate
Vˆ ) is within ε of V . Further, the distribution for µt tells us that if we fix a small confidence
parameter δ, 0 < δ  1, and define ζ = −Φ−1(δ), then (for V > 0) with probability at
least δ, µt ≤ E[µt] − ζ
√
Var[µt], which allows us to get a lower bound on t if we want high
probability convergence.
Theorem 6. Fix ε < |V |
2
, δ ≤ Φ(−1).
(i) For t > |V |/ερ20, |V | − |E[µt]| < ε.
(ii) For t > max
{
2|V |
ερ20
, 4ζ
2
ε2
}
, where ζ = −Φ−1(δ) ≥ 1,
Pr[µt > V − ε] > 1− δ if V > 0; Pr[µt < V + ε] > 1− δ if V < 0.
Proof. Here, we will prove the result for the case {V > 0}. Note that for V > 0, we must
have V
1+tρ20
< V since t, ρ20 > 0, so that E[µt] > 0 ∀t ≥ 1, from result (4.4).
(i) The L.H.S. of the required inequality is
V − E[µt] = V
1 + tρ20
, from result (4.4),
<
V
1 + V
ε
for t > V/ερ20,
=
ε
ε
V
+ 1
< ε ≡ R.H.S.,
since ε
V
> 1.
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(ii) From the definition of the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
Pr[µt < V − ε] = Φ
(
V − ε− E[µt]√
Var[µt]
)
,
where
V − ε− E[µt]√
Var[µt]
=
V − ε(1 + tρ20)
ρ20
√
t
, from result (4.4), after simplification,
<
V − εtρ20
ρ20
√
t
, since ε > 0,
=
V
ρ20
√
t
− ε√t
<
1
ρ20
√
t
· εtρ
2
0
2
− ε√t, for t > 2V
ερ20
,
=
ε
√
t
2
− ε√t
= −ε
√
t
2
< −ζ, for t > 4ζ
2
ε2
,
= Φ−1(δ)
=⇒ Pr[µt < V − ε] < δ,
from the strict increasing monotonicity of Φ(·). Now, the L.H.S. of the required in-
equality is
Pr[µt > V − ε] = 1− Pr[µt < V − ε] > 1− δ ≡ R.H.S.
The proof for {V < 0} is analogous.
Part (i) of the theorem says that to get convergence in expectation, O(V/ερ20) time is needed.
Note that, from the well-known Gaussian tail inequality (see e.g. Boucheron et al. (2004)),
it is easy to show that ζ = −Φ−1(δ) = O(√ln(1/δ)); so, if one wants convergence with
probability at least 1−δ, then part (ii) of the theorem makes it clear that O(V/ερ20 +ln 1δ/ε2)
time is needed. These bounds will be useful in showing that our algorithm is nearly as good
as exact inference with non-thresholded observations.
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4.6.2 Approximate Bayesian inference with censored signals
The algorithm in Section 4.5 has two basic phases. The first is if ρt is large, in which case the
algorithm is a heuristic that truncates the distribution until colapse into the Gaussian world,
at which point the process (truncation→collapse) repeats until ρt gets below ρ∗. We do not
go into the details of the dynamics for ρt > ρ
∗ because in this relatively noiseless regime,
many heuristics can “localize” the posterior quickly. The interesting regime is ρt → 0, when
the signals start to get noisy. In this regime, our algorithm will always be doing approximate
Gaussian inference (since ρt is decreasing), updating according to Equations (4.2) and (4.3).
Once in this regime, we essentially show that our algorithm is near-optimal by proving that
µt converges quickly to V in expectation, and it also does so with high probability. For
asympotic results, we have in mind that ρ0 → 0. Proposition 3 below mirrors part (i) of
Theorem 6 above, and speaks to the speed of convergence to the target in expectation for
the case of censored signals; the (heuristic) proof is provided in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. There exist absolute positive constants C > 0 and k, 1 ≤ k < pi√2 ≈ 4.44
such that, if t > C/(ρ20ε
k), then |V | − |E[µt]| < ε.
Recall that the expectation is with respect to p0(v) and the i.i.d. zt ∼ N (0, 1), hence this
result is relevant when the prior is correct. From Theorem 6, the best we could hope for,
even with non-thresholded signals, for the expectation to get within ε of V is t = O(1/ρ20ε).
Thus, our dependence on ρ20 is optimal. The theorem gives polynomial convergence in 1/ε
but, in practice, k is almost 1, which is near-optimal asymptotic convergence, as illustrated
with an example in Figure 4.3.
Our second result (the proof, again, is in Appendix C) demonstrates unconditional conver-
gence with high probability, regardless of whether our prior p0(v) is correct. For simplicity,
we assume without loss of generality that V > 0. Note that µt follows a stochastic process.
We ask how long we have to wait before, with high probability, µt will have crossed V − ε.
This analysis is sufficient to convey the main point of the convergence, because once you cross
this barrier, the stochastic process has an attractor at V , and so will stay in this region. The
tough part is getting to this region.
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Figure 4.3: A log-log plot showing the time taken by E[µt] (approximated by the average
computed over 106 simulations) to converge to V − ε when V = 3, µ0 = 0, ρ0 = 0.5.
Evidently, the convergence time approaches O(1/ε) as ε becomes small, which gives us
empirical evidence that it is near-optimal.
Theorem 7. Fix 0 < δ < 1, 0 < ε < V , 0 < ρ0 ≤ 1, and define ∆ = V − ε. There is an
absolute constant C > 0 such that if t > T = eC(ln(1/δ)+∆)/ε/ρ20, then with probability at least
1− δ, maxi≤t µi > V − ε.
This constant T gives us an upper bound on the time at which µt first crosses V − ε. In the
practical setting where the prior is ill-specified, V is very large and ε is usually specified as a
percentage of V . Then, the exponent is some constant and the dependence on 1/ρ0 is what
we are interested in. Comparing with part (ii) of Theorem 6, we see that our algorithm is
asymptotically optimal with respect to 1/ρ0.
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4.7 Experimental results
We perform experiments to evaluate the practical performance of our algorithm. Our simu-
lations measure convergence time as the time taken by µt to enter the region [V − ε, V + ε]
for the first time. We are interested in the dependence of the convergence time on ρ0 and ε.
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Figure 4.4: Plot of average correct-prior convergence time vs ρ0, logarithmic along the
vertical axis.
First, we compare the non-parametric algorithm (NonParam) to exact inference on non-
thresholded signals, and show that noisy binary signals are almost as informative as the
unthresholded signals. This is already surprising. Assuming that the prior is correct, we set
the support of the non-parametric histogram to [−6ρ0, 6ρ0] and use 1,000 histogram bins.
We generate V randomly according to p0 and any value of V outside this finite support is
discarded. For our algorithm, we set the switch-over parameter ρ∗ = 2.5. The number of
steps taken by each algorithm to converge to the region [V − ε, V + ε], averaged over 108
runs for NonParam and 109 runs for each other algorithm, is reported in Figure 4.4.
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In our second set of simulations, we fix σ0 at 0.5 and vary ε. To ensure adequate resolution
for NonParam, we use 24ρ0/ε bins (giving a resolution of ε/2). The number of steps to
convergence is presented in Figure 4.5. The average is over 105 runs for NonParam (owing
to computational burden) and 107 runs for each other algorithm. It is clear from the figures
that not only is learning from noisy binary thresholds feasible in this Bayesian model, but
can be performed almost as well as learning from non-thresholded signals, in accordance
with the theory.
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Figure 4.5: Plot of average correct-prior convergence time vs ε, logarithmic along the vertical
axis.
4.8 Discussion
This contibution can be viewed as constructive proof of the claim that it is possible to learn
a real-valued target from noisy valuations binarized by a threshold, asymptotically almost
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as efficiently as if the actual valuations were accessible to the learner. This means that
thresholding does not significantly impede our ability to learn!
These results also provide theoretical underpinnings to the Bayesian market making algo-
rithm, introduced by Das and Magdon-Ismail (2009), and employed (with modifications to
make it more practical) by Brahma et al. (2012) and Chakraborty et al. (2013).
An interesting direction for future research would be to chalk out the generalization to
multiple thresholds and study how the performance converges towards the scenario where
the learner observes the agents’ actual (uncensored) signals as we increase the number of
thresholds.
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Chapter 5
Market making in practice: CDA
with LMSR
5.1 Introduction and related work
In this chapter, we will review the market microstructure called the continuous double auction
(CDA) which has traditionally been employed in many real-world financial markets, including
early prediction markets, e.g. the Iowa Electronic Markets (Berg and Rietz, 2006)). This
microstructure offers participating traders more flexibility in terms of the types of orders
they can place, compared to the models we encountered in previous chapters where an agent
/ trader could only specify whether or not she wished to buy from or sell to the principal
(Chapter 4) or additionally the quantity she wanted to trade (Chapters 2 and 3). We will
then demonstrate how the market scoring rule concept can be modified to design an agent
that operates within this CDA framework, and experimentally study the impact this MSR-
based agent has on the properties of a CDA market, particularly on its power to aggregate
traders’ information. In doing so, we will use an extension of the zero-intelligence trader
model mentioned in Chapter 4.
With this in view, let us now step outside the domain of prediction markets into the larger
world of more general financial markets, such as those for stocks, bonds, and options, that
provide participants with opportunities for hedging, investment, and speculation. The orga-
nizers of these markets have always had to deal with the chicken-and-egg problem of providing
liquidity, which, roughly speaking, is a measure of ongoing trading activity or open interest
in the market. To this end, many such markets employ specially designated agents, called
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market makers (as we have seen in previous chapters) or, sometimes, specialists, that are
responsible for providing liquidity by always being ready to transact with traders. In the
last decade or so, research on algorithmic market making has become one of the interesting
contact points between artificial intelligence and finance, both in the general context (Das,
2005, 2008b; Wah and Wellman, 2015), and specifically in the design of prediction mar-
kets (Hanson, 2003b; Chen and Pennock, 2007; Brahma et al., 2012; Othman et al., 2013;
Abernethy et al., 2014).
Most research on algorithmic market making in both financial and prediction markets has
either focused on market making as a trading strategy (Chakraborty and Kearns, 2011;
Schmitz, 2011) or has modeled the market as a pure dealer market, where the market maker
takes one side of every trade (Hanson, 2003b; Das, 2008b; Othman et al., 2013). The market
can therefore be modeled in terms of the market maker’s quoted bid (buy) and ask (sell)
prices, and traders’ decisions on whether or not to transact at these prices. However, most
modern markets, ranging from big financial markets like the NYSE and NASDAQ to smaller
prediction markets like the Iowa Electronic Markets, use the continuous double auction
(CDA) mechanism (Forsythe et al., 1992). In CDAs, participants can place limit orders
that specify a transaction price and are guaranteed to only execute at that price or better
(although execution is, of course, no longer guaranteed). The key element of CDAs is the
limit order book, which contains all active buy and sell limit orders; the highest buy and the
lowest sell constitute the market bid and ask prices at any point in time.
While most practical market making algorithms (for example, those used by market makers
on the NYSE and NASDAQ) are deployed in markets with limit order books, the academic
literature on algorithmic market making has thus far produced almost no analysis of the
impact of market making in CDA markets (with the exception of Wah and Wellman (2015)).
Here we begin to tackle this problem in the context of market making in prediction markets.
The logarithmic market scoring rule proposed by Hanson (2003b) is probably the most
commonly deployed automated market maker in prediction markets. Hanson (2003a) also
provides a scheme for integrating order books with his market making algorithm which,
to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been evaluated in the literature. This scheme, as
proposed, involves the market maker having special access to orders before they hit the order
book, and a “parallel” implementation that looks at the incoming order, the order book, and
executes portions of the trade with the market maker and portions with the existing orders
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on the order book. In addition to the special system privileges this requires, it is not entirely
transparent to traders, since the order books themselves never reflect the market maker’s
presence (and thus give a worse impression of the state of prices and the bid-ask spread than
reality).
In this paper, we propose a modification of Hanson’s scheme for integrating LMSR with CDA
mechanisms that allows an LMSR-based market making agent to compute limit bid and ask
prices and participate in the order books as any other trader would, while still maintaining the
key desirable properties – namely improved liquidity with bounded worst-case loss. We call
this the “Integrated” market maker (as opposed to the “Parallel” market maker of the original
scheme). In general, analysis of the properties of market making algorithms in practice is
difficult, since they affect the dynamics of the pricing mechanism itself, and therefore the
standard practice of backtesting on historical data is of very limited value. However, there is
evidence that simulation models with zero-intelligence (ZI) traders (Gode and Sunder, 1993)
can replicate many key features of limit order book dynamics (Farmer et al., 2005a; Othman,
2008) and have practical value in assessing the properties of market making algorithms
(Brahma et al., 2012). Therefore, we evaluate market properties in prediction markets
populated by ZI traders; we compare the parallel and integrated implementations of LMSR
with a situation where no market maker is present, and also a pure dealer market mediated
by LMSR.
We are mostly interested in general market properties. In particular,
• Information aggregation properties: For example, how fast does the market price
converge to the true underlying asset value? How far away is the price from the true
value, on average?
• Market quality properties: For example, how liquid is the market, as measured by the
bid-ask spread? How much surplus or price improvement does the market generate?
In our experiments we find that the presence of the market maker leads to generally lower
bid-ask spreads and higher trader surplus (or price improvement), but, surprisingly, does
not necessarily improve price discovery and market efficiency; this latter effect is more pro-
nounced when there is higher variability in trader beliefs.
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5.2 Market Model
In this section, we describe the precise market model we use and the algorithms used for
trading and market making. We simulate four different market microstructures:
(1) A Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism without any market maker (pureCDA);
(2) A CDA with the “Integrated” implementation of LMSR (INT);
(3) A CDA with the “Parallel” implementation of LMSR (PAR);
(4) A pure dealer framework with all trades going through a traditional LMSR market
maker (pureLMSR).
Prediction market We focus on a prediction market set up to forecast whether a single
extraneous uncertain event, which can be modeled as a binary random variable X, will occur
at some pre-determined future date; on that date, the market terminates, and every unit
(share) of the asset traded in the market is worth $1 if the event occurs and is worthless
otherwise; we call this cash equivalent of the asset its liquidation value or true value. Before
that date, anyone can place orders to buy or (short-)sell any amount of the asset in the
market at prices in the interval [0, 1], i.e. the market institution does not impose any budget
constraints on traders. We also assume that there is a fixed probability distribution with
Pr(X = 1) = ptrue from which the realization of X is drawn on the termination date so
that the expected “true” value of the asset is ptrue, but no agent in the world knows this
ptrue precisely. However, under a “rational expectations” assumption, the market price in
equilibrium is expected to approach ptrue (Pennock and Sami, 2007).
Types of orders Traders in a financial exchange can typically place buy/sell orders of
two kinds: (1) market orders that specify only a quantity and demand immediate execution,
hence accept any price offered by the other party, and (2) limit orders that specify both a
quantity and a limit on acceptable transaction prices (called a limit price or marginal price)
but are not guaranteed execution. A Continuous Double Auction (CDA) maintains two order
books, one for buy orders (bids) and the other for sell orders (asks), which are two priority
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queues for outstanding limit orders prioritized by limit price and arrival time (higher priority
is assigned to a buy order with a higher bid price and a sell order with a lower ask price). Any
incoming limit order is placed on the appropriate book, and the mechanism automatically
checks to see if the current best (highest) bid is at least as large as the current best (lowest)
ask; if yes, then the smaller of the two quantities ordered is traded at the limit price of
the order that arrived earlier, the books are updated, and this is continued till the best ask
exceeds the best bid. Any new market order is executed immediately, perhaps partially,
against the best available outstanding order(s) or is rejected if the book on the other side is
empty. In our simulations, all traders place limit orders only but some of them can become
market orders effectively, e.g. if an incoming limit buy order “crosses” the books. i.e. its
bid is no less than the best ask(s) on the sell order book, and its demand does not exceed
the supply of said booked order(s).
Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule We now describe the cost function-based operational
formulation of the LMSR market maker, that we touched upon in Chapter 2, for a single-
security prediction market liquidating20 in {0, 1} (Hanson, 2003b; Chen and Pennock, 2007).
Its “state” is described by a real scalar qmm, interpreted as the net outstanding quantity
of the security; its instantaneous price at this state, i.e. cost per share of buying/selling
an infinitesimal amount from/to LMSR, is given by pmm =
eqmm/B
1+eqmm/B
where B > 0 is a
parameter controlling all properties of the market maker. A trader placing a market order
for buying any finite quantity Q of assets from LMSR would have to pay it a dollar amount
C(qmm;Q) = B ln
(
1+e(qmm+Q)/B
1+eqmm/B
)
and after the transaction, the market maker’s state is
updated to (qmm +Q); for a sell order, the same formula applies by setting Q to the negative
of the supplied quantity, and −C(qmm;Q) > 0 becomes the sales proceeds. One key property
of LMSR is that it’s loss is bounded (for the binary case by B ln 2).
Population of traders Every agent other than the market maker is called a “background”
trader (Wah and Wellman, 2015). Before every simulation, the expected true asset value
ptrue is chosen at random from a common-knowledge common prior which is a uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Every trader i then observes a private sequence of Ntrials Bernoulli
20The security is said to liquidate when the forecast event is realized, i.e. we know whether X = 1 or
X = 0, so that the market terminates and
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trials with probability of success ptrue, and sets her idiosyncratic valuation of the asset to
her Bayesian posterior expectation of the true value, vi =
xi+1
Ntrials+2
where xi is the number of
successes in her sample. Thus, Ntrials is a measure of the precision of the signal that each
trader receives, related to the inverse of the variance of beliefs across the population, similar
to the model of Zhang et al. (2012). The implementation of a trading decision on top of the
belief then follows the zero-intelligence (ZI) trader model (Gode and Sunder, 1993; Othman,
2008), with the addition of non-unit trade sizes. At each step of a simulation (a “trading
episode”), a trader is picked uniformly at random and is assigned buyer or seller status with
equal probability except for pureLMSR (see below). She then places her limit order, the
limit price being drawn uniformly at random from [vi, 1] if she is a seller and from [0, vi] if
she is a buyer, and the order quantity from a common exponential distribution with mean
λ = 20 which is known to the market mechanism.
(1) pureCDA We have already fully explained the interaction between a CDA mechanism
with no market making and the trading population under Types of Orders.
(2) PAR The parallel implementation is a single-security version of Robin Hanson’s “booked
orders for market scoring rules” (Hanson, 2003a). We delineate its operation for a buy order,
the treatment of sell orders being symmetric. Suppose a limit buy order for a quantity qb
at a limit price (bid) pb arrives when the LMSR market maker’s instantaneous price is pmm,
and the current best bid and ask prices are bmax, amin (at market inception, both books are
empty, and pmm = 0.5). If pb ≤ pmm21, the order cannot be immediately executed, so it is
pushed on to the limit buy order book. If pmm < pb, and qb is not large enough to drive
pmm beyond min{pb, amin}, then the incoming order is completely executed with the market
maker according to the traditional LMSR algorithm; otherwise, if pmm < pb < amin, it is
only partially executed with LMSR till pmm reaches pb, the residual order being placed on
the buy order book; but if pb ≥ amin, LMSR sells only till its instantaneous price hits amin
after which the incoming order executes against the best booked ask. If the top level of the
book is exhausted but the incoming order is not, LMSR is invoked again, and this process
recurs till either the order is finished or the new best ask exceeds the order’s bid price. The
loss bound of the standard LMSR algorithm is maintained in this case.
21In this implementation, pmm always lies between the best ask and bid prices on the books, so pb ≤ pmm
implies that pb does not exceed the minimum ask price either.
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(3) INT In this novel “integrated” implementation that we propose, whenever the best ask
and bid prices on the books change, an LMSR-based agent steps in.
1. If its instantaneous price pmm ≤ bmax, then LMSR generates only a limit sell order for a
quantity qask = B ln
(
1/pmm−1
1/amin−1
)
at an ask price of B
qask
ln
(
1−pmm
1−amin
)
.
2. If pmm ≥ amin, then it generates a buy order for qbid = B ln
(
1/bmax−1
1/pmm−1
)
at a bid of
B
qbid
ln
(
1−bmax
1−pmm
)
.
3. If bmax < pmm < amin, both orders are generated.
Note that if fully executed immediately these orders would take the LMSR price to bmax and
amin respectively. The LMSR trader then replaces all its earlier orders with the new order(s)
if this action does not immediately cross the books, otherwise it sits idle. After this step,
the market is now ready to accept a new order from the background traders, or continue
the execution of a partially filled outstanding order, as the case may be. Thus, this market
maker can be implemented in practice as just another trader, which is a significant benefit
over the PAR framework where the market maker requires some special access to incoming
trades and order books. Moreover, any feasible trade with the INT market maker is executed
at its actual quoted price rather than following the non-linear LMSR pricing function, which
makes trading more transparent and intuitive to traders.
The original LMSR loss bound again holds. Also, we can prove that INT myopically imposes
at least as high a cost on the next arriving trader as PAR, assuming that the market makers
and order books are in the same state.
Proposition 4. Suppose the LMSR market maker in both PAR and INT are in state q, and
the order books are also otherwise identical. For any next arriving trade, the immediate cost
incurred by the next trader is at least as high for INT as it is for PAR.
The proof is uncomplicated, so we only sketch it here. Consider the last of the three cases
for INT above, bmax < pmm < amin, and let Q
∗ be the quantity one would need to buy from
LMSR to bring its price to amin. Then, if the current state of the INT market maker is q, it
will place a sell order of Q∗ at an ask of C(q;Q
∗)
Q∗ . Now if a buy order for Q < Q
∗ arrives with a
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of how the market maker in the INT setting places ask and bid quotes
every time the state of the books changes.
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sufficiently high bid, the whole of it will execute with the market maker, and the immediate
earnings of the latter will be QC(q;Q
∗)
Q∗ . If the PAR market maker had the same state q (hence
the same pmm) when the same buy order arrived, the ensuing trade would cost the trader
C(q;Q) which is less than INT’s earnings since C(q;Q)
Q
< C(q;Q
∗)
Q∗ from the convexity of C.
Similar arguments apply to the other cases.
This result suggests that INT might provide somewhat less liquidity in general than PAR,
and incur less loss in doing so, but we do not expect them to be very different. However,
this is a loose prediction, since the result is myopic – it says nothing about price evolution
in a market; given the market maker’s active role, the dynamics of the evolution of q and
the order book could conceivably end up quite different. We examine this issue further in
the experiments.
(4) pureLMSR In this setting, traders still place limit orders but an LMSR market maker
takes one side of every trade. At each trading episode, a trader arrives and compares her
private valuation vi to the current market price pmm. If vi > pmm, she decides to buy; if
vi < pmm, she decides to sell, and leaves without placing any order otherwise. Then she picks
her limit price and order size exactly as the ZI traders above. The quantity bought/sold is
the minimum of the order size and the quantity needed to drive the LMSR’s instantaneous
price to the trader’s limit price, and monetary transfers are determined by the above function
C(·; ·).
Note that all components of each limit order of a trader are independent of the market state
for all four settings, except for the direction of the trade (buy/sell) in pureLMSR.
5.3 Evaluation
We present an overview of the various measures we use to evaluate the properties of our
market environments.
Information aggregation properties:
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Figure 5.2: Experimental results, averaged over 1000 simulations each. The labels along the
horizontal axis indicate the number of private Bermoulli trials with success probability ptrue
observed by each trader in the respective simulation set; this number is directly related to
the precision in trader beliefs.
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• ConvTime (Convergence time): This is defined as the number of trading episodes it takes
for the “market price” pM to get within a band of size ±0.05 around the true expected
asset value ptrue for the first time; pM(t) is measured at the end of every trading episode t
as the mid-point of the bid-ask spread ((bmax(t) + amin(t))/2) for each of the models with
CDA, and as the LMSR instantaneous price for the pure dealer case.22 Thus,
ConvTime = min{t : pM(t) ∈ [ptrue − 0.05, ptrue + 0.05]}. A lower convergence time means
that the market’s estimate (price) quickly gets close to the true expected asset value, i.e.
the market is efficient.
• RMSD and RMSDeq: RMSD is the root-mean-squared deviation of the market price
(defined above) from ptrue over the entire simulation (ntrades trading episodes). RMSDeq is
the root-mean-squared deviation between the same quantities but over only the “equilib-
rium period”, i.e. for t ≥ ConvTime. Lower values of these measures indicate lower price
volatility, another desirable property from an information aggregation perspective.
Market quality properties:
• Spread and Spreadeq: For each scenario with a CDA, the market bid and ask prices
bM(t) and aM(t) at the end of each trading episode are the highest bid bmax and the lowest
ask amin on the books respectively (set to 0 and 1 if the corresponding book is empty).
For the pure dealer setting, we assume that the market maker knows the average order
size λ of the trading population, so for a current market state of qmm, the effective market
quotes are taken to be aM =
C(qmm;λ)
λ
and bM =
−C(qmm;−λ)
λ
which are the prices per share
of buying and selling λ shares from and to LMSR at the current state respectively. In
our notation, “Spread” denotes the bid-ask spread (aM(t)− bM(t)) averaged over all ntrades
episodes, while “Spreadeq” is the average taken over the equilibrium period only, as above.
The bid-ask spread is widely used as a proxy for market liquidity and smaller values are
better, since they imply lower trading costs.
• (Idiosyncratic) TraderSurplus: If a trader with idiosyncratic valuation v places a buy
order of which a quantity q goes through at an execution price pexec, then the trader’s
surplus is defined as q(v−pexec) (similarly, a seller’s surplus is q(pexec−v)). TraderSurplus
22If the market price does not enter this band over the duration of the simulation, ConvT ime is set to
ntrades = 500; in our simulations, this is rarely observed.
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denotes the sum of individual surpluses of all background traders. Also note that (v−pexec)
and (pexec − v) correspond loosely to the notion of price improvement, when weighted by
the probability of execution at that difference. So, even in settings where the private or
idiosyncratic value assumption is untenable, the surplus is still a useful measurement of
how much value participants are getting from being in one particular microstructure over
another. Since every order executes at a price at least as desirable as its limit price, all
trader price improvements (surpluses) are positive.
• MMloss: This is the loss incurred by the market making mechanism, computed just
like (the negative of) a trader surplus, with the private valuation replaced with the true
expected asset value ptrue. Obviously, this does not apply to pureCDA. Since the market
is an ex post zero-sum game between the market maker and the trading population,
this measure is also numerically equal to the true expectation of the traders’ collective
net payoff. This measure is particularly important when the market institution itself
subsidizes the market maker.
5.3.1 Results
We ran three sets of 1000 simulations each. In each set, we used a different value of the
parameter Ntrials (20, 40, 100) controlling the precision of trader beliefs. In each simulation,
we made the same random sequence of ntrades = 500 traders interact with each of our four
microstructures. The LMSR parameter B is fixed at 100 for all simulations. We computed all
of the above measures for each simulation, and then averaged them over all 1000 simulations.
The results are presented in Figure 5.2, and the analysis follows. Note that, the values (rmsd
of prices, spreads) depicted in Figures 1(c)-(f) are in cents while those in the last two figures
(surplus, losses) are in dollars, for clarity.
Information aggregation: ConvTime (a) follows the pattern: pureLMSR << pureCDA
< INT < PAR. However, in terms of stability (RMSD, overall (b) and in equilibrium (c)),
pureCDA fares the best and the two hybrid mechanisms are very close to each other. The
quick convergence and high volatility of LMSR are well-known; surprisingly, coupling it with
a CDA delays convergence drastically, but it does ensure more stable prices (lower RMSDeq)
once the price converges. While it seems that the market maker-CDA combination might
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impede the market’s learning abilities, it is likely in this case to be an artifact of the fixed
beliefs held by ZI traders, who stick to their beliefs no matter what happens to the price –
it’s not clear that any scoring rule style of market maker would be able to learn quickly when
the signals have high variance and the traders don’t update their signals. This hypothesis is
borne out by the fact that the effect diminishes as the variance in traders’ beliefs decreases.
Liquidity / Trading activity: Perhaps the biggest reason to deploy a market-maker is to
reduce spreads. Figures 1 (d) and (e) show that INT serves this purpose more effectively
than pureCDA. The behavior of PAR, which seems to induce very high spreads, is surprising.
This behavior is because we measure the market bid and ask only after the extraneous LMSR
agent has intervened and perhaps cleared some orders which would still be waiting in the
books in the absence of a market maker, so the spread looks artficially large, compared
with pureCDA. In addition, PAR doesn’t actually place any new orders on the books, since
it waits for orders to arrive before acting, as opposed to INT, which proactively improves
spreads by adding to the order book. This finding, which casts doubt on the meaningfulness
of spread measurement for PAR, is problematic since many real-life traders use the spread
to gauge market quality and make decisions.
To get a better idea of the market maker’s role in improving trading activity, we also com-
puted the actual volume of trade executed. We did this in two ways: for each simulation,
we maintained a ledger where each entry recorded the buyer, seller, execution price, and
quantity of every market trade; after ntrades episodes, we added all these traded quantities
together to obtain Vol=quantity absorbed by buyers and market maker (if present)=quantity
supplied by sellers and market maker. PAR beats both pureCDA and INT with respect to
this measure.
We also calculated an alternative measure of trading volume by subtracting the total residual
quantity on the order books at the end of each simulation from the total quantity ordered by
all traders: Vol∗ = quantity absorbed by buyers (from sellers and market maker) + quantity
supplied by sellers (to buyers and market maker). It double-counts, perhaps appropriately,
every quantity traded between background traders, and thus reflects the overall “satisfaction”
of the entire background trader population in a way that the previous measure does not.
23 Strangely, for higher variability in trader beliefs, PAR gives the worst Vol∗ bettered
23Of course, for pureLMSR, Vol∗ =Vol since the market maker takes one side of every trade.
113
by INT and pureCDA, but there is a complete reversal in this behavior as the variability
decreases. Based on observations of some sample trade ledgers and order book residuals,
we believe that the reason is this: in any CDA with a market maker, the market maker
gets the advantage of immediacy due to its continuous presence and itself undercuts some of
the background traders, thereby reducing the (double-counted) quantity that changes hands
between these traders. Hence pureCDA, where every trade must occur between background
traders, has a higher Vol∗. But with increasing Ntrials as trader beliefs get closer to each other,
relatively more traders trade with other background traders, who now offer competitive prices
themselves. This is an interesting example of how the presence of the market maker can affect
the dynamics of trade in surprising ways.
Also note that regardless of the microstructure, both Vol and Vol∗ decrease as the knowledge
of the trading crowd gets more and more precise, which is consistent with the idea that as the
noise in the beliefs of traders with a common knowledge structure reduces, trading becomes
less profitable, hence less likely (an extreme case is captured by the no-trade theorems).
Welfare: Trader surplus or (weighted) price improvement decreases with increasing precision
in beliefs but the presence of a market maker consistently improves the surplus as opposed
to having only a CDA, PAR more so than INT. It is also noteworthy that the combination
of CDA and market making performs better in this respect than each of them individually.
Moreover, we consistently observe INT loss < PAR loss ≈ pureLMSR loss, and these losses
respect the known LMSR loss bound. This empirical observation supports the notion that
Proposition 1 (which shows that myopic costs faced by the market maker are lower for INT
than for PAR when they start from the same state in terms of q and the order books)
might generalize to expected losses over sequences of trades from a particular starting point,
an interesting direction for theoretical work on the topic (in a handful of our individual
simulations, INT made slightly more loss than PAR, which shows that the sequence result
cannot hold deterministically).
5.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we introduced a new LMSR-based market making algorithm that handles
limit orders, and also presented one of the first contributions to the academic literature on
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the experimental evaluation of algorithmic market making in a CDA setting (for another
example, see Wah and Wellman (2015)). Note that we kept our agent model simple since
our aim was to focus on the role of the marker making entity in price discovery / information
aggregation.
A natural next step in this vein would be to analyze these market settings with more so-
phisticated trader models, particularly (extensions of) those used by Brahma et al. (2012).
To give a brief overview, these traders are of two broad types: (1) fundamentals traders who
base their trading decisions (orders sizes and limit prices) primarily on their private informa-
tion and may incorporate the observed history of market prices into their decision making,
(2) technical traders who have no “insider” knowledge of the asset value and strategize on
the basis of market price movements, serving mainly as noise traders. Among other things,
it will be interesting to study how varying the proportions of these different types of trading
agents affects price discovery in the market.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
To summarize this dissertation, I am have studied the topic of subjective input aggregation
from novel theoretical and experimental points of view, and, along the way, brought out both
the similarities and differences among aggregation methods developed in diverse disciplines.
In particular, I have explicated the aggregational characteristics of the price process induced
by a popular prediction market making algorithm, and discussed the extent to which such
mechanisms can be derailed when the potential for manipulative behavior is present. I have
put forward an algorithm that can learn a fixed unknown value by only being told whether
or not a Gaussian sample centered around that value is above or below a threshold in every
discrete time-step, in a number of time-steps that is (asymptotically) near-optimal in certain
problem parameters. I have also presented the design of a new market maker that operates
in a realistic financial exchange with booked orders, and described an experimental set-up
with simulated trading agents for measuring its performance. Finally, I have identified open
questions that I believe still need to be addressed in the investigation of the above problem
domains.
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Appendix A
Proofs of theorems in Chapter 2
A.1 A general well-behaved MSR as an Opinion Pool
for a general risk-averse utility
First, we shall recapitulate the mathematical properties of a well-behaved market scoring
rule (Definition 2 in Chapter 2): The underlying (strictly proper and regular) scoring rule
for such an MSR can be written as
sj(p) =
G(p) +G′(p)(j − p), j ∈ {0, 1}, p ∈ [0, 1], p 6= j,G(p), p = j ∈ {0, 1} (A.1)
from (2.1) in Chapter 2, where
1. G : [0, 1]→ R is a continuous function.
2. G′(·) is real-valued in [0, 1] except possibly that G′(0) = −∞ or G′(1) =∞.
3. G′′(·) exists and is positive in [0, 1], 0 < G′′(p) <∞ for 0 < p < 1.
4. G′′′(·) exists, and |G′′′(p)| <∞ for 0 < p < 1.
Notice that the positivity of G′′(·) implies the strict convexity of G(·) and the increasing
monotonicity of G′(·). Property 2 ensures that sj(·) is real-valued except possibly that
s0(1) = ∞ or s1(0) = ∞. G(p) = ps1(p) + (1 − p)s0(1 − p) is the expected score function
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sometimes called the information measure or generalized entropy function associated with
the scoring rule sx(·) (Gneiting and Raftery (2007)).
For x ∈ {0, 1}, the first derivative of sx(p), ∀p ∈ (0, 1), is
s′x(p) = G
′′(p)(x− p) =⇒ s′1(p) = G′′(p)(1− p) > 0, s′0(p) = −G′′(p)p < 0,
since G′′(p) > 0. Hence, s1(p) and s0(p) are strictly increasing and decreasing functions of p
respectively, which is quite intuitive since the reward for predicting a higher probability for
the outcome that actually materialized should be higher.
Moreover, if pi−1 and pi denote respectively the instantaneous price of an MSR immediately
before and after agent i interacts with it, then by the design of an MSR, the agent’s ex post
compensation from the market for any outcome x ∈ {0, 1} is given by
cx(pi, pi−1) = sx(pi)− sx(pi−1).
We can readily obtain the following properties of cx:
c1(p, pi−1)− c0(p, pi−1) = G′(p)−G′(pi−1); (A.2)
∂
∂p
cx(p, pi−1) = s′x(p) = G
′′(p)(x− p), ∀pi−1 ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ {0, 1}. (A.3)
Hence, c1(p, pi−1) and c0(p, pi−1) are also strictly increasing and decreasing in p respectively,
regardless of pi−1, as expected.
Next, we shall enumerate, from Section 2.4 in Chapter 2, the criteria that an agent utility
function ui(·) must meet in our setting:
1. Continuity: ui(·) is continuous over [cmini ,∞] where cmini can attain any value in
[−∞, 0].
2. Increasing monotonicity (Non-satiation): u′i(·) is continuous and positive real-
valued over [cmini ,∞] except possibly that u′i(cmin) =∞ or u′i(∞) = 0.
3. Strict concavity (Risk aversion): u′′i (·) is continuous and negative real-valued
over [cmini ,∞] except possibly that u′′i (cmin) = −∞ or u′′i (∞) = 0.
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We shall now provide a detailed, joint proof of Lemmas 3 and 4, for completing the proof of
Theorem 1 in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Restatement of Lemma 3. If a myopic agent with subjective probability pii and a risk-
averse utility function of wealth ui(·), possessing properties 1, 2, and 3 above, trades with a
well-behaved market scoring rule for a single Arrow-Debreu security, and updates the market’s
instantaneous price from pi−1 ∈ (0, 1) to pi in the process, then pi is the unique solution in
(0, 1) to the following fixed-point equation:
pi =
piiu
′
i(c1(pi, pi−1))
piiu′i(c1(pi, pi−1)) + (1− pii)u′i(c0(pi, pi−1))
. (A.4)
Restatement of Lemma 4. The implicit function pi(pi−1, pii) described by (A.4) has the
following properties:
1. pi = pii if and only if pii = pi−1.
2. 0 < min{pi−1, pii} < pi < max{pi−1, pii} < 1 whenever pii 6= pi−1, 0 < pii, 6= pi−1 < 1.
3. For any given pi−1 (resp. pii), pi is a strictly increasing function of pii (resp. pi−1).
Proof. If agent i’s subjective probability of {X = 1} is pii ∈ (0, 1) and her utility function is
ui(·), her expected myopic utility for taking a trading action that updates the market price
pi−1 to any p ∈ [0, 1] is given by
u˜(p; pi−1, pii) = piiui(c1(p, pi−1)) + (1− pii)ui(c0(p, pi−1)).
The first and second derivatives of the above with respect to p respectively simplify to
u˜′(p; pi−1, pii) = G′′(p)f(p; pi−1, pii);
u˜′′(p; pi−1, pii) = G′′′(p)f(p; pi−1, pii) +G′′(p)f ′(p; pi−1, pii),
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where
f(p; pi−1, pii) = pii(1− p)u′i(c1(p, pi−1))− (1− pii)pu′i(c0(p, pi−1)) so that
f ′(p; pi−1, pii) = − [piiu′i(c1(p, pi−1)) + (1− pii)u′i(c0(p, pi−1))]
+G′′(p)
[
piiu
′′
i (c1(p, pi−1))(1− p)2 + (1− pii)u′′i (c0(p, pi−1))p2
]
< 0, ∀p ∈ (0, 1), given any pii, pi−1 ∈ (0, 1),
since G′′(·) > 0, u′i(·) > 0, and u′′i (·) < 0 everywhere. Hence, f(·) is strictly decreasing
everywhere, its values at pi−1 and pii being given by
f(pi−1; pi−1, pii) = (pii − pi−1)u′i(0); (A.5)
f(pii; pi−1, pii) = pii(1− pii) [u′i(c1(pii, pi−1))− u′i(c0(pii, pi−1))] . (A.6)
Case I pi−1 < pii: From (A.2),
c1(pii, pi−1)− c0(pii, pi−1) = G′(pii)−G′(pi−1) > 0
due to the increasing monotonicity of G′(·). But
c1(pii, pi−1) > c0(pii, pi−1) =⇒ u′i(c1(pii, pi−1)) < u′i(c0(pii, pi−1))
due to the decreasing monotonicity of u′i(·). Hence, from (A.6), f(pii; pi−1, pii) < 0.
Also, from (A.5), since u′i(0) > 0, f(pi−1; pi−1, pii) > 0.
These values, along with the decreasing monotonicity of f(·), imply that f(p; pi−1, pii)
has a unique zero in (pi−1, pii).
Case II pi−1 = pii: From (A.5) or (A.6),
f(pii; pi−1, pii) = f(pi−1; pi−1, pii) = 0,
and pii = pi−1 is the unique zero of f(p; pi−1, pii) due to its monotonic nature.
Case III pi−1 > pii: By symmetry, we can argue exactly as for Case I that f(p; pi−1, pii) has a
unique zero in (pii, pi−1).
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Thus for any pii, pi−1, there exists a unique solution in (0, 1), say p∗, to the equation
f(p; pi−1, pii) = 0. Since |G′′(p∗)|, |G′′′(p∗)| <∞, we must have
u˜′(p∗; pi−1, pii) = 0;
u˜′′(p∗; pi−1, pii) = G′′(p∗)f ′(p∗; pi−1, pii) < 0,
since G′′(p∗) > 0 and f ′(p∗; pi−1, pii) < 0. In other words, rational risk-averse agent i’s
price-update pi = arg maxp∈[0,1] u˜(p; pi−1, pii) is given by pi = p∗ so that
f(pi; pi−1, pii) = 0
⇒ pii(1− pi)u′i(c1(pi, pi−1)) = (1− pii)piu′i(c0(pi, pi−1)), from definition
⇒ pi
1− pi =
pii
1− pii ·
u′i(c1(pi, pi−1))
u′i(c0(pi, pi−1))
(A.7)
⇒ pi = piiu
′
i(c1(pi, pi−1))
piiu′i(c1(pi, pi−1)) + (1− pii)u′i(c0(pi, pi−1))
The last step facilitates the interpretation of pi as a risk-neutral probability. However, for
most subsequent proofs, we shall recall the more convenient odds ratio formulation provided
in (A.7).
Moreover, it is easy to see that the findings in Case I, Case II, and Case III above jointly
imply properties 1 and 2 in the theorem statement. To prove property 3, first note that, for
x ∈ {0, 1},
∂
∂pii
cx(pi(pi−1, pii), pi−1) = s′x(pi)
∂pi
∂pii
= G′′(pi)(x− pi)∂pi
∂pii
,
∂
∂pi−1
cx(pi(pi−1, pii), pi−1) = s′x(pi)
∂pi
∂pi−1
− s′x(pi−1)
= G′′(pi)(x− pi)∂pi
∂pii
−G′′(pi−1)(x− pi−1)
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Now, taking the partial derivative with respect to pii of both sides of (A.7),
1
(1− pi)2
∂pi
∂pii
=
1
(1− pii)2
u′i(c1)
u′i(c0)
+
(
pii
1− pii
)
u′′i (c1)
∂c1
∂pii
u′i(c0)− u′i(c1)u′′i (c0)∂c0∂pii
(u′i(c0))2
⇒ v1 ∂pi
∂pii
= v2 + u
′′
i (c1)u
′
i(c0)G
′′(pi)(1− pi)∂pi
∂pii
+ u′i(c1)u
′′
i (c0)G
′′(pi)pi
∂pi
∂pii
where v1 =
(
1− pii
pii
)(
u′i(c0)
1− pi
)2
, v2 =
u′i(c0)u
′
i(c1)
pii(1− pii) ,
⇒ ∂pi
∂pii
=
v2
v1 −G′′(pi) [u′′i (c1)u′i(c0)(1− pi) + u′i(c1)u′′i (c0)pi]
> 0.
This is because 0 < pii, pi < 1, u
′
i(c1), u
′
i(c0), G
′′(pi) > 0, and u′′i (c1), u
′′
i (c0) < 0 in our model
so that v1, v2 > 0, hence both the numerator and denominator are positive.
Similarly, taking the partial derivative with respect to pi−1 of both sides of (A.7),
1
(1− pi)2
∂pi
∂pi−1
=
(
pii
1− pii
)
u′′i (c1)
∂c1
∂pi−1
u′i(c0)− u′i(c1)u′′i (c0) ∂c0∂pi−1
(u′i(c0))2
⇒ v1 ∂pi
∂pi−1
= u′′i (c1)u
′
i(c0)
[
G′′(pi)(1− pi)∂pi
∂pii
−G′′(pi−1)(1− pi−1)
]
+ u′i(c1)u
′′
i (c0)
[
G′′(pi)pi
∂pi
∂pii
−G′′(pi−1)pi−1
]
⇒ ∂pi
∂pi−1
=
−G′′(pi−1) [u′′i (c1)u′i(c0)(1− pi−1) + u′i(c1)u′′i (c0)pi−1]
v1 −G′′(pi) [u′′i (c1)u′i(c0)(1− pi) + u′i(c1)u′′i (c0)pi]
> 0
for the same reasons as ∂pi
∂pii
.
Hence pi(pi−1, pii) is increasing in each of pi−1 and pii, the other remaining constant.
Corollary 4. If pii > pi−1 (resp. pii < pi−1), then pi−1 < pi < pii (resp. pii < pi < pi−1), i.e.
a myopic risk-averse agent moves the market price in the direction of her belief but not all
the way.
This intuitive result follows from the analysis in Case I and Case III of the above proof.
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Corollary 5. The agents’ beliefs as well as the market’s initial price put bounds on the
instantaneous price at the end of every episode:
min{p0, pi1, pi2, . . . , pii} ≤ pi ≤ max{p0, pi1, pi2, . . . , pii}, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . .
A.1.1 LMSR as LogOP for CARA utility agents
The following is the proof of Theorem 2 from Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2.
Restatement of Theorem 2. The only risk-averse utility function for which myopic agent
i, having a subjective belief pii ∈ (0, 1), and trading with an LMSR market with parameter b
and current instantaneous price pi−1, results in the market’s updated price pi being identical
to a logarithmic opinion pool between the current price and the agent’s subjective belief, i.e.
pi = pi
αi
i p
1−αi
i−1
/ [
piαii p
1−αi
i−1 + (1− pii)αi(1− pi−1)1−αi
]
, αi ∈ (0, 1), (A.8)
is given by
ui(c) = τi (1− exp (−c/τi)) , c ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}, constant τi ∈ (0,∞), (A.9)
the aggregation weight is αi =
τi/b
1+τi/b
.
Proof. Sufficiency: If agent i’s utility is of the form specified in the theorem, then the
first and second derivatives of the utility function are respectively
u′i(c) = exp (−c/τi) > 0, and
u′′i (c) = − exp (−c/τi) /τi < 0 ∀c ∈ [−∞,∞].
Hence, Lemma 3 is applicable. Making appropriate substitutions in (2.5),
pi
1− pi =
pii
1− pii ·
exp
(
− b
τi
ln
(
pi
pi−1
))
exp
(
− b
τi
ln
(
1−pi
1−pi−1
)) = ( pii
1− pii
)(
pi
pi−1
)−b/τi ( 1− pi
1− pi−1
)b/τi
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Thus,
(
pi
1− pi
)1+b/τi
=
(
pii
1− pii
)(
pi−1
1− pi−1
)b/τi
Exponentiating both sides by 1
1+b/τi
,
pi
1− pi =
(
pii
1− pii
) 1
1+b/τi
(
pi−1
1− pi−1
) b/τi
1+b/τi
=
(
pii
1− pii
)αi ( pi−1
1− pi−1
)1−αi
,
where αi =
1
1+b/τi
= τi/b
1+τi/b
. Simplifying, we get the required LogOP formulation in the
theorem statement; alternatively, by taking the logarithm on both sides, we obtain the
equivalent additive log-odds ratio formulation.
Necessity: Since we have restricted ourselves to the class of utility functions satisfying
criteria 1, 2, and 3, a utility function that results in a logarithmic opinion pool on interacting
with LMSR must satisfy Lemma 3 with
pi = pi
αi
i p
1−αi
i−1
/ [
piαii p
1−αi
i−1 + (1− pii)αi(1− pi−1)1−αi
]
for some constant αi ∈ (0, 1),
or, equivalently, with
pii
1− pii =
(
pi
1− pi
) 1
αi
(
1− pi−1
pi−1
) 1−αi
αi
.
Making the requisite substitutions in (2.5) and simplifying, we see that u′i(·) must satisfy(
pi
pi−1
) 1−αi
αi
u′i
(
b ln
(
pi
pi−1
))
=
(
1− pi
1− pi−1
) 1−αi
αi
u′i
(
b ln
(
1− pi
1− pi−1
))
∀pi, pi−1 ∈ (0, 1) (A.10)
since, owing to the fact that each of pii and pi−1 is allowed to attain any value in (0, 1), pi
defined as the LogOP above can lie anywhere in (0, 1) as well.
Since 0 < pi−1
pii
, 1−pi−1
1−pii <∞, we claim that relation (A.10) is true if and only if u′i(·) satisfies
y
1−αi
αi u′i(b ln(y)) = Mi, ∀y ∈ (0,∞), where constant Mi = u′i(0). (A.11)
The sufficiency is obvious. To establish the necessity, suppose there exists a risk-averse utility
function satisfying (A.10) but not (A.11). Then, there must exist y1, y2 ∈ (0,∞), such that
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y1 > y2 without loss of generality, and
h(y1) 6= h(y2), where h(y) = y
1−αi
αi u′i(b ln(y)) ∀y ∈ (0,∞).
But, if 0 < y2 < 1 < y1 < ∞, we can obtain p˜i = y2(y1 − 1)/(y1 − y2) ∈ (0, 1) and
p˜ = (y1 − 1)/(y1 − y2) ∈ (0, 1) for which (A.10) is violated, giving us a contradiction. Thus,
any ui(·) satisfying (A.10) must also obey
h(y1) = h(y2) ∀y1, y2 : 0 < y2 < 1 < y1 <∞.
This also means that for any two values y1, y3 ∈ (1,∞), and any given y2 ∈ (0, 1), we must
have h(y1) = h(y2) as well as h(y3) = h(y2), implying that h(y1) = h(y3) ∀y1, y3 ∈ (1,∞).
By similar reasoning, we can deduce that h(y2) = h(y4) ∀y2, y4 ∈ (0, 1). Finally, by the
continuity of h(y) at y = 1, which in turn follows from the continuity of u′i(c) at c = 0 in our
model and the obvious continuity of y
1−αi
αi at y = 1, we arrive at (A.11).
Now, applying the transformation c = b ln(y), we obtain the first-order ordinary differential
equation
u′i(c) = Mi exp
(
−1− αi
αib
c
)
, −∞ ≤ c ≤ ∞
where the extreme values of c have been included for continuity. Solving the above, we get
ui(c) = −Miαib
1− αi exp
(
−1− αi
αib
c
)
+ Ci, Ci being the constant of integration
= −Miτi exp(−c/τi) + Ci, where τi = αib
1− αi =⇒ αi =
τi/b
1 + τi/b
≡ τi (1− exp(−c/τi))
since a utility function is strategically equivalent to any positive-affine transformation of
itself.
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A.1.2 LMSR as LinOP for an atypical utility with decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion
Here, we present the proof of Theorem 3 from Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2.
Restatement of Theorem 3. If myopic rational agent i, having a subjective belief pii ∈
(0, 1) and a risk-averse utility function satisfying criteria 1, 2, and 3 in Section A.1 above,
trades with a LMSR market with parameter b and current instantaneous price pi−1, then the
market’s updated price pi is identical to a linear opinion pool between the current price and
the agent’s subjective belief, i.e.
pi = βipii + (1− βi)pi−1, for some constant βi ∈ (0, 1) (A.12)
if and only if agent i’s utility function is of the form
ui(c) = ln(exp((c+Bi)/b)− 1), c ≥ −Bi, (A.13)
where Bi > 0 represents agent i’s budget, with the aggregation weight being given by βi =
1− exp(−Bi/b).
Proof. If agent i’s utility is of the form specified in the theorem, then by Lemma 2, we can
obtain the lower and upper bounds on the feasible values of pi as follows:
s1(p
min
i ) = c
min
i + s1(pi−1)
⇒ b ln(pmini ) = −Bi + b ln(pi−1)
= b ln(pi−1 exp(−Bi/b))
= b ln(pi−1(1− βi)), since βi = 1− exp(−Bi/b)
⇒ pmini = pi−1(1− βi), from the monotonicity of ln(·); (A.14)
s0(p
min
i ) = c
min
i + s0(pi−1)
⇒ b ln(1− pmaxi ) = −Bi + b ln(1− pi−1) = b ln((1− pi−1) exp(−Bi/b))
⇒ 1− pmaxi = (1− pi−1) exp(−Bi/b) = (1− pi−1)(1− βi)
⇒ pmaxi = 1− (1− pi−1)(1− βi) = βi + (1− βi)pi−1 (A.15)
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Sufficiency: For −Bi ≤ c <∞,
u′i(c) =
exp((c+Bi)/b)
b (exp((c+Bi)/b)− 1) > 0, and
u′′i (c) = −
exp((c+Bi)/b)
b2 (exp((c+Bi)/b)− 1)2
< 0.
Hence we can invoke Lemma 3. Now,
exp
(
c1(pi, pi−1) +Bi
b
)
= exp
(
ln
(
pi
pi−1
)
+
Bi
b
)
= exp
(
ln
(
pi
pi−1 exp(−Bi/b)
))
=
pi
pi−1(1− βi)
⇒ exp
(
c1(pi, pi−1) +Bi
b
)
=
pi
pmini
from (A.14).
Similarly, exp
(
c0(pi, pi−1) +Bi
b
)
=
1− pi
1− pmaxi
from (A.15).
(A.16)
Hence,
u′i(c1(pi, pi−1))
u′i(c0(pi, pi−1))
=
1
b
· pi/pmini
pi/pmini −1
1
b
· (1−pi)/(1−pmaxi )
(1−pi)/(1−pmaxi )−1
=
pi
1− pi ·
pmaxi − pi
pi − pmini
.
It is precisely for obtaining the above ratio that we require the scaling factor of 1/b, dependent
on the market maker parameter, in the exponential in the utility function. Substituting in
(2.5), and noting that pi/(1− pi) 6= 0 for 0 < pi−1 < 1, we get
1 =
pii
1− pii ·
pmaxi − pi
pi − pmini
⇐⇒ pi = (1− pii)pmini + piipmaxi
⇐⇒ pi = βipii + (1− βi)pi−1,
on plugging in the expressions for pmini and p
max
i from (A.14) and (A.15), and simplifying.
Necessity: Since we have restricted ourselves to the class of utility functions satisfying
criteria 1, 2, and 3, a utility function that results in a linear opinion pool on interacting with
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LMSR must satisfy Lemma 3 with pi = βipii + (1 − βi)pi−1 for some constant βi ∈ (0, 1).
Making the requisite substitutions in (2.5) and simplifying, we see that u′i(·) must satisfy
u′i
(
b ln
(
βi
(
pii
pi−1
)
+ 1− βi
))
βi + (1− βi)pi−1pii
=
u′i
(
b ln
(
βi
(
1−pii
1−pi−1
)
+ 1− βi
))
βi + (1− βi)
(1−pi−1
1−pii
)
∀pi−1, pii ∈ (0, 1). (A.17)
Since 0 < pi−1
pii
, 1−pi−1
1−pii <∞, we claim that relation (A.17) is true if and only if u′i(·) satisfies
u′i(b ln(βiy + 1− βi)) = Ki
(
βi +
1− βi
y
)
, ∀y ∈ (0,∞), (A.18)
where constant Ki = u
′
i(0), and the (negative) lower bound on the domain of ui(·) is given
by −Bi = b ln(1− βi) with u′i(−Bi) =∞24.
The sufficiency is obvious. To establish the necessity, suppose there exists a risk-averse utility
function satisfying (A.17) but not (A.18). Then, there must exist y1, y2 ∈ (0,∞), such that
y1 > y2 without loss of generality, and
g(y1) 6= g(y2), where g(y) = u
′
i(b ln(βiy + 1− βi))
βi +
1−βi
y
∀y ∈ (0,∞).
But, if 0 < y2 < 1 < y1 < ∞, we can obtain p˜i = y2(y1 − 1)/(y1 − y2) ∈ (0, 1) and
p˜ = (y1 − 1)/(y1 − y2) ∈ (0, 1) for which (A.17) is violated, giving us a contradiction. Thus,
any ui(·) satisfying (A.17) must also obey
g(y1) = g(y2) ∀y1, y2 : 0 < y2 < 1 < y1 <∞.
This also means that for any two values y1, y3 ∈ (1,∞), and any given y2 ∈ (0, 1), we must
have g(y1) = g(y2) as well as g(y3) = g(y2), implying that g(y1) = g(y3) ∀y1, y3 ∈ (1,∞).
By similar reasoning, we can deduce that g(y2) = g(y4) ∀y2, y4 ∈ (0, 1). Finally, by the
continuity of g(y) at y = 1, which in turn follows from the continuity of u′i(c) at c = 0 in our
model and the obvious continuity of (βi + (1− βi)/y) at y = 1, we arrive at (A.18).
24This constraint is necessary since limy→0+ Ki
(
βi +
1−βi
y
)
=∞; also note that Ki is positive real-valued
since u′i(c) ∈ (0,∞) for c ∈ (−Bi,∞).
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Now, applying the transformation c = b ln(βiy + 1 − βi), we obtain the first-order ordinary
differential equation
u′i(c) =
Kiβi exp(c/b)
exp(c/b)− (1− βi) , b ln(1− βi) ≤ c ≤ ∞
where the extreme values of c have been included for continuity. Solving the above, we get
ui(c) = Kiβi(b ln(exp(c/b)− (1− βi)) + Ci), Ci being the constant of integration
= Kiβi(b ln(exp(c/b)− exp(−Bi/b)) + Ci), since −Bi = b ln(1− βi)
= Kiβib ln(exp((c+Bi)/b)− 1) +Kiβi(Ci −Bi)
≡ ln(exp((c+Bi)/b)− 1)
since a utility function is strategically equivalent to any positive-affine transformation of
itself.
Comment on the linear price update rule: This linear price update induced in a
LMSR market by a myopic agent with a static belief pii and risk-averse utility (A.13) is
indistinguishable from that due to a myopic risk-neutral non-Bayesian agent who uses a
simple convex combination-based heuristic to learn from the latest market price (taking it
as a proxy for the accumulated information of her partially informed peers made public
till that point in time), and hence update her point estimate of Pr(X = 1) from pi to
pi′i = βipii + (1 − βi)pi−1, βi ∈ (0, 1) being a measure of her confidence in her own private
signal; in this non-Bayesian interpretation, too, the agent’s budget Bi = −b ln(1− βi) turns
out to be directly related to her confidence or certainty. This non-Bayesian learning rule can
be seen as an example of “adjustment from an anchor”, a well-known heuristic in prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), where an agent uses her private signal pii as an
anchor and, on encountering the market as an additional information source, adjusts her
belief away from her anchor by the additive term (1 − βi)(pi − pii) for making a trading
decision.
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A.2 LMSR with logarithmic utility agents
Here, we present the proof of Proposition 1 from Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2.
Proof. Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3 in Section 2.4.2, we can deduce the
bounds pmini = pi−1 exp(−w˜i) and pmaxi = 1− (1− pi−1) exp(−w˜i), w˜i = wi/b, on the feasible
market price at the end of trading episode i, and hence rewrite
p̂i = (1− pii)pmini + piipmaxi .
For the logarithmic utility, u′i(c) = 1/(c + wi) > 0 and u
′′
i (c) = −1/(c + wi)2 < 0 for
−wi ≤ c <∞ so that we can invoke Lemma 3, and, using (2.5), show that
(1− pii)pi ln
(
pi
pmini
)
= pii(1− pi) ln
(
1− pi
1− pmaxi
)
. (A.19)
Since 0 <
pi−pmini
pi
,
pmaxi −pi
1−pi < 1, we can use the well-known Maclaurin series expansion of the
logarithmic function
ln(1 + x) =
∞∑
j=1
(−1)j+1xj
j
, −1 < x ≤ 1
to obtain the following:
ln
(
pi
pmini
)
= − ln
(
1− pi − p
min
i
pi
)
=
pi − pmini
pi
+ δi;
ln
(
1− pi
1− pmaxi
)
= − ln
(
1− p
max
i − pi
1− pi
)
=
pmaxi − pi
1− pi + δi,
where δi =
∑∞
j=2
1
j
(
pi−pmini
pi
)j
, and δi =
∑∞
j=2
1
j
(
pmaxi −pi
1−pi
)j
.
Substituting in Equation (A.19) and simplifying,
pi = p̂i + ∆i,
where p̂i = (1− pii)pmini + piipmaxi , and ∆i = pii(1− pi)δi − (1− pii)piδi.
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Appendix B
Proofs of theorems in Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2 from Section 3.4
Restatement of Lemma 2 For a symmetric well-behaved market scoring rule, the lower
and upper thresholds pL, pH defined in (3.5) and (3.6) satisfy the equalities
f ′(pL) + f ′(pH) = 2f ′(1
2
); (B.1)
pL + pH = 1; (B.2)
f(pH)− f(pL) = (2pH − 1)f ′(1
2
) = (1− 2pL)f ′(1
2
). (B.3)
Proof. To prove (B.1): f ′(pL) + f ′(pH) = 2f ′(1
2
).
From the equations (3.5) and (3.6) that define pL and pH respectively, we get
f ′(pL) + f ′(pH) = 2
(
f(1
2
)− f(0))+ 2 (f(1)− f(1
2
)
)
= 2 (f(1)− f(0))
= 2f ′(1
2
),
putting y = 1 in the symmetry condition (3.3).
To prove (B.2): pL + pH = 1.
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For this result, we first establish the more general result that for any symmetric well-behaved
MSR,
f ′(x) + f ′(z) = 2f ′(1
2
), x, z ∈ (0, 1) if and only if x+ z = 1. (B.4)
Proof of sufficiency Setting 1+y
2
= x in the symmetry condition (3.3), we obtain
f(x) = f(1− x) + (2x− 1)f ′(1
2
) ∀x ∈ (1
2
, 1)
Thus, f ′(x) = lim
∆x→0
f(x+∆x)−f(x)
∆x
= lim
∆x→0
f(1−x−∆x)+(2x+2∆x−1)f ′( 1
2
)−f(1−x)−(2x−1)f ′( 1
2
)
∆x
= lim
∆x→0
f(1−x−∆x)−f(1−x)+2∆xf ′( 1
2
)
∆x
= − lim
δ→0
f(1−x+δ)−f(1−x)
δ
+ lim
∆x→0
2f ′(1
2
)
= −f ′(1− x) + 2f ′(1
2
)
Hence, f ′(x) + f ′(1 − x) = 2f ′(1
2
) for any x ∈ (1
2
, 1). Setting z = 1 − x, we see that
f ′(z) + f ′(1− z) = 2f ′(1
2
) holds for any z ∈ (0, 1
2
) as well; it is trivially true for x = z = 1
2
.

Proof of necessity Since f ′(·) is monotonic on (0, 1),
f ′(x) + f ′(z) 6= f ′(x) + f ′(1− x) for any z 6= 1− x. 
Since, from result (3.8), we know that f ′(pL) + f ′(pH) = 2f ′(1
2
), we can conclude from (B.4)
that pL + pH = 1.
To prove (B.3): f(pH)−f(pL) = (2pH −1)f ′(1
2
) = (1−2pL)f ′(1
2
). If we set pH = 1+y
2
, then
y = 2pH − 1. From (3.9), y = 2(1− pL)− 1 = 1− 2pL and pL = 1−y
2
. Hence, we can invoke
the symmetry condition (3.3) to get the desired result.
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B.2 Equilibrium of the game in Section 3.4.3
We shall now proceed to determine Alice’s choice of pA = p
PBE
A in a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, as stated in Theorem 4 and Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 in Section 3.4.3. Although
the theorem applies to the special case p0 =
1
2
, we will begin by proving results (up to and
including Lemma 7) for the more general scenario p0 ∈ (pL, pH) which subsumes this special
case, and then restrict ourselves to p0 =
1
2
.
Propositions 5 and 6 imply that
pPBEA = arg max
p
R̂A(p; p0),
where R̂A(p; p0) = EA
[
RA(pA, p0, vA, vB)|pA = p
]
, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
EA[·|pA = p] denoting the expectation with respect to Alice’s belief under the assumption
that she will choose the best vA given pA = p (Lemma 5), and will take into account the
impact of her trading choice pA = p on strategic Bob’s choices (Lemma 6).
Proposition 5. For p ∈ [0, 1]\{pL, pH} and p0 ∈ (0, 1),
R̂A(p; p0) = s(p,EA[v|pA = p)− s(p0,EA[v|pA = p]), v = vA+vB2 ,
where EA[v|pA = p], according to our notation, is Alice’s posterior expected average vote
(market outcome) just before Bob has the opportunity to trade. The expressions for EA[v|pA =
p] in terms of Bob’s commonly known non-participation probability pi and Alice’s posterior
probability q0 of Bob’s signal being sB = 0, given her own signal sA, for the different sub-
intervals in which p may lie, are presented in Table B.1.
p EA[v|pA = p]
0 ≤ p < pL µ0,1 = 1−piq02
pL < p < p0 µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
p0 < p < p
H µ1,1 = 1− piq02
pH < p ≤ 1 µ1,0 = 1+pi(1−q0)2
Table B.1
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Proof. Using Propositions 5 and 6 and recalling that honest Bob votes his true signal sB,
we can easily verify the expressions for EA[v|pA = p] provided in Table B.1. Hence, using
(3.2), we can show that for 0 < pL < p0 < p
H < 1, and p ∈ [0, 1]\{pL, pH},
R̂A(p; p0) = EA[s(pA, v)− s(p0, v)|pA = p]
= EA[s(p, v)− s(p0, v)|pA = p]
= s(p,EA[v|pA = p])− s(p0,EA[v|pA = p]),
the key idea being the linearity of the scoring rule function s(r, ω) in ω for r 6= ω.
We shall demonstrate the proof idea for the special the case pA = p ∈ [0, pL) which corre-
sponds to the first row of the Table B.1 (the treatment of the other cases being similar): In
this case, Alice will certainly vote vA = 0 but, from her perspective, Bob’s participation is
still uncertain so that v = vA+vB
2
∈ {0, 1
2
}. However, Alice knows that Bob will vote vB = 1
definitely if is strategic (which happens with probability (1 − pi)) or with probability
Pr(sB = 1|sA) = (1 − q0) if he is honest; Bob will vote vB = 0 otherwise. Hence, given
pA = p ∈ [0, pL),
v =
12 with probability (1− pi) · 1 + pi(1− q0) = 1− piq0,0 otherwise
⇒ EA[v|pA = p ∈ [0, pL)] = 12 · (1− piq0) + 0 · (piq0) = 1−piq02 = µ0,1.
Now, for the sub-case p ∈ (0, pL), p0 6= 12 :
R̂A(p; p0) = (s(p, 0)− s(p0, 0))piq0 + (s(p, 12)− s(p0, 12))(1− piq0)
= (f(p)− f ′(p)p− f(p0) + f ′(p0)p0)piq0
+
(
f(p) + f ′(p)(1
2
− p)− f(p0)− f ′(p0)(12 − p0)
)
(1− piq0) from (3.2)
= f(p) + f ′(p)
(
1−piq0
2
− p)− [f(p0) + f ′(p0) (1−piq02 − p0)] , on rearrangement
= s(p, µ0,1)− s(p0, µ0,1) (Table B.1, first row).
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But for p ∈ (0, pL), p0 = 12 ,
R̂A(p; 12) =
(
f(p)− f ′(p)p− f(1
2
) + 1
2
f ′(1
2
)
)
piq0
+
(
f(p) + f ′(p)(1
2
− p)− f(1
2
)
)
(1− piq0)
= f(p) + f ′(p)
(
1−piq0
2
− p)− [f(1
2
) + f ′(1
2
)
(
1−piq0
2
− 1
2
)]
= s(p, µ0,1)− s(12 , µ0,1).
Similar calculations apply to the sub-cases p = 0, p0 6= 12 and p = 0, p0 = 12 , leading to the
same conclusion.
Note that R̂A(p0; p0) = 0, as expected. Moreover, for any pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1),
0 < µ0,0 < µ0,1 <
1
2
< µ1,0 < µ1,1 < 1. (B.5)
For our subsequent analysis, it is convenient to define a family of functions
gu,v(p; p0) , s(p, µu,v)− s(p0, µu,v), u, v ∈ {0, 1}, p ∈ [0, 1]. (B.6)
Corollary 6. From Proposition 5, it follows that for any p0 ∈ (pL, pH), which includes
p0 =
1
2
,
R̂A (p; p0) =

g0,1(p; p0), 0 ≤ p < pL
g0,0(p; p0), p
L < p < p0
0, p = p0
g1,1(p; p0), p0 < p < p
H
g1,0(p; p0), p
H < p ≤ 1
This readily leads to the following properties of R̂A(p; p0), which turn out to be crucial in
determining the global maximum of R̂A(·; p0) over [0, 1]:
Property 1 From the properties of proper scoring rules, it is clear that the unique maximum
of gu,v(·; p0) = s(p, µu,v)− s(p0, µu,v) over [0, 1] for any given p0 and (u, v)-pair
is µu,v; however, depending on the values of p
L (determined by the scoring
135
function), pi, and q0, the value µu,v (as in Table B.1) might not lie in the sub-
interval of [0, 1] over which R̂A(·; p0) coincides with gu,v(·; p0), in which case
we should take into account the supremum of the relevant segment lying at
one of its end-points. For example, if µ0,1 < p
L, then supp∈[0,pL) R̂A(p; p0) =
g0,1(µ0,1; p0) so that the maximizer of the segment of R̂A(·; p0) over [0, pL) is
µ0,1, but if µ0,1 > p
L, then supp∈[0,pL) R̂A(p; p0) = g0,1(pL; p0) which is achieved
at the extremity p = pL. Symmetric results hold for the other three segments.
Property 2 From definition, gu,v(p0; p0) = 0 for any u, v ∈ {0, 1}. In particular, g0,0(p0; p0) =
g1,1(p0; p0) = 0, hence R̂A(p; p0) is continuous at p = p0. However, as we estab-
lish in Lemma 7 below, R̂A(p; p0) has jump discontinuities at the thresholds
pL and pH .
Lemma 7. For any p0 ∈ (pL, pH),
g0,0(p
L; p0) > g0,1(p
L; p0), and g1,1(p
H ; p0) > g1,0(p
H ; p0),
regardless of pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. From (B.6), (3.2), and Table B.1,
g0,0(p
L; p0)− g0,1(pL; p0) =
(
1−pi
2
) (
f ′(p0)− f ′(pL)
)
> 0,
from the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·), since p0 > pL, and pi < 1. Similarly,
g1,1(p
H ; p0)− g1,0(pH ; p0) =
(
1−pi
2
) (
f ′(pH)− f ′(p0)
)
> 0,
from the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·), since pH > p0.
The following lemmas hold for the particular case of p0 =
1
2
∈ (pL, pH), and we shall invoke
them repeatedly through out our equilibrium analysis.
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Lemma 8. For any pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1),
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) R g0,0(pL; 12),
and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) R g0,1(pL; 12)
⇐⇒ q0 Q 12 .
Proof. For i, j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}, from (B.6), (3.2), and Table B.1,
gi,j(p
H ; 1
2
)− gk,l(pL; 12) = [f(pH)− f(pL)] + f ′(pH)(µi,j − pH)− f ′(pL)(µk,l − pL)
− f ′(1
2
)(µi,j − µk,l)
= (pH − pL)f ′(1
2
) + f ′(pH)(µi,j − pH)
− (2f ′(1
2
)− f ′(pH)) (µk,l − pL)− f ′(12)(µi,j − µk,l)
from symmetry condition (3.3) since pH − 1
2
= 1
2
− pL,
and from the result (3.8),
=
(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
)
(µi,j + µk,l − 1) ,
on simplification, using the result pL + pH = 1.
In particular, for {i, j, k, l} = {1, 1, 0, 0} and {i, j, k, l} = {1, 0, 0, 1} respectively,
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
)− g0,0(pL; 12) = g1,0(pH ; 12)− g0,1(pL; 12)
=
(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
)
pi
(
1
2
− q0
)
Since f ′(pL) > f ′(1
2
) by the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·) and pi > 0, the above identity
implies the required result.
Lemma 9. For any pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1), and any i, j ∈ {0, 1},
g1,i(µ1,i;
1
2
) R g0,j(µ0,j; 12) ⇐⇒ µ1,i + µ0,j R 1.
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Proof. From (B.6) and (3.2),
g1,i(µ1,i;
1
2
)− g0,j(µ0,j; 12) = f(µ1,i)− f(µ0,j)− f ′(12)(µ1,i − µ0,j)
= [f(1− µ1,i) + f ′(12)(2µ1,i − 1)]− f(µ0,j)
− f ′(1
2
)(µ1,i − µ0,j),
from symmetry condition 3.3 since µ1,i >
1
2
by (B.5),
= [f(1− µ1,i)− f(µ0,j)] + f ′(12)(µ1,i + µ0,j − 1)
> f ′(µ0,j) (1− µ1,i − µ0,j) + f ′(12)(µ1,i + µ0,j − 1)
due to the strict convexity of f(·),
=
(
f ′(1
2
)− f ′(µ0,j)
)
(µ1,i + µ0,j − 1),
where f ′(1
2
)−f ′(µ0,j) > 0 from the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·), since µ0,j < 12 ∀j ∈ {0, 1}
by (B.5). Hence, the required result follows from the above inequality.
Lemma 10. For any pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1),
g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) R g1,1(pH ; 12) ⇐⇒ pi R pi∗H(q0),
where pi∗H(q0) is the unique zero in (0, 1) of the function
FH(pi; q0, f) , g1,0(µ1,0; 12)− g1,1(pH ; 12), 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1. (B.7)
Likewise,
g0,1(µ0,1;
1
2
) R g0,0(pL; 12) ⇐⇒ pi R pi∗L(q0),
where pi∗L(q0) is the unique zero in (0, 1) of the function
FL(pi; q0, f) , g0,1(µ0,1; 12)− g0,0(pL; 12), 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1. (B.8)
The exact locations of pi∗H(q0) and pi
∗
L(q0) in (0, 1), however, depend on the magnitude of q0
relative to pL, pH , and we shall address these issues as and when necessary.
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Proof. From (B.6), (3.2), and Table B.1,
FH(pi; q0, f) = f(1+pi(1−q0)2 )− f(pH)− f ′(pH)
(
1− pH − piq0
2
)
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1−pi
2
)
. (B.9)
Evidently, FH is continuous according to our criteria, and its first derivative of FH with
respect to pi is
∂FH
∂pi
= f ′(1+pi(1−q0)
2
)
(
1−q0
2
)
+ q0
2
f ′(pH)− 1
2
f ′(1
2
)
>
(
1−q0
2
)
f ′(1
2
) + q0
2
f ′(pH)− 1
2
f ′(1
2
)
since 1−q0
2
> 0 and 1+pi(1−q0)
2
> 1
2
for pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1),
and f ′(·) is strictly increasing in (0, 1).
= q0
2
(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
)
> 0 since pH > 1
2
.
Hence, FH(·; q0, f(·)) is a strictly increasing function for pi ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, for any
q ∈ (0, 1),
lim
pi↗1
FH(pi; q0, f) = f(1− q02 )− f(pH)− f ′(pH)
(
1− q0
2
− pH)
> 0, from the strict convexity of f(·);
lim
pi↘0
FH(pi; q0, f) = f(12)− f(pH)− f ′(pH)
(
1− pH)+ 1
2
f ′(1
2
)
< f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
− pH)+ 1
2
f ′(1
2
)− f ′(pH) (1− pH)
from the strict convexity of f(·),
= − (1− pH) (f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
)
< 0 since 1
2
< pH < 1, f ′(·) is strictly increasing.
From the above analysis, we conclude that FH(pi; q0, f) = g1,0(µ1,0; 12) − g1,1(pH ; 12) has a
unique zero at some pi = pi∗H(q0) ∈ (0, 1), is strictly negative for pi < pi∗H(q0), and strictly
positive for pi > pi∗H(q0). This completes the proof.
The proof for the second part involving FL(pi; q0, f) is analogous by symmetry, hence omitted.
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All subsequent analysis applies to the particular case of p0 =
1
2
. A perfect Bayesian equi-
librium (PBE) of the two-player two-stage (trade-voting) game under consideration is a
specification of a strategy profile, which in this case is the vector (pPBEA , v
PBE
A , p
PBE
B , v
PBE
B ),
and a consistent (Bayesian) belief system. We have already established in Lemma 6 that all
relevant information about Alice’s strategy that Bob needs in order to make his own decision,
in case he ends up participating in the prediction market, is available directly from pA, and
there is no need for Bob to go through the process of updating his belief about Alice’s signal
sA and hence reasoning about Alice’s voting choice vA. Hence, we can safely abstract away
from explicitly describing Bob’s belief system for our particular game. We can also abstract
away from from specifying how Alice updates her belief about Bob if and after Bob trades
because, regardless of Bob’s behavior in the market, Alice’s voting choice is already fixed by
the decision she makes in the first stage of the game (Lemma 5), based on her belief about
Bob’s actions immediately after obtaining her signal.
This still leaves us with the issue of reasoning about Alice’s equilibrium price-report pPBEA .
Note that, by Lemma 6, Bob is indifferent between vB = 0 and vB = 1 if pA ∈ {pL, pH}
although Bob’s voting choice for these values of pA is crucial for Alice’s decision making due
to the jump discontinuities in R̂A(p; p0) at p = pL and p = pH , as indicated by Lemma 7.
But we cannot have Bob (pA = p
L, vB = 1) or (pA = p
H , vB = 0) as part of an equilibrium
as in Section 3.4.1: If Alice knew that Bob would respond with vB = 1 to pA ∈ [0, pL] and
vB = 0 to pA ∈ (pL, 12 ] (resp. vB = 0 to pA ∈ [pH , 1] and vB = 1 to pA ∈ (12 , pH)), she
would prefer to set pA to a value greater than (resp. less than) but close enough to p
L (resp.
pH) so as to get a higher expected profit. Finally, observe, regardless of which gu,v(p;
1
2
) we
consider at p = 1
2
, Alice’s payoff for pA =
1
2
is always zero. Thus, finding Alice’s equilibrium
price-report pPBEA reduces to the problem of figuring out the local suprema of the segments
of the functions g0,1(p;
1
2
), g0,0(p;
1
2
), g1,1(p;
1
2
), g1,0(p;
1
2
), defined above, over the sub-intervals
[0, pL), [pL, 1
2
], (1
2
, pH ], (pH , 1] respectively, and then comparing them to determine the global
maximum of R̂A(p; 12) over 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 for different values of pi, q0 ∈ (0, 1).
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B.2.1 Analysis for symmetric well-behaved MSRs with 0 < pL < 14,
3
4 < p
H < 1, e.g. LMSR
Case 1 0 < q0 < 2p
L In this case, q0 <
1
2
< 1−2pL, so that 2pL
1−q0 <
1−2pL
1−q0 < 1 <
2pL
q0
< 1−2p
L
q0
.
Moreover, since pi < 1,
µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
> 1
2
− pipL > 1
2
− pL > pL, since pL < 1
4
;
µ1,1 = 1− piq02 > 1− pipL > 1− pL = pH .
Hence, regardless of pi, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL) and (pH , 1] are
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) and g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) at pL and pH respectively.
Case 1.1 0 < q0 < 2p
L and 0 < pi ≤ 2pL
1−q0 . In this case,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
≤ pL, equality holding if and only if pi = 2pL
1−q0 ;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
≤ 1
2
+ pL = 3
2
− pH < pH ,
since pH = 1− pL > 3
4
.
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [pL, 12 ] and (pH , 1] are
g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) at pL and pH respectively, satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
)
from Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 <
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Thus, R̂A has a unique
global maximum at p = pH (HPP).
Case 1.2 0 < q0 < 2p
L and 2p
L
1−q0 < pi ≤
1−2pL
1−q0 . In this case,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
> pL;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
≤ 1+(1−2pL)
2
= 1− pL = pH ,
equality holding if and only if pi = 1−2p
L
1−q0 .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [pL, 12 ] and (pH , 1] are
g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
), and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) at µ0,0 > p
L and pH respectively. But we already
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know that g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) from Lemma 7, and that g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) >
g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), µ0,0 being the global maximizer of g0,0(·; 12). This implies that
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) since g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) from Lemma 7. We can
thus conclude that the global maximum of R̂A is either g0,0(µ0,0; 12) at µ0,0 > pL
or g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) at pH . Let us define
G(pi; q0, f) , g1,1(pH ; 12)− g0,0(µ0,0; 12)
= f(pH)− f(pi(1−q0)
2
) + f ′(pH)
(
pL − piq0
2
)
− f ′(1
2
)
(
1− pi
2
)
,
plugging in µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
, µ1,1 = 1− piq02 .
Then, G ′′(pi; q0, f) = −f ′′(pi(1−q0)2 )
(
1−q0
2
)2
< 0,
since f ′′(r) > 0, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1;
G(pi; q0, f)
∣∣
pi=
2pL
1−q0
=
[
f(pH)− f(pL)]+ f ′(pH)(pL − ( q0
1−q0
)
pL
)
− f ′(1
2
)
(
1− pL
1−q0
)
=
[
(1− 2pL)f ′(1
2
)
]
+ f ′(pH)pL
(
2− 1
1−q0
)
− f ′(1
2
)
(
1− pL
1−q0
)
,
from symmetry condition 3.3,
= pL
(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
) (
2− 1
1−q0
)
> 0,
because 2 > 1
1−q0 for q0 <
1
2
, and f ′(pH) > f ′(1
2
) due to the increasing mono-
tonicity of f ′(·) (since pH > 1
2
). Moreover, since pH = 1− pL,
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G(pi; q0, f)
∣∣
pi=
1−2pL
1−q0
= f(1− pL)− f(1
2
− pL)
+ f ′(pH)
(
pL −
(
q0
1−q0
) (
1
2
− pL))
− f ′(1
2
)
(
1−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
= f(1− pL)− [f(1
2
+ pL)− 2pLf ′(1
2
)
]
+ f ′(pH)
(
1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
− f ′(1
2
)
(
1−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
,
using the symmetry condition (3.3) again,
>
[
f(1− pL)− f(1
2
+ pL)
]
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
− f ′(1
2
)
(
1− 2pL −
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
,
since 1
2
>
1
2
−pL
1−q0 for q0 < 2p
L, f ′(pH) > f ′(1
2
),
>
[
f ′(1
2
+ pL)
(
1
2
− 2pL)]− f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
− 2pL) ,
from the strict convexity of f(·),
= 2
(
1
4
− pL) (f ′(1
2
+ pL)− f ′(1
2
)
)
> 0 for pL < 1
4
,
due to the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·).
Thus, G(pi; q0, f) is a continuous, strictly concave function over [0, 1] with pos-
itive values at both pi = 2p
L
1−q0 and pi =
1−2pL
1−q0 , hence for pi ∈
(
2pL
1−q0 ,
1−2pL
1−q0
]
,
G(pi; q0, f) > 0 =⇒ g1,1(pH ; 12) > g0,0(µ0,0; 12).
Thus finally, we conclude that, for this case too, R̂A has a unique global
maximum at p = pH (HPP).
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Case 1.3 0 < q0 < 2p
L and 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi < 1. In this case,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
> 1
2
− pL > pL, since pL < 1
4
;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
> 1+(1−2p
L)
2
= 1− pL = pH .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [pL, 12 ] and (pH , 1] are
g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
), and g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) at µ0,0 > p
L and µ1,0 > p
H respectively. But,
as in Case 1.2 , g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
); also, since
µ1,0 + µ0,0 =
1
2
+ pi(1− q0) = 1 + 2(14 − pL) > 1 for pL < 14 , pi > 1−2p
L
1−q0 ,
Lemma 9 tells us that g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) < g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
).
All these inequalities involving the local suprema of R̂A over the four sub-
intervals under consideration indicate tha the global maximum of R̂A over
(0, 1) is either g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) at pH or g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) at µ1,0 > p
H . By Lemma 10,
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) R g1,0(µ1,0; 12) ⇐⇒ pi Q pi∗H(q0),
where pi∗H(q0) is the unique zero in (0, 1) of the continuous function FH(pi; q0, f),
defined in (B.9). We already know that limpi↗1FH(pi; q0, f) > 0; also, note that
FH(pi; q0, f)
∣∣
pi=
1−2pL
1−q0
= f(1− pL)− f(pH)
− f ′(pH)
(
pL −
(
q0
1−q0
) (
1
2
− pL))
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
= −
(
1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
)
since 1− pL = pH ,
< 0
since 1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0 > 0 for 1 <
2pL
q0
, and f ′(pH) > f ′(1
2
) due to the increasing
monotonicity of f ′(·). This implies that 1−2pL
1−q0 < pi
∗
H(q0) < 1. Hence, R̂A
has a unique global maximum at p = pH (HPP) for 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi < pi
∗
H(q0), a
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unique global maximum at p = µ1,0 > p
H (LPP) for pi∗H(q0) < pi < 1, and two
equivalent global maxima at p = pH and p = µ1,0 for pi = pi
∗
H(q0).
In particular, in case of LMSR, for which f(r) = r ln r + (1− r) ln(1− r) and
pH = 4/5, (B.9) simplifies to
FH(pi; q0, f) = ln(25(1 + x)1+x(1− x)1−x/64)− x
(
q0
1−q0
)
ln 4,
where x = pi(1−q0). Hence, for LMSR, pi∗H(q0) = x∗L(q0)/(1−q0), where x∗L(q0)
is the unique root of the fixed-point equation x = ln(64/(25(1+x)
1+x(1−x)1−x))( q0
1−q0
)
ln 4
;
x∗L(q0) ∈ (1− 2pL, 1− q0) = (3/5, 1− q0) since pi∗H(q0) ∈
(
1−2pL
1−q0 , 1
)
.
Case 2 q0 = 2p
L In this case, since pi < 1 and pL < 1
4
,
µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
= 1
2
− pipL > 1
2
− pL > pL;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
= 1
2
+ pi
(
1
2
− pL) < 1
2
+ 1
2
− pL = 1− pL = pH ;
µ1,1 = 1− piq02 = 1− pipL > 1− pL = pH .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), (12 , pH ], and (pH , 1] are g0,1(pL; 12),
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively, at pL, pH , pH , satisfying
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) > g0,1(p
L; 1
2
),
from Lemmas 7 and 8 (since q0 <
1
2
) respectively. This makes it impossible for the global
maximum of R̂A to lie in either [0, pL) or (pH , 1].
Now, for pi ≤ 2pL
1−2pL , µ0,0 =
pi(1−2pL)
2
≤ pL so that the local maximum of R̂A over [pL, 12 ] is
g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) at pL. But, g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) from Lemma 8 (since q0 <
1
2
). For pi > 2p
L
1−2pL ,
µ0,0 > p
L so that the local maximum of R̂A over [pL, 12 ] is g0,0(µ0,0; 12) at µ0,0 > pL. In that
case, we need to consider the difference
(
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
)− g0,0(µ0,0; 12)
) ∣∣
q0=2pL
= G(pi; 2pL, f) (see
Case 1.2 ). We can proceed exactly as in Case 1.2 to show that G(pi; 2pL, f) is a continuous,
strictly concave function of pi with G ′′(pi; 2pL, f)∣∣
pi=
2pL
1−2pL
> 0 and G ′′(pi; 2pL, f)∣∣
pi=1
> 0 (note
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that 1−2p
L
1−q0 = 1 for q0 = 2p
L); hence G(pi; 2pL, f) > 0 ∀pi
(
2pL
1−2pL , 1
)
, implying g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) <
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), again.
Thus, for 0 < pi < 1, R̂A has a unique global maximum at p = pH (HPP).
Case 3 2pL < q0 <
1
2
In this case, 2p
L
1−q0 <
2pL
q0
< 1 < 1−2p
L
1−q0 <
1−2pL
q0
.
Case 3.1 2pL < q0 <
1
2
and 0 < pi ≤ 2pL
q0
. In this case,
µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
≥ 1
2
− pL > pL since pL < 1
4
;
µ1,1 = 1− piq02 ≥ 1− pL = pH .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL) and (12 , pH ] are
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) and g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) at pL and pH respectively.
Now, for 0 < pi ≤ 2pL
1−q0 ,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
≤ pL;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
≤ 1
2
+ pL = 3
2
− pH < pH since pH > 3
4
.
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [pL, 12 ] and (pH , 1] are
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) at pL and pH respectively, satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
)
from Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 <
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Thus, R̂A has a unique
global maximum at p = pH (HPP).
Again, for 2p
L
1−q0 < pi ≤
2pL
q0
,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
> pL;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
< 1+(1−2p
L)
2
= 1− pL = pH since pi < 1−2pL
1−q0 .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [pL, 12 ] and (pH , 1] are
g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) at µ0,0 > p
L and pH respectively. But g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) <
146
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) from , and since µ0,0 is the global maximum of g0,0(·; 12), we also
have g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) > g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) > g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), the last inequality following from
Lemma 7. Thus, the contention for the global maximum of R̂A is between
g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) at µ0,0 > p
L and g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) at pH .
Again, as in Case 1.2 and Case 2, we have to consider the function G(pi; q0, f) =
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
)−g0,0(µ0,0; 12) for q0 ∈ (2pL, 12). We already know that it is a continu-
ous, strictly concave function with a positive value at pi = 2p
L
1−q0 for 0 < q0 <
1
2
.
Also, proceeding as in Case 2, we can show that
G(pi; q0, f)
∣∣
pi=
2pL
q0
> 2p
L
q0
(
1
2
− q0
) (
f ′(1− µ0,0)− f ′(12)
)
, µ0,0 =
pL(1−q0)
q0
,
> 0, since 1− µ0,0 > 12 , q0 < 12 .
Hence, for 2p
L
1−q0 < pi ≤
2pL
q0
, G(pi; q0, f) > 0, i.e. g1,1(pH ; 12) > g0,0(µ0,0; 12), so
that in this case, too, R̂A has a unique global maximum at p = pH (HPP).
Case 3.2 2pL < q0 <
1
2
and 2p
L
q0
< pi < 1. In this case,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
> pL since pi > 2p
L
1−q0 ;
µ0,1 > µ0,0 > p
L from inequalities (B.5);
µ1,1 = 1− piq02 < 1− pL = pH ;
µ1,0 < µ1,1 < p
H from inequalities (B.5).
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ] and
(pH , 1] are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
), g1,1(µ1,1;
1
2
), and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) at pL, µ0,0 > p
L,
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µ1,1 < p
H and pH respectively, satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) from Lemma 7,
< g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) since µ0,0 is the maximizer of g0,0(·; 12),
< g1,1(µ1,1;
1
2
)
from Lemma 9 since µ1,1 + µ0,0 = 1 + pi(
1
2
− q0)
for q0 <
1
2
;
g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) from Lemma 7,
< g1,1(µ1,1;
1
2
) since µ1,1 is the maximizer of g1,1(·; 12).
Thus, R̂A has a unique global maximum at p = µ1,1 (LPP).
Case 4 q0 =
1
2
Here, we just need the following two sub-cases.
Case 4.1 q0 =
1
2
and 0 < pi ≤ 4pL.
µ0,0 =
pi
4
≤ pL;
µ0,1 =
1
2
− pi
4
≥ 1
2
− pL > pL since pL < 1
4
;
µ1,0 =
1
2
+ pi
4
≤ 1
2
+ pL = 3
2
− pH < pH since pH > 3
4
;
µ1,1 = 1− pi4 ≥ 1− pL = pH .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ] and
(pH , 1] are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) at pL, pL, pH and
pH respectively, satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) = g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
)
from Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 =
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Hence, R̂A has two
equivalent global maxima at p = pL and p = pH (HPP).
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Case 4.2 q0 =
1
2
and 4pL < pi < 1.
µ0,0 =
pi
4
> pL;
µ0,1 > µ0,0 > p
L;
µ1,1 = 1− pi4 < 1− pL = pH ;
µ1,0 < µ1,1 < p
H .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ] and
(pH , 1] are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
), g1,1(µ1,1;
1
2
), and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) at pL, µ0,0 >
pL, µ1,1 < p
H and pH respectively. This situation is similar to in Case 3.2
with the only difference that g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) = g1,1(µ1,1;
1
2
) from Lemma 9 since
µ1,1 + µ0,0 = 1 for q0 =
1
2
. Hence, R̂A has two equivalent global maxima at
p = µ0,0 and p = µ1,1 (LPP).
Case 5 1
2
< q0 < 1 By symmetry, the analysis is similar to that for 0 < q0 <
1
2
(Cases 1,
2, and 3 combined), and is thus omitted.
B.2.2 Analysis for symmetric well-behaved MSRs with pL = 14,
pH = 34, e.g. QMSR
Case 1 0 < q0 <
1
2
Note that 0 < 1
2(1−q0) < 1 for these values of q0. We need to consider
the following sub-cases:
Case 1.1 0 < q0 <
1
2
and 0 < pi < 1
2(1−q0) . In this case,
µ0,1 >
1−1·1
2
2
= 1
4
= pL since pi < 1, q0 <
1
2
;
µ0,0 =
1
4
· (2pi(1− q0)) < 14 = pL;
µ1,1 > 1− 1·
1
2
2
= 3
4
= pH ;
µ1,0 =
1
4
· (2 + 2pi(1− q0)) < 14 · (2 + 1) = 34 = pH .
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Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively at pL, pL, pH , pH ,
satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
),
due to Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 <
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Hence, R̂A has a unique
global maximum at p = pH .
Case 1.2 0 < q0 <
1
2
and pi = 1
2(1−q0) . In this case,
µ0,0 =
1
2
2
= 1
4
= pL;
µ0,1 > µ0,0 = p
L from (B.5);
µ1,0 =
1+
1
2
2
= 3
4
= pH ;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 = p
H from (B.5).
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively at pL, pL, pH , pH ,
satisying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
),
due to Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 <
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Hence, R̂A has a
unique global maximum at p = pH = µ1,0, making the two equilibrium domains
indistinguishable.
Case 1.3 0 < q0 <
1
2
and 1
2(1−q0) < pi < 1. In this case,
µ0,0 =
1
4
· (2pi(1− q0)) > 14 = pL;
µ0,1 > µ0,0 > p
L;
µ1,0 =
1
4
· (2 + 2pi(1− q0)) > 14 · (2 + 1) = 34 = pH ;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 > p
H .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) respectively at pL, µ0,0, p
H , µ1,0.
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Note that µ0,0 +µ1,0 =
1
2
+pi(1− q0) > 1 since pi > 12(1−q0) . So, from Lemma 9,
g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) > g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
)
> g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) since µ0,0 is the maximizer of g0,0(·; 12),
> g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), from Lemma 7.
Thus, neither g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
) at µ0,0 nor g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) at pL can be the global max-
imum – it is either g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) at µ1,0 or g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) at pH . Recall, from
Lemma 10 , that
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) R g1,0(µ1,0; 12) ⇐⇒ pi Q pi∗H(q0),
where pi∗H(q0) is the unique zero in (0, 1) of the continuous function FH(pi; q0, f),
defined in (B.9). We already know that limpi↗1FH(pi; q0, f) > 0, in general.
Now, for pH = 3
4
and 0 < q0 <
1
2
, we obtain
lim
pi↘ 1
2(1−q0)
FH(pi; q0, f) = f(34)− f(34)− f ′(34)
(
1
4
− q0
4(1−q0)
)
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
− 1
4(1−q0)
)
< −f ′(1
2
)
(
1
4
− q0
4(1−q0)
)
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
− 1
4(1−q0)
)
= 0,
the inequality following from the fact that f ′(3
4
) > f ′(1
2
) due to the increasing
monotonicity of f ′(·), and 1
4
− q0
4(1−q0) > 0 for q0 <
1
2
.
Thus, R̂A has a unique global maximum at pH for 12(1−q0) < pi < pi∗H(q0), a
unique global maximum at µ1,0 for pi
∗
H(q0) < pi < 1, and two equivalent global
maxima at pH and µ1,0 > p
H for pi = pi∗H(q0).
In particular, for QMSR, we have f(r) = r2, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 in addition to pH = 3
4
,
so that
FH(pi; q0, f) = (1−q0)24
[
pi2 + q0
(1−q0)2pi − 34(1−q0)2
]
on simplication,
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which is a quadratic polynomial in pi. Using the quadratic formula and dis-
carding the inadmissible negative root of FH(pi; q0, f) = 0, we obtain
pi∗H(q0) =
− q0
(1−q0)2 +
1
1−q0
√( q0
1−q0
)2
+3
2
=
(
√
3+v2−v)/2
1−q0 ,
where v = q0
1−q0 .
Case 2 q0 =
1
2
In this case, for 0 < pi < 1,
µ0,1 =
1
2
− pi
4
> 1
2
− 1
4
= 1
4
= pL;
µ0,0 =
pi
4
< 1
4
= pL;
µ1,1 > 1− 1·
1
2
2
= 3
4
= pH ;
µ1,0 =
1
2
+ pi
4
< 1
2
+ 1
4
= 3
4
= pH .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1] are g0,1(pL; 12),
g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively at pL, pL, pH , pH , satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) = g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
),
due to Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 =
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Hence, for any pi ∈ (0, 1), R̂A has
two equivalent global maxima at p = pL and p = pH .
Case 3 1
2
< q0 < 1 By symmetry, the analysis is similar to that for 0 < q0 <
1
2
(Case 1 ),
and is thus omitted.
B.2.3 Analysis for symmetric well-behaved MSRs with 14 < p
L < 12,
1
2 < p
H < 34, e.g. SMSR
Note that, for such scoring rules, 0 < 1− 2pL < 1
2
< 2pL < 1.
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Case 1 0 < q0 < 1− 2pL In this case, 2pLq0 >
1−2pL
q0
> 1; also, 0 < 1−2p
L
1−q0 <
2pL
1−q0 < 1.
Case 1.1 0 < q0 < 1− 2pL and 0 < pi ≤ 1−2pL1−q0 . Then,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
< pL since pi ≤ 1−2pL
1−q0 <
2pL
1−q0 ;
µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
> 1−(1−2p
L)
2
= pL since pi < 1 < 1−2p
L
q0
;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
≤ 1+(1−2pL)
2
= 1− pL = pH ,
equality holding only if pi = 1−2p
L
1−q0 ;
µ1,1 = 1− piq02 > 1− pL since pi < 1 < 2p
L
q0
,
= pH since pH = 1− pL.
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively at pL, pL, pH , pH ,
satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
),
due to Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 <
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Hence, R̂A has a unique
global maximum at p = pH .
Case 1.2 0 < q0 < 1− 2pL and 1−2pL1−q0 < pi ≤
2pL
1−q0 . Then,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
≤ pL, equality holding only if pi = 2pL
1−q0 ;
µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
> 1−(1−2p
L)
2
= pL since pi < 1 < 1−2p
L
q0
;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
> 1+(1−2p
L)
2
= 1− pL = pH ;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 = p
H by (B.5).
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) respectively at pL, pL, pH , µ1,0,
satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) < g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
),
due to Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 <
1
2
), and 7 respectively.
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Hence, the global maximum of R̂A must be either g1,1(pH ; 12) at pH or g1,0(µ1,0; 12)
at µ1,0 > p
H . By Lemma 10 ,
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) R g1,0(µ1,0; 12) ⇐⇒ pi Q pi∗H(q0),
where pi∗H(q0) is the unique zero in (0, 1) of the continuous function FH(pi; q0, f),
defined in (B.9). Note that
lim
pi↘1−2p
L
1−q0
FH(pi; q0, f) = f(1+(1−2pL)2 )− f(pH)
− f ′(pH)
(
pL −
(
q0
1−q0
) (
1
2
− pL))
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
= −f ′(pH)
(
pL +
(
1− 1
1−q0
) (
1
2
− pL))
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)
,
since 1+1−2p
L
2
= 1− pL = pH .
= −
(
1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0
)(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
)
< 0
since 1
2
−
1
2
−pL
1−q0 > 0 for 1 <
2pL
q0
, and f ′(pH) > f ′(1
2
) due to the increasing mono-
tonicity of f ′(·). From this, we can conclude that pi∗H(q0) > 1−2p
L
1−q0 . However,
we have not been able to prove (or disprove) that pi∗H(q0) <
2pL
1−q0 for a general
f(·) satisfying pL > 1
4
and for q0 < 1− 2pL. Our conjecture is that the relative
magnitudes of pi∗H(q0) and
2pL
1−q0 depend on the form of f(·) and the exact value
of pL, and hence, so does the value of pi ∈
(
1−2pL
1−q0 ,
2pL
1−q0
]
beyond which the
global maximizer of R̂A switches from pH to µ1,0 > pH , if it does switch at all.
But the inability to determine the conditions under which pi∗H(q0) lies below or
above 2p
L
1−q0 does not in any way detract from our analysis, as we shall show in
conjunction with the findings in Case 1.3 below.
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Case 1.3 0 < q0 < 1− 2pL and 2pL1−q0 < pi < 1. Then,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
> pL since pi > 2p
L
1−q0 ;
µ0,1 > µ0,0 > p
L by (B.5);
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
> 1+(1−2p
L)
2
= 1− pL = pH ,
since pi > 2p
L
1−q0 >
1−2pL
1−q0 ;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 = p
H by (B.5).
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) ,g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) respectively at pL, µ0,0 , p
H ,
µ1,0. Now, for pi >
2pL
1−q0 where p
L > 1
4
, we have µ1,0 + µ0,0 =
1
2
+ pi(1 − q0) >
1
2
+ 2pL > 1. Thus, from Lemma 9,
g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) > g0,0(µ0,0;
1
2
)
> g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), since µ0,0 is the maximizer of g0,0(·; 12),
> g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), from Lemma 7.
Hence, the global maximum of R̂A must be either g1,1(pH ; 12) at pH or g1,0(µ1,0; 12)
at µ1,0 > p
H , putting us in a position similar to that in Case 1.2 .
Combining the last two cases, we can conclude that R̂A has a unique global
maximum at pH for 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi < pi
∗
H(q0), a unique global maximum at µ1,0 >
pH for 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi < pi
∗
H(q0), and two equivalent global maxima at p
H and
µ1,0 > p
H for pi = pi∗H(q0).
In particular, for SMSR, for which f(r) =
√
r2 + (1− r)2, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, and
pH = 1
2
(
1 +
√√
2−1
2
)
, we have
FH(pi; q0, f) =
√
1+pi2(1−q0)2
2
− 1+γS−γSpiq0√
2(1+γ2S)
, γS =
√√
2−1
2
.
By simple algebra, we can show that the equation FH(pi; q0, f) = 0 reduces to
the quadratic equation
pi2
(
1−
(
γ2S
1+γ2S
)
v2
)
+ 2γS(1+γS)
1+γ2S
· v
1−q0 · pi −
2γS
1+γ2S
· v
(1−q0)2 = 0,
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where v = q0/(1−q0). Using the quadratic formula, discarding the inadmissible
negative root, and simplifying,
pi∗H(q0) =
x∗S(q0)
1−q0 , where
x∗S(q0) =
√
γS(1+γ
2
S)(2+γSv
2)−γS(1+γS)v
(1+γ2S)−γ2Sv2
=
√
K1+K2v2−K3v
1−K2v2 , where
K1 =
2γS
(1+γ2S)
= 2
√
2
(√
2− 1
)3/2
≈ 0.7540;
K2 =
γ2S
1+γ2S
= 3− 2
√
2 ≈ 0.1716;
K3 =
γS(1+γS)
1+γ2S
= 3− 2
√
2 +
√
2
(√
2− 1
)3/2
≈ 0.5486.
Case 2 q0 = 1− 2pL In this case, since pi < 1,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
= pipL < pL;
µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
= 1−pi(1−2p
L)
2
> 1−(1−2p
L)
2
= pL;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
= 1
2
+ pipL;
µ1,1 = 1− piq02 = 12 − pi
(
1−2pL
2
)
.
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL) and [pL, 12 ] are g0,1(pL; 12) and
g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) respectively, both at at pL, satisfying g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) > g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) due to Lemma 7.
But for determining the local suprema over (1
2
, pH ] and (pH , 1], we need further conditions
on pi.
Case 2.1 q0 = 1− 2pL and 0 < pi ≤ 1−2pL2pL . Since pL > 14 , we have
(1− 2pL)2 = 1− 4pL + (2pL)2 < (2pL)2 ⇐⇒ 1−2pL
2pL
< 2p
L
1−2pL .
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Hence,
µ1,0 =
1
2
+ pipL ≤ 1
2
+ 1−2p
L
2
= 1− pL = pH ,
equality holding if and only if pi = 1−2p
L
2pL
;
µ1,1 =
1
2
− pi
(
1−2pL
2
)
> 1− pL = pH , since pi < 2pL
1−2pL .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals (12 , pH ] and (pH , 1] are
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) and g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively, both at at pH , satisfying g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) >
g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) due to . Moreover, since q0 <
1
2
, g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) from
Lemma 8.
Hence, R̂A has a unique global maximum at p = pH .
Case 2.2 q0 = 1− 2pL and 1−2pL2pL < pi < 1. Then,
µ1,0 =
1
2
+ pipL > 1
2
+ 1−2p
L
2
= 1− pL = pH ;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 > p
H .
We already know that g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) > g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), and from Lemma 10
,
g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) R g1,0(µ1,0; 12) ⇐⇒ pi Q pi∗H(q0),
where pi∗H(q0) is the unique zero in (0, 1) of the continuous function FH(pi; q0, f),
defined in (B.9), with limpi↗1FH(pi; q0, f) > 0 for any q0 ∈ (0, 1). Now,
lim
pi↘1−2p
L
2pL
FH(pi; 1− 2pL, f) = f(1− pL)− f(pH)− f ′(pH)
(
pL − (1−2pL)2
4pL
)
+ f ′(1
2
)
(
1
2
− 1−2pL
4pL
)
= −
(
pL−1
4
pL
)(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
)
,
since 1− pL = pH .
< 0,
since pL > 1
4
and f ′(pH) > f ′(1
2
) from the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·). Thus, we can
conclude that 1−2p
L
2pL
< pi∗H(q0) < 1.
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Hence, R̂A has a unique global maximum at pH for 1−2pL2pL < pi < pi∗H(q0), a unique global
maximum at µ1,0 for
1−2pL
2pL
< pi < pi∗H(q0), and two equivalent global maxima at p
H and
µ1,0 > p
H for pi = pi∗H(q0). For SMSR, we can proceed as in Case 1.3 to obtain
pi∗H(q0)
∣∣
q0=1−2pL =
x∗S(q0)
∣∣
q0=1−2pL
2pL
, where
x∗S(q0)
∣∣
q0=1−2pL =
√
γS(1+γ
2
S)(2+γSv
2)−γS(1+γS)v
(1+γ2S)−γ2Sv2
∣∣∣∣∣
v=2pL/(1−2pL)
= γS, since p
L = 1−γS
2
.
⇒ pi∗H(q0)
∣∣
q0=1−2pL =
γS
1−γS ≈ 0.8352.
Case 3 1− 2pL < q0 < 12 In this case, q0 < 2pL since pL > 14 , hence 0 < 1−2p
L
1−q0 < 1 <
2pL
1−q0 ;
also, 0 < 1−2p
L
q0
< 1 < 2p
L
q0
. Moreover, since q0 <
1
2
, we have 1−2p
L
1−q0 <
1−2pL
q0
.
Case 3.1 1− 2pL < q0 < 12 and 0 < pi ≤ 1−2p
L
1−q0 . Then,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
< pL since pi < 1 < 2p
L
1−q0 ;
µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
> 1−(1−2p
L)
2
= pL since pi ≤ 1−2pL
1−q0 <
1−2pL
q0
;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
≤ 1+(1−2pL)
2
= 1− pL = pH ,
equality holding only if pi = 1−2p
L
1−q0 ;
µ1,1 = 1− piq02 > 1− pL since pi < 1 < 2p
L
q0
,
= pH since pH = 1− pL.
Hence, arguing exactly as in Case 1.1 , R̂A has a unique global maximum at
p = pH .
Case 3.2 1− 2pL < q0 < 12 and 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi < 1. Then,
µ0,0 =
pi(1−q0)
2
< pL since pi < 1 < 2p
L
1−q0 ;
µ1,0 =
1+pi(1−q0)
2
> 1+(1−2p
L)
2
= 1− pL = pH ;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 > p
H .
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Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1] are
g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) respectively at pL, pH and µ1,0 > p
H , sat-
isfying g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) by Lemma 8 since q0 =
1
2
. Note that if
1−2pL
1−q0 < pi ≤
1−2pL
q0
, then µ0,1 =
1−piq0
2
≥ pL, so that the local supremum
of R̂A over [0, pL) is g0,1(pL; 12) at pL but g0,1(pL; 12) < g0,0(pL; 12) by Lemma 7;
and if 1−2p
L
q0
< pi < 1, then µ0,1 < p
L, so that the local maximum of R̂A
over [0, pL) is g0,1(µ0,1;
1
2
) at µ0,1 but then g0,1(µ0,1;
1
2
) < g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) since
µ0,1 + µ1,0 = 1 + pi
(
1
2
− q0
)
> 1, by Lemma 9. Thus, as in Case 1.2 , R̂A has a
unique global maximum at pH for 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi < pi
∗
H(q0), a unique global maxi-
mum at µ1,0 > p
H for 1−2p
L
1−q0 < pi < pi
∗
H(q0), and two equivalent global maxima
at pH and µ1,0 > p
H for pi = pi∗H(q0), where pi
∗
H(q0) has the same meaning as in
Case 1.2 , and the same expression for SMSR as specified after Case 1.3 .
Case 4 q0 =
1
2
Note that 0 < 2−4pL < 1 for 1
4
< pL < 1
2
, and pL+pH = 1 by Proposition 2.
Case 4.1 q0 =
1
2
and 0 < pi ≤ 2− 4pL = 4pH − 2. In this case,
µ0,1 =
1
2
− pi
4
≥ 1
2
− 1
2
+ pL = pL,
equality holding if and only if pi = 2− 4pL;
µ0,0 =
pi
4
< 1
4
< pL for pi < 1;
µ1,1 = 1− pi4 > 1− 14 = 34 > pH for pi < 1;
µ1,0 =
1
2
+ pi
4
≤ 1
2
+ pH − 1
2
= pH ,
equality holding if and only if pi = 4pH − 2.
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively at pL, pL, pH , pH ,
satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) = g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
),
due to Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 =
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Hence, R̂A has two
equivalent global maxima at p = pL and p = pH .
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Case 4.2 q0 =
1
2
and pi = 2− 4pL = 4pH − 2.
µ0,1 = p
L;
µ0,0 < µ0,1 = p
L by (B.5);
µ1,0 = p
H ;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 = p
H by (B.5).
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(p
L; 1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
) respectively at pL, pL, pH , pH ,
satisfying
g0,1(p
L; 1
2
) < g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) = g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
) > g1,0(p
H ; 1
2
),
due to Lemmas 7, 8 (since q0 =
1
2
), and 7 respectively. Hence, R̂A has two
equivalent global maxima at p = pL = µ0,1 and p = p
H = µ1,0.
Case 4.3 q0 =
1
2
and 2− 4pL = 4pH − 2 < pi < 1. In this case,
µ0,1 =
1
2
− pi
4
< 1
2
− 1
2
+ pL = pL for pi > 2− 4pL;
µ0,0 < µ0,1 < p
L by (B.5);
µ1,0 =
1
2
+ pi
4
> 1
2
+ pH − 1
2
= pH for pi < 4pH − 2;
µ1,1 > µ1,0 > p
H .
Hence, the local suprema of R̂A over the intervals [0, pL), [pL, 12 ], (12 , pH ], (pH , 1]
are g0,1(µ0,1;
1
2
), g0,0(p
L; 1
2
), g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
), g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
) respectively at µ0,1, p
L, pH , µ1,0,
satisfying
g0,1(µ0,1;
1
2
) = g1,0(µ1,0;
1
2
); g0,0(p
L; 1
2
) = g1,1(p
H ; 1
2
). (B.10)
due to Lemma 8 since q0 =
1
2
. Again, as in Case 1.3 and Case 2.2 , we now need
to consider the equation FH(pi; q0, f)
∣∣
q0=
1
2
= 0; note that limpi↗1FH(pi; 12 , f) >
0, and
lim
pi↘4pH−2
FH(pi; 12 , f) = −2
(
f ′(pH)− f ′(1
2
)
) (
3
4
− pH) < 0,
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since pH < 3
4
, and f ′(pH) > f ′(1
2
) due to the increasing monotonicity of f ′(·).
Hence, the root of this equation pi∗ ∈ (2− 4pL, 1), so we can conclude that R̂A
has two equivalent global maxima at pL, pH for pi < pi∗, two equivalent global
maxima at µ0,1 < p
L, µ1,0 > p
H for pi > pi∗, and four equivalent global maxima
at µ0,1, p
L, pH , µ1,0 for pi = pi
∗.
For SMSR, as before,
pi∗(1
2
) =
x∗S(q0)
∣∣
q0=
1
2
1
2
, where
x∗S(q0)
∣∣
q0=
1
2
=
√
γS(1+γ
2
S)(2+γSv
2)−γS(1+γS)v
(1+γ2S)−γ2Sv2
∣∣∣∣∣
v=1
⇒ pi∗H(12) = 2
(√
γS(1 + γ2S)(2 + γS)− γS(1 + γS)
)
≈ 0.9983 , pi∗S, since γS =
√√
2−1
2
.
Case 5 1
2
< q0 < 1 By symmetry, the analysis is similar to that for 0 < q0 <
1
2
(Cases 1,
2, and 3 combined), and is thus omitted.
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Appendix C
Proofs of results in Chapter 4
We now provide the proofs of Proposition 3 and Theorem 7 from Chapter 4; please refer to
the chapter for the meanings of all symbols used here.
Throughout this appendix, we assume that σz = 1, µ0, and 0 < ρ0 ≤ 1; the latter implies
that only the update equations (4.2) and (4.3) apply.
Let ηt , |µt+1 − µt| = ρ
2
t
√
2/pi√
1+ρ2t
, the step-size of the mean update. The proofs of both main
results rely on the following lemma which shows that ηt = Θ(1/t).
Lemma 11. For ρ0 ≤ 1, ηt < c1
t
and
ηt >
c2ρ
2
0 t ≤ b1/ρ20c,
c2
t
t ≥ b1/ρ20c+ 1,
where c1 =
√
2
pi
(
pi+(pi−2)ρ20
2
)
and c2 =
1
2
√
pi
.
Proof. To deduce the upper bound on ηt: Note that, from the recursion in (4.3), it is
clear that ρ2t > 0 ∀t ≥ 1 since ρ2 > 0; also,
ρ2t+1 = ρ
2
t
[
1 + ρ2t (1− 2/pi)
1 + ρ2t
]
< ρ2t ∀t ≥ 0,
since 0 < 1− 2/pi < 1, ρ2t > 0. Hence,
0 < ρ2t < ρ
2
0 ≤ 1, ∀t ≥ 1. (C.1)
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Note that ηt =
ρ2t
√
2/pi√
1+ρ2t
< ρ2t
√
2
pi
∀t, since
√
1 + ρ2t > 1. Hence, to obtain the required upper
bound c1/t where c1 =
√
2
pi
(
pi+(pi−2)ρ20
2
)
, it suffices to show that
ρ2t <
(
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
2
)
· 1
t
, ∀t ≥ 1. (induction hypothesis)
The inequality is satisfied for t = 1 since
ρ21 =
ρ20
1 + ρ20
(
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
pi
)
<
(
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
2
)
· 1
1
, (base case)
since
ρ20
1+ρ20
< 1, pi > 2. Now, assuming that the hypothesis holds for some t ≥ 1, we have,
from (4.3) again,
ρ2t+1 = ρ
2
t
[
1 + ρ2t (1− 2/pi)
1 + ρ2t (1− 2/pi) + (2/pi)ρ2t
]
= ρ2t
/(
1 +
2/pi
1 + ρ2t (1− 2/pi)
· ρ2t
)
= 1
/( 1
ρ2t
+
2
pi + (pi − 2)ρ2t
)
< 1
/( 1
ρ2t
+
2
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
)
from (C.1),
< 1
/(
t · 2
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
+
2
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
)
, from the induction hypothesis,
=
(
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
2
)
· 1
t+ 1
. (inductive step)
To deduce the lower bound on ηt: First note that, by definition,
ηt >
√
2
pi
· ρ
2
t√
2
=
ρ2t√
pi
∀t ≥ 1, (C.2)
since ρ2t < ρ
2
0 ≤ 1 ∀t ≥ 1. Next, we will establish that
ρ2t >
ρ20
1 + tρ20
∀t ≥ 1. (induction hypothesis)
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The result holds for t = 1 since
ρ21 >
ρ20
1 + ρ20
, since
pi + (pi − 2)ρ20
pi
> 0. (base case)
Returning to the recursion (4.3) and assuming the hypothesis to be true for some t ≥ 1, we
see that,
ρ2t+1 >
ρ2t
1 + ρ2t
=
1
1/ρ2t + 1
>
1
(1 + tρ20)/ρ
2
0 + 1
=
ρ20
1 + tρ20 + ρ
2
0
=
ρ20
1 + (t+ 1)ρ20
. (inductive step)
Now, if 1 ≤ t ≤ b1/ρ20c ≤ 1/ρ20 ∈ [1,∞), then tρ20 ≤ 1 so that ρ2t > ρ
2
0
2
; but, if t ≥ b1/ρ20c+1 >
1/ρ20 > 1, then ρ
2
t >
1
1/ρ20+t
> 1
t+t
= 1
2t
. Combining these results with inequality (C.2), we
obtain the desired lower bound.
We shall now define symbols used in proofs.
Let ∆µt = µt+1−µt; pˆ , Φ(ε) where ε & 0 is a tolerance parameter, as defined in Chapter 4,
and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function; obviously, pˆ > Φ(0) = 0.5.
Also, denote by p+t the probability (from the perspective of someone who knows the true
V as well as the distribution of the zt’s) of the binary signal xt received by the learner at
time-step t is positive, given her current (public) threshold µt, i.e.
p+t = Pr[V + zt ≥ µt|zt ∼ N (0, 1)] = 1− Φ(µt − V ) = Φ(V − µt). (C.3)
Let E[·] denote the expectation (from the perspective of someone who knows the true V
and the learner’s belief updating and threshold-setting heuristics) at time 0 with respect to
the uncertainty in {zi}i<t, and Ext [·] the same with respect to the the uncertainty in the
binary signal xt, given all the relevant available information up to the beginning of epoch t
(including µt).
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Restatement of Proposition 3. There exist absolute positive constants C > 0 and k,
1 ≤ k < pi√2 ≈ 4.443 such that, if t > C/(ρ20εk), then |V | − |E[µt]| < ε.
(Heuristic) proof of Proposition 3. We provide the proof for {V > 0}, that for {V < 0}
being analogous.
Evidently,
Ext [∆µt] = p+t ηt + (1− p+t )(−ηt) = (2p+t − 1)ηt ∀t,
where the value of ηt for every t is predetermined and known right from t = 0. If ξt , E [µt],
then
ξt+1 = ξt + 2(E[p+t − 0.5]).
First note that, as long as µt < V (which is the scenario we are interested in) which implies
that p+t > 0.5, we have ξt > 0 ∀t ≥ 1 since ξ0 = 0. Moreover, if we wait until (V − µt) is
small enough (with a high probability) to use the following first-order approximation based
on a Maclaurin series expansion
Φ(V − µt) ≈ Φ(0) + Φ′(0)(V − µt) ⇐⇒ Φ(V − µt)− 0.5 ≈ V − µt√
2pi
,
then, from (C.3) and using the linearity of expectation,
∆ξt ≈
√
2
pi
(V − ξt)ηt∆t, (C.4)
where ∆ξt = ∆ξt+1 −∆ξt, ∆t = 1.
Let tα denote the number of time-steps such that
max
t∈{0,··· ,tα}
µt ≥ V − α
with probability at least (1− δ) where 0 < δ  1, and α is small enough for the above linear
approximation to be reasonable (but α is still larger than and independent of the tolerance
parameter ε in the theorem statement). From Theorem 7 in Chapter 4, we already know25
25Although we have not proved this theorem yet, the proof (provided at the end of this appendix) does
not assume Proposition 3; hence all our statements are consistent.
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that tα = O(e
V/α/ρ20) and is obviously independent of ε. Since the process has already
crossed V −α (a value close to V ) within tα and the step-size ηt only becomes progressively
smaller, we can say intuitively that µt is above V −α with a very high probability for t > tα.
Also, for such large values of t, we can use the fact that ηt = Θ(1/t) to get the following
approximate difference equation, from (C.4):
∆ξt =
c
√
2/pi
t
(V − ξt)∆t, for some constant c, c2 ≤ c ≤ c1.
Let tε be the time taken by ξt to “hit” (i.e. cross for the first time) V − ε. Since we are
interested in the case ε → 0, we can assume that tε > tα, and the deterministic quantity
ξtα = E[µtα ] is less than V (otherwise, there is nothing to prove). Then, taking a continuous
approximation (a differential equation) to the above difference equation and integrating
between the proper limits, ∫ V−ε
ξtα
dξ
V − ξ = c
√
2/pi
∫ tε
tα
dt
t
=⇒ ln
(
V − ξtα
ε
)
= c
√
2/pi ln
(
tε
tα
)
=⇒ tε = tα
(
V − ξtα
ε
)k
where k = 1
c
√
pi
2
. Using the value of c2 from Lemma 11, we get the upper bound on k stated
in the theorem; although c1 gives us a (loose) lower bound on k that is smaller than 1, we
recall from Theorem 6 that we cannot have an asymptotic bound on the convergence time
sub-linear in 1/ε, hence we must have k ≥ 1. 
Restatement of Theorem 7. Fix 0 < δ < 1, 0 < ε < V , 0 < ρ0 ≤ 1, and define
∆ = V − ε. There is an absolute constant C > 0 such that if t > T = eC(ln(1/δ)+∆)/ε/ρ20, then
with probability at least 1− δ, maxi≤t µi > V − ε.
Proof of Theorem 7. Given the initial belief distribution N (0, ρ0), the value of ρt, and
hence of ηt, for each t ≥ 0 is completely determined. Thus, after t time-steps, the learner
could attain any one of at most 2t pre-defined values of µt each corresponding to a unique
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path of the form
[
(0, 0), (µ(1), 1), ..., (µ(t), t)
]
in the (µ, t)-space, where µ(t) denotes one of the
possible mean beliefs that the learner could have at time t. With this insight, we define a
reinforcement learning setting in which each such path is a state of the learner.
Define S = {s = [(0, 0), ..., (µ(t), t)] ;µ(t) < V − ε}. Obviously, for any s in S, from (C.3),
p+t > pˆ = Φ (ε) > 0.5.
After a binary signal is received, µt can only move “upward” or “downward” by the amount
ηt, so that any state s ∈ S can only transition to one of two states which we denote by
[s; (µ(t) + ηt, t + 1)] and [s; (µ(t) − ηt, t + 1)] respectively. For a given time-horizon [0, τ ],
let us define pi as the policy which assigns to any state s ∈ S the constant probability pˆ
of moving upward to the state [s; (µ(t) + ηt, t + 1)], and pi
′ the policy as that which assigns
the state-contingent probability p+t to the same upward transition (pi
′ corresponds to our
approximate inference algorithm) with the following exceptions: If any transtion results in
a state
[
(0, 0), ..., (µ(t), t)
]
where µt > V − ε or t = τ , then under either policy (pi or pi′) the
process passes into a dead state at the next transtion and remains in that state forever. To
each transtion we assign a reward 1 if the transtion results in a state with the final µt above
V − ε and 0 otherwise; all transtions to the dead state have zero reward. The state value
function Vpτ (s) for state s ∈ S under policy p ∈ {pi, pi′} is defined as the the limit, as γ → 1, of
the infinite-horizon geometrically discounted, by a factor γ, sum of expected rewards. From
the definition of states and rewards, it readily follows that Vpτ (s) is the probability that at
least one of the states in the interval [t, τ ] has its last µ-value exceeding (V − ε), starting
from state s under the policy p:
Vpτ (s) = Pr
({
max
t≤i≤τ
µ(i) ≥ V − ε
}
|p
)
.
The following lemma formalizes the notion that the policy pi′ dominates pi.
Lemma 12. For any s =
[
(0, 0), ..., (µ(t), t)
] ∈ S, where t < τ , Vpi′τ (s) ≥ Vpiτ (s).
In particular, for the initial state ϕ = [(0, 0)], Vpi′τ (ϕ) ≥ Vpiτ (ϕ).
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We will provide the proof of the above lemma after the main proof, but will now focus on
deducing a lower bound on Vpiτ (ϕ) for the dominated process.
Vpiτ (ϕ) = Pr
({
max
i≤τ
µ(i) ≥ V − ε
}
|pi
)
≥ Pr (µ(τ) ≥ V − ε|pi) since {µ(τ) ≥ V − ε} ⊆ {max
i≤τ
µ(i) ≥ V − ε}
= Pr
[
µ(τ) − E
[
µ(τ)
] ≥ −(2pˆ− 1) τ−1∑
t=0
ηt + ∆
∣∣pi] , where ∆ = V − ε.
The last equality follows from the observation that, for any s ∈ S under pi, E [∆µt] =
(2pˆ − 1)ηt ∀t ≥ 0 so that µ(t) is the sum of i.i.d. random variables {∆µi}t−1i=0 and has
expectation (2pˆ− 1)∑t−1i=0 ηi.
Using the lower bound on ηt from Lemma 11 and the inequality (which, in turn, follows from
the strictly decreasing monotonicity of 1/t)
t2∑
t=t1
1
t
>
∫ t2+1
t1
dt
t
= ln( t2+1
t1
), (C.5)
we can show that
(2pˆ− 1)
τ−1∑
t=0
ηt −∆ > 0 for τ > τ ′ =
(
b 1
ρ20
c+ 1
)
exp
(
2
√
pi∆
2pˆ− 1
)
. (C.6)
Hence, for τ > τ ′, by Hoeffding inequality (see e.g. Boucheron et al. (2004)), we have
Pr
[
µ(τ) ≥ V − ε|pi
] ≥ 1− δ for δ ≥ exp[−2 ((2pˆ− 1)∑τ−1t=0 ηt −∆)2∑τ−1
t=0 (2ηt)
2
]
.
Combining this result with Lemma 12, we conclude that the above inequality also holds for
our algorithm, i.e. Pr
[
µ(τ) ≥ V − ε|pi′
] ≥ 1− δ.
On rearranging the inequality of interest, we find that, for any given δ, it is sufficient for τ
to satisfy
(2pˆ− 1)
τ−1∑
t=0
ηt −∆ ≥
√√√√2 ln(1/δ) τ−1∑
t=0
η2t
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Combining the lower bound on ηt from Lemma 11 with the inequality (C.5) as before, and
using result (i) presented below, we can obtain a lower bound on the above L.H.S. that
is linear in ε and logarithmic in τ ; moreover, using result (ii) stated below, we can also
obtain an upper bound on the above R.H.S. that is independent of ε, τ and sub-linear in
ln(1/δ). Further, taking (C.6) into consideration (which accounts for the linear dependence
on 1/ρ20 and exponential dependence on ∆), we obtain the desired asymptotic convergence
time bound.
(i) From the strict concavity of Φ(x) for x ≥ 0,
2pˆ− 1 = 2[Φ(ε)− 0.5] = 2[Φ(ε)− Φ(0)] > 2N(ε)ε,
where N(x) = Φ′(x) = e−x
2/2/
√
2pi is the standard normal probability density function.
Also, since N(x) is strictly decreasing for x ≥ 0 and it is possible to obtain a small
positive constant, say λ, that exceeds all interesting values of ε, we conclude that 2pˆ−1
is bounded below by the linear (in ε) expression 2N(λ)ε.
(ii) From Lemma 11, η2t < c
2
1/t
2, and, for any t1 ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, t2 ∈ {t1 + 1, t1 + 2, . . .},
t2∑
t=t1
1
t2
<
∞∑
t=1
1
t2
= ζ(2) =
pi2
6
,
where ζ(·) denotes the Riemann zeta function (Riemann, 1859).

Proof of Lemma 12. For an arbitrary s ∈ S, define
V+ = Vpiτ ([s;
(
X(t) + ηt+1, t+ 1
)
]), V− = Vpiτ ([s;
(
X(t) − ηt+1, t+ 1
)
]).
By the definition of policy pi,
Vpiτ (s) = pˆV+ + (1− pˆ)V−.
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Figure C.1: An example demonstrating that, for any µH > µL, if there is a path from µL
that crosses V − ε within a time-horizon then the identical path from µH also crosses V − ε
within that horizon.
Given the nature of the random walk, induced by pi, the probability of crossing the barrier
V − ε within a given time horizon starting from µH = µ(t) + ηt+1 is at least as large as that
starting from µL = µ(t) − ηt+1 at the same epoch, i.e. V+ ≥ V−.
To see why this is true, define a path to be a sequence of upward and downward movements
(i.e. a sequence of +1’s and −1’s) over a fixed number of epochs and the length of the path
to be the number of epochs the path spans. Under pi, a path of a given length from µH has
the same probability as the corresponding path of the same length from µL since the upward
(resp. downward) probability at a given epoch is fixed at pˆ (resp. 1− pˆ).
Let (xt, xt+1, · · · , xT ) ∈ {+1,−1}T−t+1 denote a feasible path starting from µL at time t and
crossing (V − ε) within the horizon [t, T ]. Then the corresponding path from µH also crosses
(V − ε) within the specified horizon since
V − ε ≤ µL +
τ∑
i=t
xiηi < µ
H +
τ∑
i=t
xiηi.
This implies that there are at least as many paths from µH as from µL that cross the
barrier within a time horizon. This completes the argument since paths represent mutually
exclusive ways of crossing (V − ε), and hence the overall probability of crossing is the sum
of the probabilities of individual paths. Figure C.1 provides an illustration.
Thus, using well-known terminology from the reinforcement learning literature, let us con-
sider a single deviation strategy under which the action in an arbitrarily chosen s in S is
given by pi′(s) while the action in every other state s′ ∈ S, s′ 6= s remains pi(s′). Then, the
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state-action value for this state s is given by
Qpi (s, pi′(s)) = p+t V+ + (1− p+t )V−
= p+t (V+ − V−) + V−
> pˆ(V+ − V−) + V−, since p+t > pˆ,V+ − V− ≥ 0,
= pˆV+ + (1− pˆ)V−
= Vpiτ (s).
Since the state s is arbitrarily chosen, we conclude that that the single deviation strategy
improves the value for every state in S. Hence, by the strong form of the policy improvement
theorem of reinforcement learning (see Sutton and Barto (1998) Sec. 4.2), if the action for
every state s ∈ S is changed to pi′(s) from pi(s), then Vpi′τ (s) ≥ Vpiτ (s) ∀s ∈ S. 
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